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In 1957, Governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to prevent
the integration of Little Rock Central High. In response, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
sent elements of the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to ensure that nine black
students could attend the school unmolested by a riotous mob. The Little Rock crisis is
usually studied as a landmark event in the civil rights movement, but it can be further
examined as key event in the Cold War, which illuminates several interesting aspects of
the crisis. First, it reveals the background of the segregated Arkansas National Guard and
the newly-integrated 101st immediately before the Little Rock mission. Second, the
plans, orders, and actions taken in the name of enforcing court orders can position the
Little Rock mission as the Army viewed it – as a test of military readiness and military
strategy. Finally, a focus on the soldiers themselves reveals how and why they performed
their duty, and how they reconciled their identity with their military service during the
integration crisis. Southerners in uniform followed orders for a number of reasons –
professionalism, a Cold War ethos, and because their duty “protected” white society from
a variety of threats, such as violent Klansmen, the Red Menace, federal interlopers,
segregationist teenagers, and violations of Southern social taboos. By “protecting” the
entire South, white and black, and the soldiers defended concepts of paternalism and
white sovereignty even as they protected black activists and established a pattern of
action which ultimately advanced the cause of racial justice.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

1

Introduction

1

2

The Guard

15

3

Faubus

37

4

Integration Wednesday

76

5

Skilled, Tough, and Ready Around the Clock

99

6

The Mob

129

7

Fort Central

151

8

America’s Day

182

9

The Palace Guard

210

10 The Setback

241

11 Living Hell

271

12 The Close Out

302

13 Conclusion

323

References

341

iii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
September 2, 1957, 6:40 AM. It was over in a blinding flash. A few miles
northwest of Yucca Lake, Nevada, a 500-foot-tall tower rooted in the hard desert pan
disintegrated instantly under the destructive power of a bomb equivalent to 10,000 tons of
TNT. The mushroom cloud from SHOT GALILEO rose 37,000 feet into the air amidst a
rumbling roar that shook the desert floor. At ground zero, temperatures soared to 3,000
degrees Fahrenheit. It was the sixteenth nuclear explosion in the blazing Nevada desert
that summer.
Five thousand yards away, 130 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division
crouched in foxholes, buffeted by 100-mile-per-hour winds stirred up by SHOT
GALILEO. When the thermal and concussion wave had passed over them, they
immediately rose and began disassembling and reassembling their weapons as a test to
determine “how a fighting man thinks and acts in the wake of a nuclear blast.”1 After this
timed exercise, the paratroopers cleared a path through a simulated minefield, and
negotiated “an infiltration course.”2 Clipboards in hand, scientists scurried along after the
paratroopers, making careful observation of the performance in the shadow of the
mushroom cloud.3 Overhead, two Air National Guard pilots made reconnaissance flights

1. “Paratroopers Exposed to Powerful A-Bomb Blast,” Toledo Blade, September 3, 1957,
2.
2. Shot GALILEO: a test of the PLUMBBOB series, 2 September 1957, United States
Defense Nuclear Agency, 21.
3. “Paratroopers Exposed to Powerful A-Bomb Blast,” 2.
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to “assess the blast damage by means of photographic techniques.”4 Whatever the
possibilities of a nuclear war may have been for the rest of America, for these men it had
already come to pass.
Six hours after SHOT GALILEO, and some 2,000 miles away, Arkansas
Governor Orval Eugene Faubus set another military operation into motion by ordering
the commander of the Arkansas National Guard, Major General Sherman T. Clinger, to
move troops to the campus of Little Rock Central High in order to prevent “disorder,
violence, and destruction of property.”5 Faubus’s orders had the symbolic impact of a
nuclear bomb, devastating the city and shocking the nation and the world. A few days
later, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev told Eleanor Roosevelt during an interview that
the “small republics” that made up “the whole state of the USSR” were “equal in rights.”6
America’s racial inequality, and Little Rock school integration, suddenly became part of
the Cold War.
On September 4, nine black students attempted to enter the school, but Faubus’s
Guardsmen turned them away. While the Guard maintained law and order that day – no
one was injured under their watch over the course of the next eighteen days – newsman

Will Counts captured on film the rage of the white crowd at the school as it seethed
behind fifteen-year-old black student Elizabeth Eckford.

4. Shot GALILEO, 43.
5. Orval Faubus, Down from the Hills (Little Rock, AR: Democrat Printing &
Lithographing Company, 1980), 207.
6. Eleanor Roosevelt, “Interview with Nikita Kruschev,” My Day, October 3-8, 1957.
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/documents/columns/kruschev_interview.cfm (accessed April 29,
2012).
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This ugly conflict drew Faubus into a fruitless meeting with President Dwight
Eisenhower on September 14, and when the court placed an injunction on Faubus to
cease his interference at Central High, he removed the troops on September 20 rather
than order them to assist in the integration effort. On Monday, September 23, the Little
Rock Police Department attempted to follow the court orders and integrate the school, but
a savage mob convinced the police to remove the black students after only a few hours.
Eisenhower, incensed at the lawlessness portrayed in newspapers and on television, sent
the 101st Airborne Division into Little Rock on September 24. The following morning,
September 25, the group which soon came to be known as the “Little Rock Nine” walked
through the front doors of Little Rock Central High School under a heavy military escort
of U.S. Army paratroopers.
These nine black students – Earnest Green, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas,
Melba Beals, Carlotta Walls, Elizabeth Eckford, Gloria Ray, Thelma Mothershed, and
Minnijean Brown – were the heroes of one of the most important struggles in civil rights
history. Over the next several months they were beaten, pushed, tripped, and spit upon at
the school. They faced hostile mobs, received telephone death threats, and watched as
crosses burned on their lawns. Their efforts, however, forced a societal change.
This is the well-known story of the integration of Central High School, an
important and oft-told chapter of the civil rights movement. And while the Little Rock
Nine have certainly earned the respect and accolades they have received, it is also
important to remember that they did not break through the color line at Little Rock alone.
The most direct and essential help came from the U.S. Army’s new elite – and racially
integrated – unit, the 101st Airborne Division. What is perhaps lesser-known is that the
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paratroopers stayed only until the end of November; then the men of the federalized
Arkansas National Guard, a rigidly segregated all-white unit of southern state militia,
assumed security for the school and the nine black students for the remainder of the
school year.
The Central High crisis has traditionally, and properly, been told as a civil rights
story, from the viewpoint of the civil rights activists. But an interesting story can be told
by examining the soldiers involved in the crisis – both those in the elite 101st, and the
South’s own citizen-soldiers. This task requires an understanding of the military culture
of these units, as well as the policies that created them.
This work explores the Little Rock crisis in three ways. First, it views the event as
a military operation in the context of the Cold War, examining the background of the
Arkansas National Guard and the 101st prior to the launch of the Little Rock mission.
Second, it recounts the mission as the Army viewed it – the plans, orders, and actions the
soldiers undertook in the name of enforcing court orders. Finally, it studies the social
context of the soldiers themselves: how and why they performed their duty, and how they
reconciled their identity with their military service during the integration crisis.
The nine-month-long mission involved some 11,000 active duty and reserve
troops, and proved to be an important operation for the modern United States military.
Little Rock simultaneously tested Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor’s concept
of airborne troops as a “flexible response” force. The airborne troopers of Taylor’s
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) “invaded” Arkansas by air in a matter of hours,
presenting fierce opposition to any recalcitrant agitators in the city. Over the course of the
next few days, they deftly handled a touchy situation in the state capital without any
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serious casualties. The operation was in many ways a dress rehearsal for a “fire brigade”
designed to drop into various Cold War “brush fire wars.”7 After the Sputnik launch on
November 4, the Pentagon replaced the paratroopers with Guardsmen in case the STRAC
were needed during the increased world tensions. This happened even quicker than the
Army might have anticipated: in May, 1958, as federalized Guardsmen still patrolled
Little Rock Central High, 500 paratroopers of the 101st flew 1,740 miles to Puerto Rico
in only 17 hours, to standby in case Vice President Nixon needed rescuing from unruly
pro-communist crowds in Caracas, Venezuela.8 Thus, the lessons from Little Rock were
applied almost immediately.
The Little Rock mission also cemented the National Guard’s position as a modern
reserve force, a far cry from what had been an antiquated and parochial militia beholden
to state governors. By 1959, the Army considered the National Guard vital in order to
strike more than “one punch” against American enemies in ground combat; large
numbers of reserve forces were needed, the Army said, in order to strike multiple blows.9
The professionalism and loyalty of the Arkansas National Guard remained a serious
consideration in Army plans to intervene in a domestic disturbance in Little Rock, but
after a few days on the job, and few unfortunate missteps, the Guard passed muster and
the Army turned the mission over to the reserve forces. Cold War military policies had
created a Guard of “fully trained personnel capable of prompt action in an emergency.”10

7. Gordon R. Young, The Army Almanac (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1959), 23.
8. Ibid., 3.
9. Ibid., 4.
10. Young, Army Almanac, 4.
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Thus, Guard action act Little Rock proved it capable, in the eyes of the Army, of other
Cold War assignments.
The mission also had important national political ramifications. A newfound
National Guard professionalism proved important politically for the Eisenhower
administration, as well as his successor, John F. Kennedy. Southern demagogues depicted
the two presidents as tyrants using bayonets to force “race-mixing” upon an unwilling
South. Images of a Second Reconstruction were common. The federal government
extricated itself from these claims by pushing the enforcement of federal court orders into
the hands of the southern states themselves, thus making “local” involvement a political
imperative. U.S. Army troops departed Little Rock as rapidly as possible, leaving the
security to federalized Guardsmen. Although segregationists brayed in protest against the
mission, they were compelled to accept the “law and order” efforts of men in Army
uniform. For southern moderates, military action allowed southern states to win back a
measure of participation in their own governance, achieving a much-desired
respectability in the eyes of the nation.
Much like the soldiers who performed under the shadow of a mushroom cloud on
Yucca Flat, the Guardsmen and paratroopers at Little Rock played their own proscribed
roles in what came to resemble other crises of the Cold War. They were called to duty by
presidential orders, wore helmets and uniforms, carried weapons, rode in convoys,
marched in formation, and faced danger in the line of duty. There were troop movements,
intelligence gathering missions, media frenzies, a failed summit, an “invasion,” a brief
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clash of arms, and a supposedly quick resolution to an intractable problem.11 In fact,
while the Little Rock operation was underway the Army was conducting extensive testing
of “tactical” nuclear weapons in Nevada as Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor
struggled to keep the Army relevant – and Cold War planners sought to cut budgets and
reduce conventional military manpower. The Soviet Union heightened tensions by
launching two Sputnik satellites, which shocked the military establishment and redoubled
action against the Soviet threat. Little Rock was an important military mission, and its
success was linked in part directly to America’s Cold War strategy.12
The America of the 1950s was a highly militarized society.13 At the time of the
crisis in Little Rock some 300,000 draftees and 400,000 National Guardsmen served in a
U.S. Army comprised of nearly one million soldiers.14 Cold War calculations consumed
ever-increasing amounts of the national budget and suffused the political discourse of
both parties. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s military record propelled him to the presidency just
as the Korean War subsided. The nation’s towering military might had proven democracy
and capitalism triumphant against the “Red Menace.” Young men were drafted, or forced
to enter the reserve components to avoid the draft, and the skies were filled with the shiny
nuclear-armed bombers of General Curtis LeMay’s awesome Strategic Air Command. In
this context it seems not altogether unreasonable that American leaders believed military

11. Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 211.
12. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War, Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 130.
13. Sherry, In the Shadow of War, 211.
14. Young, The Army Almanac, 6.
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action could somehow address complex and difficult societal issues, such as racial
inequality.
Regional politics also played an important role in the crisis. The forces assembled
for Operation Arkansas consisted of soldiers from all regions of the nation, including the
South. Men from Texas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and
other southern states ensured that the Little Rock Nine could attend school at Central
High. How these southerners would perform the integration mission was a matter of
grave concern for the president and the Army. Initial reports indicated Army officers in
the South might stage a coup, or Guardsmen might refuse to answer the call to duty. In
fact, the soldiers overwhelmingly responded to the mission without complaint or
controversy, despite their inner turmoil about the mission. That they did so is a result of
the Cold Warrior ethic instilled in American fighting men of the late 1950s.
Samuel Huntington described this ethic in his seminal work, The Soldier and the
State, published in 1955. He wrote that the ethos was a conservative realism that exalted
“obedience as the highest virtue of military men.”15 He described this military ethic as
“pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic .
. . and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession.”16 Huntington continued, “A
military mind will adhere to this ethic only to the extent it is professional, that is, to the
extent that it is shaped by functional rather than societal imperatives.”17 The 101st
paratroopers, who arrived in Little Rock ready to battle segregationists, embodied that
15. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), 79.
16. Ibid., 78.
17. Ibid., 79.
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military professionalism. The substantive work of national defense strategy in the 1950s
was to make the average Arkansas National Guardsmen a professional, or at least aspire
to be one.
The military ethos blended rather easily with southern constructions of manhood,
which assessed the world and its “irrationality [and] weakness,” and in the inherent “evil
in human nature.”18 Southerners had no argument with an ethic which was “pessimistic,
collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, [and] militaristic.”19 The
contours of the Cold War required that southern manhood change its features in only
subtle ways to remain in accord with national politics.20 Principally this meant adopting a
functionalist approach to race relations, just as the military itself had adopted integration
over the last decade. American manhood, southern or otherwise, was an important part of
military and Cold War discourse by the late 1950s.
Of particular concern among commentators at the time was the extent to which an
all-powerful military could be trusted with atomic bombs and how that trust and
responsibility might threaten American society. Rogue generals could trip the trigger on a
nuclear arsenal or hold a nation hostage. More than that, commentators wondered what
impact a military-industrial complex had on American society. The central issue of this

18. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, 78.
19. Ibid.
20. Bertram Wyatt-Brown described Southern manhood as “(1) honor as immortalizing
valor, particularly in the character of revenge against familial and community enemies; (2)
opinion of others as an indispensable part of personal identity and gauge of self-worth; (3)
physical appearance and ferocity of will as signs of inner merit; (4) defense of male integrity and
mingled fear and love of woman; and final, (5) reliance upon oath-taking as a bond in lieu of
family obligations and allegiances.” See Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor Ethics and
Behavior in the Old South (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 34.
9

early nuclear age was, as one writer explained it, the “need to have protection by the
military and the need to have protection from the military.”21
It is within this Cold War military context that manhood became an important
cultural issue. It was not just the threat of global annihilation, or the fear of increased
militarism, but also whether American men could measure up to the task. America
equated conformity to masculine courage.22 This courage was defined in “narrow and
particular ways – courage was as the [military] brotherhood did.”23 The Army, it said of
itself in 1959, “works constantly to improve the moral, physical, and intellectual capacity
of its men. It creates for them an environment of decent, clean living and of intolerance of
vice, dissipation, and flabbiness.”24 The clear threat to America was a weakened male
potency: the “flabby” non-regimented man, the civilian who was unwilling or incapable
of shouldering his fair share of the load in the global war against communism, the “soft”
man who would shy away from the stark and deadly reality of the nuclear menace. 25

21. Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntingdon, Janowitz, and the
Question of Civilian Control." Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.
22. Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign
Policy (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 243.
23. Ibid.; Dean’s analysis, though refreshing and vibrant, makes no reference to the
Huntington and Millis debate, or to those other scholars who during the era were debating the
locus of military-civilian control.
24. Young, The Army Almanac, 7.
25. K.A. Cuordileone, Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War (New
York: Routledge, 2005), 3.
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Indeed, conformity was one key to understanding Cold War culture, because
disorder was an existential threat to the world powers and their nuclear arsenals.26
Southern soldiers, inculcated into the American military brotherhood, found conformity,
not rebellion, as a safe haven, and they implicitly responded to accusations that they
failed to protect white southern society from integration by adopting an “exaggerated cult
of masculine toughness and virility.”27
Cold War men were either “soft” or “hard” on communism. They were either
manly or feminine in the face of the enemy. Nonconformity was womanly, girlish, and
equated with homosexuality. Arthur Schlesinger luridly described communism as
“something secret, sweaty and furtive like nothing so much, in the phrase of one wise
observer of modern Russia, as homosexuality in a boys' school; many practicing it, but all
those caught to be caned by the headmaster.”28
Discipline, in the military, in American society, and to southern military men,
proved an essential component of masculine values. The Cold War military experience
“tamed” the blackest impulses of southern men. At the same time, to the southern soldiers
the raucous, leering, segregationist activities presented not a recapitulation of southern
values, but a threat to them. Law and order and discipline were old southern folkways
brought to the fore against rebellious youth and racial provocateurs. Southern soldiers

26. Fervent anti-communism deployed strongly against any form of non-conformity
buffered society against shocking changes of the era: “racial integration, secularism, affluence,
materialism, apathy, [and] youth rebellion.” Cuordileone, Manhood and American Political
Culture, xix.
27. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 151.
28. Ibid.
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seemed to be caught in a particularly southern expression of manhood reshaped in the
crucible of the Cold War. Whatever their personal opinions about following orders in
support of civil rights activists, the soldiers adhered to a military ethic rooted in white
southern concepts of manhood.
The principal demand of a military organization is obedience to lawful orders. As
the custodian of nuclear power, the military bombers, ships, and artillery pieces could
obliterate enemy and civilian targets. This unprecedented power necessitated a form of
obedience and discipline perhaps unprecedented in military history. Though it seems
somewhat paradoxical, the military caste earned its respect and admiration from civilian
society through its subjugation to civilian leadership.
Indeed, the southern soldiers ordered to support civil rights missions were
something of a contradiction. Yet, as George Brown Tindall reminds us, the South is a
place of both continuity and change. In The Ethnic Southerner he insists that we learn
“time and time again from the southern past and the history of others that to change is not
necessarily to disappear” or to “lose one’s identity,” but rather sometimes to change “is to
find it.”29 The Guard’s ethic of subjugation and obedience was nothing new to southern
men, it was only reified in the Cold War environment. As various historians have argued,
the white southern identity, whether real or imagined, has a profound persistence.30 It has

29. George Brown Tindall, Natives & Newcomers (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1995), viii.
30. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture: Honor, Grace, and War,
1760s-1880s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Bertram WyattBrown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983); James C. Cobb, Redefining Southern Culture: Mind and Identity in the Modern
South (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999); David Hackett Fisher, Albion’s Seed:
Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Shelton
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been reshaped and rebuilt, and it has still maintained its distinctiveness.
Concepts of racial identity certainly played an important part in the decisionmaking process of these men. Racism certainly existed among the soldiers, but racism
alone offers an insufficient explanation for their conduct during the crisis.31 Certainly
some southern soldiers, serving in integrated federal units, or working as local
peacekeepers in integration missions, fell somewhere between the vocal segregationists
and the white liberals. Through the perspective of the soldiers at Central High, we can
grapple with the complexity of Southern segregationist feelings and responses to them. It
is necessary, then, to take these men as they are, to study them and learn about them on
their own terms.
Time and again, when ordered to do so, these southern soldiers were instrumental
in protecting black civil rights activists from violence. Tennessee Guardsmen drove tanks
into Clinton, Tennessee, in 1956 to break up segregationists and protect the Clinton
Twelve; Arkansas Guardsmen walked the halls at Little Rock Central High School for the
entire 1957 school year; Alabama Guardsmen rode the buses with the Freedom Riders in
1961; Mississippi Guardsmen stood in the volcano of racism that erupted in Oxford,
Mississippi, over James Meredith’s admittance to Ole Miss in 1962; Alabama Guardsmen
asked George Wallace to step aside from the schoolhouse door at the University of
Alabama in 1963; it was again the Alabama Guardsmen who walked step by step with the
marchers from Selma to their final triumphant entry into Montgomery in 1965. In every
case, the collective presence of the Guard meant order and safety for those seeking to
Reed, The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass Society (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 1986).
31. Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative
Counterrevolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 8.
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break down the social order in the South. Yet few of these men would say that they,
individually, were supporters of integration.
The uniformed Southerner gave the white south one way to confront its racial
dilemma. The local white boys became the unlikely protectors of African-Americans.
Their adherence to military duty forced segregationists to choose: they had to either
attack fellow white southerners clad in U.S. military uniforms – with all the symbolic
force that carried at the height of Cold War – or allow integration to continue. The Guard,
of course, also presented a much more formidable opponent than nonviolent protesters;
armed, trained, and deployed in large enough numbers that no lynch mob could
intimidate them, the Guard could not be easily resisted. The Guard commanded the
masculine ground because they performed, as one southerner put it, “the most heroic act a
southern white can perform, and that is to take a risk, preferably with one’s own life, to
save a black from lynching.”32
Of course, the Guard, like their fellow Southerners in the 101st Airborne,
resented the situation into which they had been thrust. As one National Guard officer put
it, “Look fellows, we don’t have to like what we are told to do, we've got to do what we
are told to do.”33
With the spectacle of the Sputnik launch in October 1957 and the ensuing debate
about the missile gap in the following months, the issue of integration at Little Rock
substantially diminished. Segregationists compared Washington to Moscow or race-

32. Margaret Jones Bolsterli, Born in the Delta, (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee
Press, 1991), 64.
33. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas, September 28,
2007.
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mixing to communism, thereby reinforcing the weakness of the racial threat upon which
previous generations of southern men had relied. Emboldened by rock and roll and a freer
and more potent youth culture delivered powerfully through the radio and Hollywood, the
South was in transition, distancing itself economically and sexually from the older
generation. The young Guardsmen refused to be robbed of their manhood by complying
with federal orders issued by a respected and popular president. For men too young for
duty in the Korean War or the Second World War, they generally embraced the
opportunity to serve in uniform and defend their communities – from the communist
threat, from the naked force of federal intervention, and from those in their community
who threatened to use extralegal force.
Southerners in uniform followed orders for a number of reasons –
professionalism, a Cold War ethos, and because their duty saved white society from a
variety of threats, such as violent Klansmen, the Red Menace, federal interlopers,
segregationist teenagers, and violations of Southern taboos. They generally saw
themselves as defending the whole of southern society from both the “bad niggers” -- as
Terrence Roberts put it -- and the violent extremists opposing them. Drawing upon an old
southern motif, they fashioned an utter defeat into a moral victory by “protecting” the
entire South, white and black, and thus defended concepts of paternalism and white
sovereignty in the process.

15

CHAPTER 2
THE GUARD
In the fall of 1957 the Battle of Little Rock was broadcast directly into television
sets in living rooms across the country. Forces converged on the city from every direction
and the resulting conflict nearly tore the community apart. Each bloc had its own
perspectives and goals, making the conflict a fight between competing elements, even
when they were ostensibly working toward the same end. Many of these groups are well
known in studies of the crisis, while others have remained more obscure.
At the center, fighting for racial equality, were the brave young students and their
supporters, the cluster of parents and grandparents, aunts and uncles, and other friends
and relatives of Earnest Green, Terrence Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, Melba Beals,
Carlotta Walls, Elizabeth Eckford, Gloria Ray, Thelma Mothershed, and Minnijean
Brown. They faced a trying and terrifying year. The students twice confronted violent
mobs and were harassed and attacked at the school on an almost daily basis. Their parents
and guardians endured social isolation, threats, and even accusations by Little Rock
authorities of their involvement in criminal activities, all in return for merely exercising
their legal right to attend the formerly all-white Little Rock Central High school.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples played a lead
role in the crisis, bringing the cases to court and providing counsel. The Little Rock
branch of the NAACP, helmed by Daisy Bates and her husband L.C. Bates, also played a
critical role in supervising the children as they endured the terrible situation at the school,
providing moral support and some training in non-violent resistance. Ultimately the
Bates’ paid for their social transgression; they lost their newspaper after segregationist
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legislators went after their sponsors. However, the NAACP also looked after its own
interest. News coverage enhanced the prestige and influence of the organization, even as
it highlighted racial injustice in America.
Political and personal aspirations were inseparably intertwined with issues of
social justice as Little Rock moderates made use of the crisis. Superintendent Virgil
Blossom intended to capitalize on his plan of gradual integration, which he hoped would
serves as a model for all southern schools. If successful, Blossom had designs on the
governor’s seat and potentially even the U.S. Senate. Other moderates, such as Arkansas
Gazette editor Harry Ashmore, used Little Rock as a means to realize their hopes for
racial justice in the South; Ashmore’s paper won two Pulitzers for that effort. Some
moderates, such as Little Rock Mayor Woodrow Mann or Congressman Brooks Hays,
simply tried to tamp down the crisis in service of the status quo.
The Federal government was presumably working on behalf of the nine black
students, but the players at the national level also had to balance the political realities of
the time, which included Cold War tensions. Federal advocates struggled to find a
practicable way to foster integration without appearing to force it upon a reluctant South
and thereby make the situation worse. It would have been an impossible task for the
Federal government to supervise the integration process in each school district across the
south, so finding a way to secure local cooperation was critical. U.S. Attorney General
Herbert Brownell, and Osro Cobb, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
wanted to force the local authorities to act, and so they withheld material support to both
the activists and the school districts while at the same time insisting integration must
happen at once.

17

The two chief political officers involved were, of course, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Governor Orval Faubus. At the state level, Faubus, a conniving
politician, if a racial moderate, made great political hay out of opposing school
integration in Little Rock. To gain reelection for his third term in 1958, Faubus aligned
himself with segregationist firebrands in the White Citizens Council, such as Jim
Johnson, Amos Guthridge, and Rev. Wesley Pruden. The coalition ginned up racial fears
and catapulted Little Rock into the world spotlight. Faubus’s ploy succeeded. He went on
to serve a record six terms in the governor’s mansion. Faubus always claimed his role
was to prevent bloodshed; his supporters agreed, but even they felt he was simply a
political opportunist. His use of the National Guard brought that military force into the
capital city.
Eisenhower, meanwhile, was busy with pressing Cold War foreign policy issues
and reluctant to interfere in Little Rock. He struggled to find a peaceful solution to the
bombshell 1954 Brown, coaxed through the Supreme Court by Chief Justice Earl G.
Warren. Eventually, Eisenhower was forced to act, and in doing so brought into the crisis
the U.S. Army.
Ike and Faubus each brought two distinct military entities into Little Rock, and
these both had their own character and agenda. The Army arrived in Little Rock in the
form of some 1,000 elite paratroopers and a bevy of Pentagon generals. It was facing its
own strategic and budgetary challenges in the New Look-era of massive retaliation.
While the Army found Little Rock to be a frustrating mission, success there burnished its
claims to relevancy in the Cold War. Little Rock proved that flexible response and
restraint were just as important as overwhelming firepower, and foreshadowed the full-
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spectrum warfare approach of the Pentagon today.
The Arkansas National Guard played a central role as well; its citizen-soldiers, the
all-white small town southern boys from armories all over the state, kept the peace at the
school for nine long months. The Arkansas National Guard successfully performed its
mission and in so doing, provided stability to the school, the city, and the nation.
In 1957, the Arkansas National Guard consisted of two distinct forces – the
Arkansas Army National Guard and the Arkansas Air National Guard – both under one
governor-appointed commander. The Arkansas Air National Guard numbered some
1,300 men, and included a myriad of fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance squadrons, as
well other units, such as a security police squadron at Adam’s Field in Little Rock. The
Arkansas Army Guard units were equally diverse, including three infantry battalions, an
artillery regiment, and various company-sized armor, medical, and support units. It
numbered upwards of 8,500 troops, giving the total state Guard a force of approximately
10,000 men.
Since its beginning, the Guard had traditionally been a force materially supported
by state dollars, or at least equally funded by state and federal resources. As Michael
Sherry said, throughout its history “the National Guard was largely a creature of state
governments.”1 Generally, state funds paid salaries and provided for construction of
armories, while federal funds provided equipment and training. Quite often that
equipment was obsolete and the training routinely inferior to that of active duty troops.
Traditionally, state funding for the guard was just enough to keep the units together as a

1. Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 5.
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social organization, but never enough to turn the groups of men into anything more than a
rifle club, a slightly martial fraternity organization.
However, by the mid-1950s, the National Guard had become something
fundamentally different, the product of an infusion of resources provided almost entirely
by the U.S. Department of Defense, not the state legislatures.2 A nervous nation
embroiled in a global conflict with the Soviet Union pushed for a new emphasis on the
National Guard. One reason for this was that the Guard had failed to live up to
expectations during the Korean conflict.
During WWII, the Guard provided nineteen divisions and played a crucial role in
the early months of the war while the Army trained and outfitted the larger conscriptraised force. In contrast, it took months to bring the Guard units up to even a rudimentary
level of training during the Korean War mobilization. As eminent military historian
Walter Millis put it, “this was an embarrassing discovery. It meant the National Guard
and the reserve system as a whole was unable to promptly field a combat force of the
kind which it had been expected to produce.”3
A rivalry between the Guard and the Army over priorities during mobilization
created much of the problem. In the fluctuating Korean emergency, the Army
compounded that problem by treating its reserve components with disdain. Army units
refused the Guard access to proper training sites, forced the Guard to surrender
$700,000,000 in equipment, including 750 tanks and thousands of other vehicles to
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“priority” U.S. Army units, and then “stripped” Guard units by taking their best leaders
and NCOs as individual replacements instead of leaving the units intact. All of this
resulted in a Guard with a leadership deficit, precious little training equipment, and no
space in which to train.4
Two battalions of Arkansas National Guard artillery were something of an
exception to this sorry state of affairs. The first Arkansas Guard artillerymen were in the
thick of the fighting in Korea by February, 1951. The units performed well and returned
to Arkansas in the fall of 1954, providing a corps of officers and NCOs for a new
generation of the Guard.
Nevertheless, Korea revealed a shocking weakness in the once mighty U.S.
military. The Army had been weakened by post-war cuts, and the small reserves were
poorly equipped. There was nothing in place for a rapid response to a military need. The
Guard was supposed to fill that need, but the conflict had proved the Guard was
inadequate for the task. This frightened national security planners who called for a major
investment in the U.S. military reserve system.
The strategic plan contained in National Security Council brief Number 68 (NSC
68) argued the U.S needed to increase its active duty military forces and expand its ready
reserves in order to defeat the Soviet threat. In the bellicose language of its architects,
"Our force limitations will be our policy limitations . . . half measures will be more costly
and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war."5

4. Gordon R. Young, The Army Almanac (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1959),
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NSC 68 expressed a need to “balance” active duty forces with a large reserve, a role
filled by expanding the National Guard, which was tasked with providing thirteen
divisions fit for NSC 68 requirements – meaning overseas battles, most likely in central
Europe.
Federal legislation throughout the post-war and early Cold War years provided for
this National Guard expansion. An increased emphasis on the professionalization of the
Guard force had surfaced even prior to Korea, though with limited effectiveness. In 1948
the Guard was granted federal retirement pay, making a long-term career in the National
Guard much more attractive, but did little to strengthen Guard budget and force
structures.6 With NSC 68 and the Korean War as looming examples of the pressing need,
Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act in 1952, which re-organized reserve
component forces, and consolidated federal laws pertaining to the National Guard in U.S.
Code Title 32 (U.S. Code Title 10 was used for active duty forces), which, given the
disdain for the Guard throughout much of its existence, demonstrated the new importance
of the Guard in national security planning for the foreseeable future.
In 1955, Congress passed the Reserves Forces Act, which provided for four
months of federally-paid active duty training for Guard individuals, and by 1956, for the
first time, thousands of Guardsmen attended basic and advanced training on active duty
bases alongside active duty troops, something Arkansas Guard leadership immediately
implemented.7 As one commentator put it, it created a “dramatic improvement in the

6. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 231.
7. Memorandum by Major General Samuel T. Williams to Sherman T. Clinger, July 21,
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overall military knowledge of the Guardsmen.”8 Another step forward in professionalism
for the Arkansas Guard was the creation in 1957 of the Arkansas Military Academy, part
of a larger post-war trend of state Guard organization’s training their own officers to
national standards.9 In 1955, the National Guard Bureau also approved the combination
of the four weekly two-hour drills into a single monthly weekend drill — marking the
advent of the Guardsman as the “weekend warrior,” a far cry from the pre-war era of
weekly one-hour meetings, often little more than roll call and a game of poker.10
Funding flowed into National Guard coffers sums which had previously been
unimaginable. In 1935, the National Guard managed to scrape together only $34 million,
whereas in 1955, the total ready reserve forces received approximately $950 million in
appropriations from the Department of Defense.11 In Arkansas, the figures were equally
dramatic. In 1932, some 39 units with 2,200 men received only $500,000 in funding; by
1957 this had expanded to $6 million for 125 units and 10,000 men; by 1963 it had
skyrocketed to $13 million for approximately 9,250 men.12 Arkansas National Guard
readiness in federal expenditures per capita was $227 in 1932, $600 in 1957, and $1,405
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in 1963.13
The public was not blind to the problems in the Guard, nor in their necessity in
the context of the broader Cold War. In 1954, a newspaper editor in Blytheville,
Arkansas, commented:
No one dares pretend that an adequate reserve system is either cheap or attractive
to politicians and millions of their constituents. But the hard necessity cannot be
flinched at. This is not an age we can enjoy the usual peacetime haggling over
ways of training sufficient manpower and maintaining it for proper defense. Our
safety as a nation is tightly bound up with responsible action in this field.14

The Guard also received hundreds of millions of dollars in additional construction
funds throughout the 1950s. Generally this was provided as a matching grant in which the
federal government provided 75% and state government 25%. By the mid-1950s large,
spacious, modern armories were under construction all over the country; in Arkansas, due
to a severe lack of state funding, several local cities provided the state’s shortfall.15
There were other developments in the National Guard too, such as the newly
recognized Air National Guard, established in 1947. It was not left out of the Guard
budget boom either — its budget doubled from 1953 to 1960, peaking at nearly $250
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Guard, Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report, http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/9674
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million.16 Thus, by 1956, according to the Arkansas National Guard publication, The
Razorback Guardsman, the Arkansas National Guard had a total inventory of some $135
million in equipment, much of that acquired in the most recent years.17
Despite the Army’s issues with the Guard during the Korean War call-up, the
Guard enjoyed a burnished popular image during the 1950s, which aided the Guard’s
recruitment and expansion. In 1955, the autobiographical film To Hell and Back
portrayed the life of America’s most decorated World War II soldier, Audie Murphy.18 At
the time of the film Murphy was a captain in the Texas National Guard and recruiting
posters featured Murphy in full dress uniform proclaiming, “I am proud to be a National
Guardsman.”19
A front page article in a Camden, Arkansas newspaper explained that the actor
“part of whose right hip was shot away, draws $93 a month pay as the result of a 50
percent disability rating. For three years, until he joined the Texas National Guard as a
captain, he refused the money. Now he feels it is fair to take it.”20 Murphy’s comments in
the article put his wartime exploits in a context that local Guardsmen would soon learn to
appreciate: "It taught me how to get along with people, not to be selfish. War is a pretty
16. Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: the Air National Guard 1943-1969
(Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1985), 119.
17. Buddy Garret, “Arkansas National Guard New Magazine Hits Golden Anniversary,”
Arkansas Minuteman 28, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 10.
18. Lisa M. Mundey, American Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Popular Media, 19451970 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2012), 88.
19. Michael Dale Doubler, John W. Listman, and Donald M. Goldstein, The National
Guard: An Illustrated History of Americas Citizen-Soldiers (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.,
2007), 103.
20. “Audie Murphy: War Hero and Movie Star,” Camden News, August 31, 1955, 8.
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good course in public relations.”21 Theater sales pitches by Guard recruiters and Miss
Texas 1955 were part of an active recruiting campaign for the state Guard. One
California Guard unit brought its men and equipment to the theater, “displaying weapons
used in their role of "America's first line of defense."22
One motivation for joining the Guard was also the advent of the Draft. The
Selective Service Act of 1948, the Military Training and Service Act of 1951, and the
Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 all stipulated a number of exemptions to the draft,
including membership in the National Guard; many would-be draftees avoided the draft
and its two years of active duty service by joining the National Guard.
The total strength numbers for the National Guard throughout the long decade tell
the tale: in 1947 the National Guard numbered fewer than 88,000 men nationwide, but
this jumped to nearly 300,000 the next year when the Selective Service Act went into
effect, and by 1957 numbers had sailed up to 422,000. Not only did joining a local Army
or Air Force Guard unit make skipping the draft possible, but it provided some extra
money – as Audie Murphy had explained – in the form of the monthly drill check. No
matter how bellicose their language, many southerners skirted the draft and still claimed
to have done their duty in the war against the Reds, while also earning a little extra pay
on the side. For these reasons the Arkansas National Guard was successful in reaching
enlistment goals during its own recruiting drives.23
Arkansas also had several large military installations within its borders, which
21. “Audie Murphy,” Camden News.
22. “Guard Unit to View Film of Hero Here,” San Mateo Times, October 11, 1955, 11.
23. “National Guard Starts Campaign,” Blytheville Courier News, January 28, 1956, 1.
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served to heighten civilian and citizen-soldiers awareness of military activity and federal
military expenditures. Near Fort Smith, Arkansas was Fort Chaffee, a large training area
for the U.S. Army and Army National Guard; at some 76,000 acres, it included artillery
firing ranges and aircraft ordnance practice areas.24 In Central Arkansas, the principal
Army National Guard facility was Camp Joseph T. Robinson, located a short distance
north of Little Rock, just across the Arkansas River from Little Rock Central High. 25
Arkansas Air National Guard members were posted to the old World War I-era
Adam’s Field in Little Rock and the newly built Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) $31
million Little Rock Air Force Base.26 The base opened for air traffic on September 10,
1955 with a special ceremony where “local leaders and assigned personnel” welcomed
the arrival of the 70th Reconnaissance Wing which included three specially named
aircraft: “the ‘Razorback,’ ‘City of Little Rock,’ and ‘City of Jacksonville.’"27 The
Secretary of the Air Force and the SAC Commander himself, General Curtis E. LeMay,
officially dedicated the base a month later. As a testament to the importance of the new
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base, some 85,000 Arkansans attended the dedication ceremony.28 By mid-1957, over
5,500 military personnel and 300 civilian employees were working at the base, as well as
a huge construction project to build 1,535 “Capehart” family homes.29
The units assigned to the new base were directly connected to America’s Cold
War military goals. SAC assigned the 384th Bombardment Wing to the new base, which
flew B-47 Stratojet bomber aircraft. On October 1, 1957, the Air Force began the Alert
program, in which this wing participated. The Alert Program had bombers ready for
takeoff for fifteen minutes around the clock while drills with blaring klaxons awakened
air crews running from their barracks “as if Curtis Lemay himself were chasing them.”30
Another unit on the base flew the RB-47 Stratojet aerial reconnaissance aircraft,
predecessor of the U-2 spy plane. This unit deployed around the world as the “eyes in the
sky” on various Cold War fronts. At a time when the Congressional Air Power Hearings
made the “bomber gap” with Russia a household phrase, Little Rock and Central
Arkansas were literally under the shadow of LeMay’s mighty war machine. SAC aircraft
were a constant presence in Arkansas skies.
In Eastern Arkansas, the Tactical Air Command thoroughly reconditioned a
WWII-era facility and named it Blytheville Air Force Base. It housed three squadrons of
B-57 tactical bombers and claimed the longest airfield in the region, at over 11,000 feet.31
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In 1958 and 1959, SAC took over the Blytheville base too, equipping it in 1960 with its
shiny new warhorse, the massive B-52 bomber.32 Other military support facilities in the
state included the Pine Bluff Arsenal to the south of Little Rock, the Shumaker Naval
Ammunition Depot, near Camden, Arkansas, and many other smaller ordnance works
kept in mothballs since World War II.
In 1957, the Arkansas National Guard consisted of 114 Army Guard units and 11
Air Guard units spread throughout the state, with few of the units exceeding much over
100 men. Guardsmen from these units worked in and conducted operations on the major
military facilities in the state, as well as many smaller armories, which might contain only
a single building, though sometimes they were quartered on the larger Army or Air Force
bases.33 Thus, much of the character of Guard service was steeped in active duty military
jargon and culture, and often the men were directly associated with Cold War planning
even in their part time capacity.
One such exercise was Operation Minuteman, a nationwide drill conducted on
April 20, 1955. “The first such exercise ever conducted in the United States,” it evaluated
the response time and effectiveness of the various state Guard forces, as more than
400,000 Guardsmen responded to a mock call-up.34 In Arkansas alone, some 7,000
Guardsmen rushed to armories in uniform after a surprise call at 6:00 P.M. By the end of
the second hour, nearly 90% of the men were in the ranks, proof the reforms in the wake
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of NSC-68 were working.35
Air Guardsmen participated in the Cold War, too. Throughout the decade, the Air
National Guard continued to improve its training by working in an integrated fashion
with the active duty Air Force. The Air National Guard received newer aircraft and took
on more important Cold War missions. The Runway Alert Program started in 1954.
Twenty fighter-interceptor squadrons of the Air National Guard stood prepared on the
flight line every day of the year.36 During the 1950s the Air National Guard fought hard
to transform itself from “a disjointed flying club to a combat-ready reserve component of
the USAF.”37
Even the structure of the units themselves shifted to conform to the new Cold War
reality. Six National Guard divisions maintained in a high state of readiness as part of
what was called a Ready Reserve Strategic Army Force, “which could be called to active
service on short notice to back up the Regular Army.”38 From 1956 through 1959, all
U.S. Army and Army National Guard units reorganized under the new requirements for
survivability on an atomic battlefield, where it was presumed that the weapons would
destroy any firm battle line.39 The infantry and armored divisions were rearranged into
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“Pentomic Divisions” for better survivability on the nuclear battlefield.40 In line with this
type of thinking, the Arkansas National Guard in the summer of 1955 hosted an Atomic
School for its men and officers, which focused on the effects of “Mass Destruction
Weapons.” Active duty officers attended this conference, including U.S. Army Major
General Samuel T. Williams, commander of Fourth Army Headquarters in San Antonio,
Texas.41 The Headquarters at Fourth Army provided most of the active duty training for
Army Guardsmen, and later provided most of the support resources throughout the long
operation in Little Rock.
Thus by the late 1950s, Arkansas Guardsmen were well indoctrinated to the Cold
War. Better benefits, better training, larger facilities, and routine participation in the Cold
Warrior ethos was part and parcel of the National Guard experience. In addition, during
weekly or monthly meeting and during summer training the troops interacted with active
duty troops at facilities in Arkansas and other states, which exposed them not only to a
more rigid and professional military culture, but also to the viewpoints of servicemen
from all over the United States.
In the fall of 1957, the Arkansas National Guard was no longer a small, provincial
force of local boys and hayseeds. The lower ranks were becoming more professional and
many of its men were veterans of World War II or Korea. Most were well trained by
standards of the day. Col. Donald Hedden, who began his career as a forward observer in
an automatic weapons battalion in 1943, fighting in France and later in Germany, retired
40. The Pentomic division concept and Taylor’s role in the reorganization is explained in
more detail in Chapter 6.
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from the Arkansas National Guard in 1980. In 1957, Hedden was company commander
of L Company in Batesville, Arkansas. He recalled that during the mid-1950s the Guard
was “becoming more professional,” and that at the time of the Central High mobilization
fully 25% of his men were veterans.42 Given the huge federal budgetary, legislative, and
administrative investment over the previous decade, this was the largest, most well
trained, and best equipped National Guard force in the state’s history up to that time.
However, even as the Guard improved over the previous decades, it still had two
critical problems to overcome. The first challenge was its citizen-soldiers composition
and the disdain for it held by the “professional” Army. In 1957, Secretary of Defense
Charles Wilson remarked to a senate panel that the “draft dodging” National Guardsmen
were “something of a scandal.”43 Predictably, southern legislators and leaders reacted
with furor. The Georgia state legislature declared Wilson‘s remarks as “utter stupidity.”
In North Carolina, the State Adjutant General called such a charge a “slur upon the
honor” of Guardsmen. The Texas senate penned a resolution that characterized Wilson’s
accusation as “slurring, untrue, and libelous,” while the North Carolina House of
Representatives called his statement a “deeply insulting remark.”44 President Eisenhower,
usually above the fray, said it was “an unwise comment.”45 The charge of draft-dodging
Guardsmen was nothing new, and it would be renewed during the Vietnam conflict. Still,
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the active duty forces continued to consider the Guardsmen undisciplined, unmotivated,
and at times, an uncommitted force.46
The Arkansas National Guard was also made up entirely of white men; by 1957
the black National Guard of the Post-Civil War was long forgotten.47 For AfricanAmericans, the Guard could have been nothing other than a symbol of white privilege,
though that was certainly tempered somewhat by the time of the Central High crisis.
Unlike the experience of the active military, integration of the National Guard itself did
not occur until the mid-1960s, when, following the 1964 Civil Rights Acts, the National
Guard Bureau began to force the various state Guard units to integrate.48 Even this was
approached with some caution. The arguments for a slow speed paralleled those of
integration of public schools. In 1961, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Carlisle P.
Runge stated that "to take action which might for all practical purposes eliminate a
substantial portion of the major reserve combat capability of our ground and air forces is
a matter which commands the utmost caution in these perilous times."49 Cold War
concerns once again loomed in the midst of integration. Racial integration of the Guard
did not take off nationwide until well into the 1970s, as the Vietnam War wound down.
At that point, the need to join the Guard to avoid the draft subsided and recruitment
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problems in the Guard necessitated accepting black recruits. For its part, Arkansas began
admitting black Guardsmen in August, 1963, and by October of 1964 a dozen black
soldiers were members of units in Mena, North Little Rock, and Blytheville; unit
integration, however, was still “at the option of the local commanders.”50 Thus, the
Arkansas National Guard – which had stood on Faubus’ orders against integration – was
itself integrated six years later.
The all-white state Guard units of Arkansas operated as a segregated force, and it
possessed not only an expanding federal budget but also tremendous political power. The
Adjutant General was a close advisor of the governor, and the governor routinely spoke
at the state Guard officer’s convention.51 It had the ability to deploy its force of arms
behind a legal screen as well, thus the Guard was often unreachable and at times
menacing to African-Americans, who were excluded from its membership but yet relied
on it for support of civil rights’ goals. The Guard could be deployed at will by governors,
who often were openly hostile to integration in southern states.
Compounding the problem was the immediate southern symbolic heritage of the
State Guard or State Militia which stretched all the way to back the slave patrols of the
antebellum period when white males in the community hunted for escaped slaves and
responded to slave uprisings. In the years after the Civil War, whites had assembled “rifle
clubs” to police the black community in much the same fashion, eventually forcing the
Federal units into submission and ending reconstruction in the bloody “red shirt”
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campaigns in 1876.52 The memory of African Americans in Guard was lost amidst the
more powerful and also more recent expressions of white dominance and power.
The reputation of the Arkansas National Guard was further complicated by its
erroneous association with the 1919 Elaine Massacre. This was a widespread outbreak of
racially motivated violence in Eastern Arkansas in which Arkansas Governor Charles
Hillman Brough petitioned the Federal government for the use of U.S. Army troops
stationed at Camp Pike.53 The soldiers, who had just returned from fighting in Europe,
boarded a train in Little Rock along with Governor Brough, disembarked in Elaine,
Arkansas and the surrounding area, and set up machineguns on the streets. With the
assistance of law enforcement, these troops set about rounding up the blacks who were
accused of killing a railroad investigator and several other whites. The blacks had armed
themselves when whites in Arkansas and Mississippi streamed into the area with reports
of “race riot,” but the US Army’s arrival eventually crushed the fighting. According to
NAACP investigations, over 800 blacks were killed in the fields and canebrakes near
Elaine and Helena.
Judge John E. Miller, the very U.S. District Court judge who had initially handled
the Cooper vs. Aaron case, and then unexpectedly turned it over to Judge Ronald Davies,
gave an interview about the massacre in 1976, and referred to the troops involved as
National Guardsmen, saying “the national guard [sic] fired on them and they must have
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killed 100 niggers right there.”54 Grif Stockley mentions another witness who overheard a
“Guardsman” brag about killing blacks in the Elaine violence, saying “them guard boys
[sic] was shooting ‘em down like rabbits.”55 With two different sources confusing the
National Guard with the active duty U.S. Army troops stationed at Camp Pike, it is likely
that many others in the state, including in the black community in Little Rock, would
have misremembered or simply confused the U.S. Army troops responsible for the
massacre with Arkansas National Guardsmen. In 1927, Governor Martineau called out
the National Guard to restore order when Little Rock experienced its last spectacle
lynching, had thus associating the National Guard with the last lynching in the state.56
The end result, of course, was that the Arkansas National Guard was undoubtedly a force
Arkansas blacks regarded with some suspicion, and often trepidation. Certainly this
history of the National Guard weighed heavily on the black students and their families.
The grandmother of one of the Little Rock Nine said that asking Guardsmen to watch
over the integration process at the school was like having “the wolf guarding the hen
house,” and added that “you certainly won't be able to count on those boys for help.”57
Thus, despite all the federal investment in the national reserves, the Arkansas National
Guard had one foot in the past, and one foot in the future.
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CHAPTER 3
FAUBUS
In September, 1957, a farmer of modest means from Greasy Creek, Arkansas, told
a reporter, “I told Orval not to hate anybody of any race. I told him people would think he
was narrow-minded and would look down on him.”1 That farmer was Sam Faubus, father
of the governor of Arkansas. That fall, Orval Faubus had become “an enigmatic and
contradictory figure” with his use of the state militia to prevent school integration.2
Orval Eugene Faubus was born in 1910 in a tiny log cabin in Combs, Arkansas.3
Orval’s family was on the very bottom rung of Ozark society, and he grew up searching
for work in the Depression, riding the rails, at times picking fruit as a migrant worker in
the north and northwest. With only an eighth grade education he managed to land a job
teaching school. He did not earn his high school diploma until age twenty-four.4 Faubus
enlisted as a private and served in the Army during the Second World War, but soon
earned a battlefield commission and served as an intelligence officer in Normandy and
the Battle of the Bulge. He left the Army a major, returning to Arkansas as something of
a local hero, having scrupulously written letters about his experiences back home to the
local paper, The Madison County Record.5
1. “What Orval Hath Wrought,” Time, Sep. 23, 1957, 12.
2. Pete Daniels, Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
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Arkansas Press, 1997), 3.
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Faubus piddled in local politics until he landed the job of administrative assistant
to Governor Sidney McMath in 1948. Faubus was not an “uneducated plow boy,” as he
was sometimes called . . . at least not completely. A populist leader, the son of a poor hill
country agrarian and a man of meager means, he had a certain charisma that appealed to
common people, both black and white. He also had a great deal of innate intelligence, and
an excellent memory, and was an ambitious and a very capable politician.6 He was
considered so politically astute that he was considered a possible vice presidential
candidate in 1956.7
He entered the Governor’s office in 1955 as a local-boy-done-good, a military
veteran, and a man with nearly two decades of public service as a county clerk,
postmaster, and state highway commissioner. Faubus allied with industrialists to bring
Sunbelt jobs and industries to the state. Faubus convinced Winthrop Rockefeller to take
charge of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission and began courting
businesses for the state, which made Faubus and Rockefeller “an interesting pair, the heir
of a robber baron’s fortune and the son of a hardscrabble Socialist.”8 Almost immediately
industries began building plants in the state, drawn by pliant localities, inexpensive
utilities, and most importantly, a cheap non-union labor force. Faubus played his
relationship off with Rockefeller by joking, “I told him I would go to their dinner and
contribute to the Republican Party in proportion to my wealth, if [he] would come to my
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Democratic dinner and contribute in proportion to his wealth.”9
Faubus was regarded as a racial moderate. One of his first acts was to expand the
Democratic Party committee by six members and fill all those seats with black
appointees.10 He once told a group that the Brown ruling was legal and “morally right,”
and that “If I had been on the court, I would have voted the same way myself.”11
However, by the time of his re-election bid in early 1956 he was facing opposition
by an incensed segregationist element. They were angry, Roy Reed later wrote:
helped open the Democratic party apparatus to black participation and had
appointed black leaders to the party’s state committee. He had started equalizing
the salaries of black and white state employees. He had overseen the quiet
desegregation of the public schools in five districts. He had helped Arkansas
become the first state in the South to open all its white colleges to black students.
He appointed a few blacks to state boards. He had given an Arkansas Traveler
certificate, the state’s official honor, to Mrs. Daisy Bates, president of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.12

Faubus succeeded in maintaining his reputation as a moderate until early 1956,
when he faced a primary challenge from James Johnson. Born in 1924 in Crossett,
Arkansas, Johnson was typical of the race-mongers in the Democratic party opposing
Faubus. He fashioned himself as both a political outsider and agitator, although he was a
well-connected party apparatchik. He was, like many “professional southerners,” a
conspiracy theorist and fearmonger of the first order. He believed the North was a terrible
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menace which had for far too long dominated and subjugated the South. He saw
communist infiltrators everywhere — federal government employees, soldiers, FBI
agents, virtually any outsider. Johnson soberly warned members of the Mothers’ League
of Central High School of an “active Communist cell in your own community”
throughout the summer and fall of 1957.13 Johnson and his minions routinely labeled
integrationists as “fellow travelers” and “communists.”14
Faubus’s response to the Southern Manifesto, signed by congressional leaders
throughout the South in 1955, had been telling. He approached Arkansas Representative
Brooks Hays, a highly regarded moderate, and told him he should sign it. Hays recalled
that Faubus told him that if he did not sign, he would find “the Ku Klux Klan and the
extreme Citizens' Council groups taking over the political life of the state, and that the
racists and the radicals would displace the moderates.”15 Faubus sought to outmaneuver
his political opponents by taking the steam out of their single-position candidacy. Of
course, embracing even moderate approaches to prevent integration meant that he
alienated the African-American community and the state’s small number of liberals.
In the hands of fear-mongers and ardent racists such as Amis Guthridge and
James Johnson, Faubus’s meager overture toward Arkansas blacks was fashioned into
race treason. In southern Cold War masculinity, integration was cast as “soft,” while
segregationist stances were “hard.” The segregationists intoned that strong, God-fearing,
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race warriors were needed, — men that would not back down from the enemy, men that
would use force and stand the test of their generation, men whose steel spine and iron
guts would see the community through the existential Soviet threat.
Johnson heaped abuse after abuse on the heads of the African-Americans in
Arkansas. In one infamous incident he produced a fabricated tape recording for a
Citizen’s Council of Arkansas meeting in Hoxie, Arkansas, which claimed that “the
NAACP and their insolent agitators are little concerned with an education for the
‘ignorant nigger’; but, rather, are ‘demanding’ integration in the white bedroom.”16
Propelled by the “twin engines of paranoia,” communism and integration, Johnson was
an energetic and effective foil to the easy-going and racially moderate Faubus.17
The “segs” in the state, though constantly threatening violence, largely
approached the problem from a legal angle. Segregation wrapped in religious rhetoric,
patriotism, fervent anti-communism, and bland legal jargon was an easy sell to the Little
Rock working class, which resented Little Rock Central High School being integrated
while the “silk stockings” at Hall High were not. The neo-Confederate imagery, which
would bolster the movement with racial hardliners, came later.
Little Rock School Superintendent Virgil Blossom’s plan of integration at Central
High hinged on the acceptability of gradualism, but he had not anticipated the classism
which was soon exploited by segregationist elements.18 Class was one of the problems in
Little Rock, beyond the obvious concerns over racism and white superiority. Blossom’s
16. McMillen, “The White Citizens’ Council,” 128.
17. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 31.
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plan worked on “attendance zones,” and Hall High, recently built in the fashionable
Heights area of west Little Rock, was a zone devoid of blacks. Central High, however,
had black neighborhoods in proximity. As one teacher said in 1956, it was widely thought
that “Blossom had promised the Heights people that they wouldn’t have to go to school
with the Negroes.”19
Faubus’s response to the Johnson challenge was to appoint a committee of white
Arkansas Delta residents to fashion interposition proposals along the lines of the Blossom
plan. They were watered-down strategies in comparison to those supported by the
Johnson firebrands. Faubus accepted these recommendations and mobilized support for
them.20 Faubus’s move toward tokenism was largely seen as mild appeasement of the
segregationists, a fact even the NAACP recognized.21 Faubus employed an
accommodationist strategy designed to sidetrack the diehard “segs” in the resistance
movement by accepting some of their complaints, and then continued with gradualist
integration, insisting the courts had forced them to do so.
In his 1956 reelection campaign Faubus stole Johnson’s single issue, stating that
he would “maintain segregation in a calm, orderly, thoughtful, and completely legal
manner,” and that “there will be no forced integration of our public schools and
institutions as long as I am governor.”22 Liberals and moderates in the state were loath to
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see the state move backward, to lose jobs and industries and the Sunbelt ethos that had
drawn them to the state in the first place. They were opposed by a group whose racial
rhetoric “invoked a flawed history that conflated segregation, the Lost Cause, religion,
and sex.”23
Faubus’s newfound political position was allowed him to “impede desegregation
while eluding legal accountability for his actions, to appear lawful while breaking the
law, to accede ultimately to federal authorities while avoiding a humiliating capitulation,
and to invoke the threat of violence while distancing himself from its roots.”24 Arkansans
voted for Faubus in overwhelming numbers. Frightened as they were of Johnson’s hellraising tactics, “large numbers of otherwise receptive voters” endorsed Faubus’s brand of
minimal compliance.25
Arkansas voters approved several new segregationist laws that November,
including Initiated Act 2, a school pupil assignment act that allowed parents to place their
student in a school other than the one in their locale, which meant that white students
could not be forced to attend an integrated school. Voters also approved The Arkansas
Resolution and Act of Interposition, which officially opposed integration, and adopted
Constitutional Amendment 44, the so-called Johnson Amendment, which sought to use
the haggard state’s rights argument of interposition to nullify Brown.26
In February of 1957 the legislature passed four laws designed to buttress the
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segregation program now endorsed by Faubus. The first ones, House Bill 322 and 324
created the State Sovereignty Committee — “a state gestapo organization,” in the words
of Winthrop Rockefeller. It required organizations such as the NAACP to be registered
and its membership to be monitored.27 House Bill 323 suspended mandatory school
attendance at integrated schools. House Bill 325 authorized school districts to use school
funding — something never in surplus in Arkansas schools, and something Faubus and
his predecessor Sid McMath had fought hard to expand — to fight integration.28
On April 26, 1957, the Federal Appeals court unanimously affirmed the Little
Rock school board’s gradualist “Plan of Integration,” a disappointing result for the
NAACP. The court said that “under existing conditions gradual integration of the schools
was administratively advisable” and that “the question of speed was to be decided with
reference to existing local conditions.”29 The much-discussed Plan of Integration was reworked to double down on minimal compliance. The original plan had predicted that over
200 hundred black schoolchildren were eligible to attend Central High School. The
school board, armed with the new Pupil Assignment Law and abetted efforts to
discourage black children from seeking to enter Central High School, had reduced the
numbers drastically.30 By the beginning of the school year in 1957, the board had
approved only 25-30 of the original 200 or more students for admission to Central.31
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Turned back by successful school integration in Hoxie, Fayettevile, Charleston,
and Lincoln, but emboldened by recent legislative success, Johnson and the “segs”
needed a victory. They picked Little Rock Central High as their battleground. Johnson
and Guthridge brought into Little Rock a Texas radio personality, rabble-rousing
Reverend J. A. Lovell, who warned that “there are people left yet in the South who love
God and their nation enough to shed blood if necessary to stop this work of Satan."32 In
August, the CCC followed up with Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin and former Georgia
speaker of the house Roy V. Harris, who galvanized public sentiment in Little Rock
against the Blossom plan. Griffin said, “I think my visit did make a little contribution to
the unity of the people.”33
Faubus now realized he could no longer simply pander to segregationists. He had
tried to use double speak and evasion as much as any politician could, but he was running
out of options. He would have to join them, or be defeated. As Elizabeth Jacoway said,
Johnson’s machinations in the summer of 1957 had “shut off Faubus’ wiggle room.”34
As segregationist rhetoric heated up in the capital city, on August 27, 1957, only a
week before school started, Mrs. Clyde Thomason filed a case in the Chancery Court of
Pulaski County asking for a restraining order against the school board to prevent the
integration effort.35 The case alleged that children in the school district were being
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required to enroll in certain schools in violation of the laws the Arkansas legislature had
adopted to prevent integration.36
The idea for the case actually had been created by Virgil Blossom, the Little Rock
school board, Governor Faubus, and the U.S. District Court Judge John Miller.37 They
hoped the state court would postpone integration until the federal court, under Miller,
could declare the segregationist laws unconstitutional. This ruling, they hoped, would
then clear the way for integration without risking conflict with the federal government
while protecting all parties from the of the segregationists.38 The case proceeded quickly
and was held in the Pulaski County Chancery Court before Chancellor Murray Reed, a
Faubus appointee, on August 29, 1957.
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Blossom departed from the script and
testified that he knew of no impending violence. Faubus, armed with reports from the
Little Rock Police Department and the Arkansas State Police, testified that there was a
high probability of violence and unrest if the plan was implemented. He feared mob
violence and told the court that “a crowd can assemble with the best intentions and
become a mob just because of two or three hot-headed people.”39 Based on Faubus’s
testimony, Judge Reed immediately issued a temporary restraining order, saying that the
order was “designed solely to preserve peace at a time when forces beyond the control of
individuals involved have created a situation which is perilous to the community and its
36. Branton, “Little Rock Revisited,” 258.
37. Reed, Faubus, 199.
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citizens."40 Faubus left the court feeling double-crossed. Blossom had downplayed
violence, leaving Faubus as the fall guy for defying the federal courts.41
Judge Miller also departed from the script by recusing himself from the case. He
called Chief Judge Archibald Gardner of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals who in turn
handed the case over to U.S. District Court Judge Ronald N. Davies, who had recently
arrived in the state from North Dakota.42 Faubus, Blossom, and the Little Rock school
board were stunned.
The next day, August 30, 1957, school board officials carried on with their plan,
unsure of the outcome. They filed a petition in U.S. District Court, requesting that
interference by the lower court or others be stopped, that the school officials should not to
be punished for violating the state court order, and of course, that if postponement of the
plan for integration was proper, then the court should instruct the school board as to its
responsibilities. After attending a meeting in private with Judge Davies and the school
board’s lawyer, Archie House, and NAACP counsel Wiley Branton reflected, “I was
strongly of the view that most of the school officials were really hoping that the court
would find a need to delay the implementation of the integration plan.”43 Davies
immediately declared that the state court was without jurisdiction and warned that
meddling with the orders of a federal court was a serious matter.44 He ordered that any
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“and all other persons” should cease “any manner, directly and indirectly, [of] interfering
or hindering" integration.45
Politically, Faubus was trapped. The time for arguments was over. Integration
must begin. He contended he was “not for or against integration in this matter, but only in
preserving peace.”46 Faubus had cited the police checks for weapon sale in the city and
had been warned by the Capital Citizen’s Council that caravans of armed men would
travel to Little Rock and shed blood to prevent integration. He undoubtedly knew that
out-of-state elements could appear and cause trouble, for instance, Hugh Adams,
president of the Mississippi Citizen’s Council, claimed that he could “raise a regiment in
Eastern Arkansas.” Mobs of armed men with “shotguns or other weapons,” would
“surround the school and keep the Negroes out.”47
Convinced as he was of this imminent violence, Faubus met with his cabinet and
charted a path to answer his central question. Should he act preemptively, preventing the
violence that would likely occur, or he should he wait and act after the fact?
Herman Lindsey, director of the Arkansas State Police, told Faubus violence at
Central High was possible. The cabinet discussed possible actions, one of which was to
call out the National Guard, though Faubus believed that was only necessary as “the last
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resort to maintain the peace and order.” Nevertheless, he ordered Lindsey’s state police
and Major General Sherman T. Clinger, the adjutant general of the Arkansas National
Guard, to be ready.48 The previous week he had told both men to screen their files for
men who had riot control training. Now he was signaling them to be prepared in case
those men were needed.49 Soon the word circulated among the Guardsmen that if they
were called in, they should bring the firing pin to their rifles, an order that unmistakably
meant a possible shooting situation was imminent, not just a standard training drill.50
A number of his associates called on the governor to warn him off. On Saturday,
May 31, former governor Sid McMath told Faubus to not interfere, that doing so would
“do irreparable damage to the United States in the eyes of the world.”51 On the other
hand, McMath also told Faubus that his interference might elect him to a third term.52
Even Winthrop Rockefeller visited with the governor that weekend, telling him his
interference would be a “serious blow to the state and the Arkansas Industrial
Development Commission.”53
As the moderates and liberals tried to warn Faubus off, the segregationists were
winding Faubus up with fears of the Klan firing upon the school and sending the capital

48. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 107.
49. Sherman T. Clinger, interview, September 6, 1957, UALR FBI Files; Reed, Faubus,
202
50. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 109.
51. Ibid., 112.
52. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 32; Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 112.
53. Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern, 108; Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 117.
49

city up in a race riot. Jim Johnson telegrammed him, and many of his supporters were
instructed to call and try to influence the governor. A steady stream of callers deluged the
governor’s mansion at the behest of Baptist preacher Rev. Wesley Pruden of the Citizen’s
Council.54 They sensed that Faubus was “at best a Johnny-come-lately to
segregationsim,” and that he needed to be coaxed into action.55 As Jacoway said, “Faubus
backed into the arms of the segregationists; in order to avoid looking like a fool, he
stayed there.”56
Meeting with his lawyer, Bill Smith, he said, “Bill, we’re going to have bloodshed
. . . I’m going to call out the Guard.”57 Faubus had plenty of circumstantial evidence to
support his claim that violence might occur, not only in the particular situation he faced in
Little Rock, but from previous incidences across the south. In Down from the Hills,
Faubus explained the dangers of school integration, beginning in September 1956, as
some of the first integration attempts in the South began — and were faced with violence.
He hailed Texas Governor Allen Shivers and the Texas Rangers for preventing “mob
violence and gunplay” during integration in Mansfield, Texas.58 He cited the riots in
Clinton, Tennessee in which Governor Frank Clement used National Guard tanks to
quash what Faubus called “a violent storm.”59 He mentioned other actions in Tennessee,
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including the use of National Guard tanks, n Knoxville, Dayton, and Oliver Springs.60 He
also cited similar violent outbreaks in Sturgis, Kentucky, and Texarkana, Texas.61
Faubus’s use of the National Guard rested mostly on local conditions and
concerns about his political future, thanks to threats whipped up by the Capital Citizen’s
Council. He was concerned about violence. When he made the decision to call out the
Guard he told Bill Smith, “Suppose a mother, black or white, comes into this office and
sits across the desk from me where you are sitting now and inquires of me, ‘Governor,
you testified in court that you had heard of possible violence at the high school. Did you
believe there was going to be trouble?’” If he answered yes, he would then have to
answer the obvious question: “Why didn’t you do something to stop it?”62 He called out
the Guard to avoid having “blood on his hands.” From this point on, Faubus kept
claiming that he never went against the court order to stop integration, and that his only
desire was to prevent bloodshed and maintain law and order.
When Faubus made his announcement on September 2, he said, “it has been made
known to me, as Governor, from many sources that there is an imminent danger of
tumult, riot, and breach of peace.”63 An FBI analysis found Faubus gave thirteen different
reasons for calling out the Guard over the next few weeks.64 The FBI sought to determine
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the veracity of each those thirteen different reasons but stated in its files that its
investigation “does not prove Governor Faubus had no basis at all for calling out the
Guard. It appears that he may have been inclined to rely on rumors, generalities, or
sources whose reliability he had not fully established to base his action on.”65 The FBI
evaluated the evidence he presented and came to the conclusion the he might have
believed he had reason to call out the Guard, even if the Bureau was not certain that he
did.
Nevertheless, Faubus stuck to his story in the following years. In one interview he
explained exactly what he feared would happen:
There would have been small, well-organized groups that morning there that the
school opened, armed to the teeth with repeating rifles and other firearms,
determined to halt by extreme means if necessary the entry of the black students
into the school. Now one group—and I have personal knowledge of this and I can
even name some of the individuals—unloaded their weapons at a town a short
distance east of Little Rock when they learned that the National Guard had been
placed on duty. Now, if the Guard had not been placed, these determined armed
men would have been there and the well-directed volley from the well-armed
group long skilled in the use of firearms could have left many dead and wounded
people.66
Faubus’s fears may seem sensational, but they reflected the sort of violence which
broke out in the mining town of Clinton and neighboring Oliver Springs, Tennessee.
There Governor Frank Clement used the National Guard to protect the integration
process. John Kaspar, a militant segregationist from New Jersey, brought worldwide
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attention to integration in the South, was arrested for inciting a riot in Clinton. Eventually
violence consumed the town and necessitated the use of “seven tanks, three armored
personnel carriers, and six hundred soldiers.”67 Racial agitators in Clinton erected
burning crosses, assaulted black neighborhoods, and attacked law enforcement and
National Guard forces. Segregationists eventually blew up the school in Clinton with
dynamite, causing some $300,000 in damage.68
Clinton served as the frightening, worst case scenario that Faubus feared was
coming to Little Rock. Any responsible leader certainly would have tried to avoid a
Clinton-type incident in Arkansas’ capital city. Of course, it was also exactly what James
Johnson and the White Citizens Councils wanted Faubus to think, and perhaps what they
wanted to see happen. In either case, violence in Little Rock was not a threat created out
of whole cloth; it was a real possibility with historical precedents.
The origins of military orders and directives, such as the “who, what, when, and
how” of a military operation, begins in the minds of civilian leadership. Thus, whatever
Faubus imagined he was preventing, whatever size of forces he imagined were arraying
against him, can be discovered not only in his own writings and interviews, but also in
the military operation that he ordered into action. The direct verbal orders to General
Clinger have been lost to history, but the concept of the operation — that is, the threat to
which Faubus was responding and his means of fashioning his response to it, can be
surmised by studying the operation.
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Sometime around noon on September 2, 1957, Governor Faubus ordered General
Sherman T. Clinger to surround Little Rock Central High that night. Clinger was born in
1906 in Maysville, Kentucky, a little town on the Ohio River nestled in the foothills of
the Blue Ridge Mountains. The primary business of the town was agricultural, and like
many in that region, that meant mostly tobacco. Clinger had been a civilian truck driver
before joining the Arkansas National Guard in 1935, enlisting in Battery A, 142nd Field
Artillery. He moved quickly up through the ranks, and was promoted to Second
Lieutenant in 1937 and First Lieutenant in 1939, the same year he married Mildred
Marlin near Rogers, Arkansas. He entered federal service in 1941, at that time as
commander of Battery F, 142nd Field Artillery and fought throughout World War II,
most notably at the breakout at St. Lo and in the Battle of the Bugle, eventually becoming
commander of 1st Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery.69 On January 14, 1955, Faubus
selected Lieutenant Colonel Sherman T. Clinger to serve as Arkansas’ Adjutant
General.70
Officially, the position of The Adjutant General (TAG) required a general officer,
that is, an officer holding the rank of general or above. Clinger was only a lieutenant
colonel, not yet a “full-bird “colonel, much less a general. He needed to secure a
promotion to general officer in order to become TAG. Col. Steve Rucker (Ret.), of the
Arkansas National Guard Museum, remembers hearing rumors that illuminate how that
situation was resolved. According to Rucker’s sources, Clinger did not have the required
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military education to reach the rank of general and the Army National Guard refused to
grant him the promotion. Evidently, Clinger then approached the Air National Guard, a
fairly new organization that was eager to grow its own powerbase in the various states
and which was jockeying for its share of the growing military reserve budget. While it
cannot be confirmed, Rucker suggests that the Air National Guard approved Clinger’s
promotion to general officer, putting one more State Adjutant General in the Air National
Guard’s pocket, a substantial political coup for the fledgling service.71 Whatever the
situation, U.S. Army National Guard Lt. Col. Clinger was promoted and became Air
National Guard Major General Clinger, apparently without ever having served a day in
the Air National Guard prior to this appointment.
The redheaded Clinger was described as “a strong willed commander,” and he
served as Adjutant General for twelve years, longer than any other state officer in that
position.72 Clinger was at the height of his career in 1957, and he had at his disposal
manpower which for over a decade had been in transition from a small, underfunded and
untrained parochial militia to a modern military force.73
At midday on Labor Day, Monday, September 2, 1957, Governor Faubus called
out the Arkansas National Guard. He met with General Clinger, assistant Adjutant
General Lt. Col. William Page, and Lt. Col. Marion E. Johnson at the governor’s
71. E-mail correspondence with Steve Rucker, Arkansas National Guard Museum, July 1,
2012.
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mansion. Given the three responsibilities that a military officer has to a civilian authority
— to act as a representative of the military, to act as a military adviser, and to execute the
mission given him — the officers certainly would have discussed the scope and length of
the mission.74 Clinger’s assigned mission was to preserve order in Pulaski County ahead
of the violence which Faubus anticipated accompanying the impending integration of
Little Rock Central High. Faubus’s verbal orders were later updated with written ones.75
The governor told the officers to “take no chances on vandalism or somebody planting a
stick of dynamite.”76 Johnson was told to arrange security at Central High and “to allow
no one except authorized personnel” inside.77 It was then up to General Clinger and the
other Guard brass to accomplish the mission given them, to preserve “law and order” in
Pulaski County.78
Clinger’s mission, as he reported to the FBI on September 6, included not only
Little Rock Central High, but also the newly built Hall High, and the Governor’s
Mansion.79 According to FBI files, Faubus had received a number of credible death
threats.80 According to William Page, there were about a dozen troops assigned to the
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governor’s mansion to “protect property and assure his privacy.”81 The use of troops at
Hall High – the number is unclear but it could not have been very high -- might have
been more a case of protecting the children of the Little Rock elites rather than concern
over integration, though Faubus recounted feeling as though Judge Davies had broadened
the original integration plan to include Hall High.82
Shortly after receiving the call from Faubus, Clinger notified the Guardsmen at
the State Headquarters at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, a small WWI-era military post a few
miles north of Little Rock, just across the Arkansas River. Clinger lived with his family
on the military post there, and his headquarters building and staff were all stationed
there.83 Clinger called up the state employees assigned to the State Headquarters
Detachment at Camp Robinson as a means of conserving funds on the emergency
mission. These men were Guardsmen on the weekends, but their full-time jobs were as
state employees of the Arkansas National Guard; it cost the state nothing to have the men
work at the school instead of their normal jobs. The units on the base were mostly
support units – mechanics, clerks, office staff, etc. Their selection indicates that a
premium was placed on time simply because they all lived very close to Camp Robinson,
or nearby, and could be mustered quickly. The initial call went out around 3:00 PM.84
Warrant Officer Carl Gaines was one of the Guardsmen called that day. Thirty-
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four-years-old at the time, from Ozark, Arkansas, Gaines had served in the Army during
World War II, first as a combat engineer, and later in the 333rd Harbor Craft Company,
which ferried supplies to Patton’s Third Army in northern France. Gaines returned from
the war and joined the Arkansas National Guard in 1947 because he “needed the money
at the time.” At the time of the Central High crisis Gaines was a Warrant Officer serving
in one of the mechanic shops on the post.85 Since he was already employed on a MondayFriday basis, his duty at Central High would have only a minimal fiscal impact on the
state budget.
Clinger’s preparations reveal a concern for fiscal tightfistedness, rather than
selecting those with riot training.86 It is likely that he hand-selected men like Gaines
based on their status as Guard “technicians,” rather than riot duty training. In addition,
the troops deployed to the school at night likely faced less danger than those deployed
during the day, when the presence of the black children would be more likely to provoke
violence.
Gaines recalled that, “We reported [to Camp Robinson], and they told us what it
was and they equipped us and gave us the necessary equipment. Shortly before dark, we
loaded on [a cargo truck] and we went to Central High.” Unlike Faubus’s insistence to
have troops specially trained for riot duty, Gaines had received no special training for the
mission. He was issued an M-1 carbine, helmet, and a nightstick. He was also issued one
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full fifteen-round magazine of ammunition, “with instructions not to load that weapon.”87
The issue of live ammunition indicated the gravity of the situation as it was never issued
during training and drills.
The various technicians and soldiers at Camp Robinson were formed into ad-hoc
units by Lt. Col. Henry McDaniel. Commissioned officers on the post were temporarily
made company commanders or platoon leaders. Gaines, as a warrant officer, was made a
squad leader with eight to ten men under his command. He and his squad formed up on
the corner of 16th and Park.
According to Gaines, the neighborhood was incensed at the arrival of the Guard.
“They thought that we were there to put those children in that school the next morning.
That was our intent.”88 As Gaines relates here, the initial deployment of the Guard did not
indicate that Faubus was acting to prevent integration. Gaines himself thought he was
going to protect the school as it desegregated.
Traffic was heavy around the school and people delivered catcalls and harsh
language toward the Guardsmen. “We were called everything,” Gaines said.89 The Guard
brought in four cargo trucks full of troops, and then later two half-tracks to block the
traffic around the school, forming roadblocks at Park and 16th, and Park and 14th.90 This
stopped the traffic, but the problems continued. Gains said, “We were hassled until ten
87. U.S. Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, U.S. Department of Defense,
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o’clock.”91
About 10:00 PM on September 2, Faubus made an announcement on the radio
and television. He stated his reasons for calling out the Guard, and he announced that
until order could be established, the schools would have to be “operated on the same
basis as they have been operated in the past.”92 Faubus was careful to depict the Guard as
neutral troops saying: “The mission of the state militia is to maintain order. They will not
act as segregationists or integrationists, but as soldiers."93 According to Gaines, once
Faubus announced that the schools would be operated as before and that troops were
neutral, “the rest of the night it was honey and roses. We had no more problems.”94
Faubus’s drawing of a firm line between “segregationists or integrationists” and
the soldiers did a considerable amount of good for integration. The supposed “neutrality”
of the troops would be an important theme throughout the crisis. This same language and
sentiment was used by Eisenhower and the soldiers themselves. The men were morally
placed “off-limits” from attacks by segregationists. As long as the Guardsmen could be
depicted as men “just doing their duty,” the segregationists could not attack them with
community approval. Calls for attacks against them were never really able to gain any
traction. As long as integration was protected by soldiers, it normally proceeded without
the attendant trouble which usually accompanied efforts using State troopers, police, U.S.
marshals, and other law enforcement. Faubus himself embraced this same position,
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answering that his duty as governor was to enforce peace and order and his actions were
“neutral” in that he had not acted against the federal court order and halted integration,
but rather preserved life and property.
These assertions were a way to preserve traditional southern masculinity in the
face of change. If southern white men had long staked a claim to preserve the safety of
the white community, it was their duty to protect the women and children, when threats
surfaced. Faubus, and through his announcements, the Guard, could claim the same
heritage. That the threat was potential lawlessness from segregationists also concealed,
paradoxically, the actual threat – black activism. Maintaining order, as Faubus claimed,
was a coded language, a way to contest southern manhood with the firebrand
segregationists. In essence, Faubus and the Guard asked their fellow southerners to
consider issues of martial identity and legitimacy as well as claims of white supremacy.
Faubus and the Guard trumped the segregationists in this public conflict over the
right to protect white society. To a large degree, Faubus’s initial action fired the first and
fatal blow in this battle over southern masculinity. His later popularity can best be
understood as a cultural paradigm shift, the adoption of color-blind language in place of
extrajudicial violence. This is not to say that racially motivated violence ended on
September 2, only that Faubus had, perhaps quite unknowingly, cut it out from the
acceptable public discourse. Of course, he played on racial fears and prejudice, but he
positioned himself as a moderate, and thus placed the Guard and military action as a
moderating force. This was a wildly popular move, and one which the south broadly
accepted; no Guardsman was killed during highly contentious civil rights missions, and
the south consistently rallied around its soldiers after the missions.
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Sergeant Bob Evans was another soldier sent to Central High that night. He had
been a Guardsman for five years. The son of a sharecropper near Lonoke, Arkansas, he
had only a ninth grade education when he joined the Guard at age 16. In 1957 he was
married with five children. The twenty-one-year-old was employed in the maintenance
shop at Camp Robinson and living on the post with his family.95
As Evans recalled, the purpose of the mission was not given. "I didn't know why I
was there . . . we were just told to go guard the school," he said. Shortly after arriving he
said the school "started getting a lot of curiosity seekers coming around.”96 Evans was a
bit concerned about possible violence toward the Guardsmen, and noted that he was
standing there “with an unloaded rifle." Later that night, after the Faubus announcement,
Evans reported that the night became eerily quiet. The guardsmen could hear only the
crunch of acorns on the street as the occasional car passed by, and in the distance they
could hear “the roar of the big cats at the Little Rock Zoo about three miles away.”97
Evans said, "About 10 or 11 o'clock at night, I told my fellow Guardsman, 'Man,
I'm hungry.' They didn't think about us over here with nothing to eat." About that time a
car approached, driven by an elderly black couple. “They pulled up, said 'Do you mind if
we get out and talk with you? Plus, we got some coffee and doughnuts.'" The couple was
of an older generation which, Evans thought, did not agree with integration.98 This might
have been a peace offering, an attempt to soften or deflect the white soldiers’ anger
95. “Former State Guardsman Recalls Central High Duty,” Associated Press, September
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against black children during the integration process. Evans, for his part, was nonchalant
about the duty. "We just had a job to do," Evans said. "We stayed all night long guarding
an empty building."99
Both Evans and Gaines emphasized two features about their experiences. First,
they said they were simply following orders. This was a way to explain away the
controversy of their actions, to deflect potential criticism for violating fundamental
southern social norms. Second, they emphasized the potential for violence, which was a
way enhance their claims to masculine martial values. Both employed here WyattBrown’s constructions of grace and honor, where honor can be expressed as “the decision
to defy conventional prejudice of one sort or another and stoically undergo the stigma of
shame” and where grace includes “acts of justice or mercy that include honor but go
beyond its secular meanings of status.”100
Around midnight, Clinger and Page met with Virgil Blossom at the administrative
offices of the Little Rock School District to discuss the details of the next day. During
that discussion it was decided that black personnel should not be allowed on campus.101
The next morning the Mother’s League of Central High held a “sunrise service” at the
school with a number of notable segregationists in attendance, and later, Mary Thomason
sang “Dixie” for the crowd.102
About this time National Guard reinforcements began to arrive, relieving the
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Guardsmen on duty throughout the night. The reinforcement included the fifty airmen of
the 116th Security Police detachment of the Air National Guard unit stationed at nearby
Adam’s Field, as well full-time state employees technicians who worked at Adam’s Field
for the Air National Guard.103
One of the Airmen was Don Crain, a twenty-three year old Staff Sergeant from
Little Rock. Crain had graduated from Central High in 1952. He joined the Guard to be
with his friends who made it sound “exciting.” Thinking of his involvement in the
operation, Crain said, “Well, naturally being a southerner, I was not for integration. I was
not raised that way. I don’t recall a lot of the newspaper articles or anything that was
going on at the time. I didn’t see me as being involved in it.” Crain remarked that of the
men in his Security Police unit, “We discussed [integration] after we were federalized . . .
most of them were of the same opinion as me. We really weren’t for integration. We
wouldn’t do anything to further it.”104
Unlike the state technicians who worked a full-time job for the Guard, Crain was
a part-timer who, like most Guardsmen, drilled one night a week, or only on weekends.
However, his unit was one of the few called up for the State Guard mission. According to
Crain, “They called up the whole Air Police squadron [because] we had the right training,
I’m sure.”105 He recalled being notified at his work, a Little Rock telephone company,
and being told that he needed to report to Adam’s Field the next morning. Reflecting on
this he said, “We were all excited . . . you know this is what we trained to do . . . we drew
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weapons and ammunition . . . we reported there [at Central] and they dispersed us there
around the school.”106
Airman First Class Doyne Plummer lived in Sherwood, Arkansas, at the time and
was one of the Air Guardsmen who travelled to Central High that morning. Born near
Beebe, and married only a month and a half, the twenty-two-year-old had joined the
Guard for educational benefits and to avoid being drafted into the active duty forces,
since he was in college. Plummer said he had not given much thought to the recent
integration troubles since, as a newlywed, he said, “my interests were on other things.”107
Plummer recalled appearing for work at his state technician job on the air base
and being notified that he should draw equipment and be prepared to go to Central High.
According to Plummer the fulltime state employees were rotated in an ad-hoc fashion to
cover part of the duty and relieve those standing guard at the school. Plummer recalled
the jittery ride from the air base through the city of Little Rock:
It was a weird feeling to be issued a helmet, rifle, and bayonet, ammunition belt to
put over your shoulder and live ammo, and all that. That was a strange feeling.
And I remember going out that first day in the back of one of those military
vehicles, an open truck type thing, we were going . . . through the neighborhood
and everyone looking at you. We were looking back and we were wondering what
we were doing, and I am sure they were wondering what we were doing. It was . .
. eerie, that here we would be [out in the city] with our rifles and ready,
supposedly, for combat . . . it was just eerie.108
Before being transported to the school he had been told very little about the
mission. “We knew it had to with security and Governor Faubus was saying that there
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was a possibility of some dangerous situations out there.”109 Like the others, he was not
told his duty was to prevent integration. Reflecting on his thoughts about the segregation
operation, Plummer said:
Well, even though I was very young at the time, to us what Faubus was doing was
for votes and political reasons. And I guess on the other hand, at that time, I did
not quite understand why the blacks would want to go to Central High. I mean, at
that time, the thought was ‘separate but equal.’ I think that a lot of money had
been spent on the black schools at the time, so I couldn’t understand if they really
had equal education, why that they would even want to be in Central. I didn’t
really have strong feelings one way or the other. If they wanted to enter, that was
fine. I didn’t have any problem with that, but the whole thing was really more I
think the governor looking to assure his political future.110
Air Guardsman Kinsley McKissack was another state technician employed on the
airbase at Adam’s Field who performed guard duty at Central High.111 McKissak was
twenty-eight years old, and like Plummer, he was given very little information, simply
told to draw equipment, board a truck to Central High, and then told to take a position on
the sidewalk outside of the school. The men lined up on the curb with arms outstretched
and fingertips touching to establish a uniform distance between them as a cordon formed
around the school, and then they simply stood at their assigned “post,” a specific position
on the curb, until they were given orders otherwise.112
The particular position a soldier was assigned and the manning of a “post” is an
important element in understanding the common soldier’s participation in the mission. In
basic military training, General Orders operate as guidelines for the soldier’s actions in
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absence of other direct orders. One of those General Orders is “to quit my post only when
properly relieved.”113 When ordered to stand a post on the curb at the school, the soldiers
and airmen were told to act, essentially as a human fence. If they needed a break of some
sort they had to be relieved, replaced by another soldier or airman who would then serve
that post until he was relieved. To leave their post for any reason and was to invite very
serious discipline.
McKissak said the only difficulty was standing his post in the heat. He said he and
his fellow Guardsmen “resented having to stand out in the hot sun with that unloaded M1.”114 Most everyone in his unit supported the governor’s action, though he said within
his unit that “one guy, I won’t say expressed a strong opinion, but he felt like it was the
wrong thing to do. One specific guy, and I guess there were others that I don’t remember,
but this guy felt like the black people should be permitted to go to school [at Central
High].”115
As the Guardsmen formed up around the school, they got a considerable
appreciation for the nature of the crowd, which grew larger by the minute. Guardsman
Carl Gaines explained that while the Guard protected the school, the Arkansas State
Police manned checkpoints around the school. While standing his post, he was informed
that the State Police wanted him to report to a checkpoint. At the check point the
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Arkansas State Police sergeant said, “Do you know this man?”116 Gaines recognized the
man as serving with him in 176th Ordnance Maintenance Company at Camp Robinson.
Gaines asked the man, “What are you doing over here, son?” He told Gaines, “I heard the
[unit] had been called up.” Gaines said, “You heard wrong, boy.”117
After the Guardsmen left the Arkansas State Police sergeant said, “Mr. Gaines,
what do you think this is?” Gaines said the sergeant had a large ratchet in his hand. The
sergeant said, “What do you think he was going to do with that?” Gaines said, “It looks to
me Sergeant that he was going to use it like a club.” The sergeant said, “I think you’re
right,” and tossed the ratchet into the back seat of his car. Gaines looked in the back of
the police car and saw “black snake whips, ice picks, knives that they had confiscated
from people that was [sic] trying to get to Central High.”118
Gaines’ narrative, like those of the other Guardsmen, emphasized the threat of
violence, and the role of the Guard to protect society in that environment. They not only
collected weapons, or saw the weapons collected at the checkpoints, but also knew the
nature of their own people. Gaines further made a point of explaining that a Guardsman
in his unit was a potentially dangerous individual.
Air National Guardsman Doyne Plummer reiterated that theme, reporting that
“there was a group of whites just down the block . . . and they got a little bit loud and
they were inciting each other. And I remember we put our bayonets on our rifles . . . and
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we just formed a wedge, and we started just pushing them back.”119 Plummer said as the
Guardsmen pushed the crowd back, he recognized one man in the crowd as a former
Guardsman. Gaines said, “I knew him well. He was out there with that crowd, and kept
pushing in and yelling and all that. And I just pushed against him, and said “What are you
doing here?” and I think he said some sort of profanity.”120
Plummer, like Gaines, related that he recognized among the protestors a former
Guardsman, who was not only present at the school but willing to get into an altercation
with his former comrades in arms who were conducting riot duty. By telling this story,
Plummer explained not only his role as a moderating force, but also the potential danger
at the school. If a number of potentially unreliable or unrestrained Guardsmen acted
against orders, as the Plummer and Gaines stories indicate was possible, it would take
very few such Guardsmen in uniform during the mission to present a significant threat to
the black children.
Arkansas State Police Trooper Mack Thompson was in charge of the Arkansas
State Police at Central High. Thompson spent twenty years on the force, and explained
the problem that the Guard and State Police encountered during the integration crisis.
Trooper Thompson said, “Our assignment was to make any arrests . . . The National
Guard didn’t have that authority.”121 At Central, Thompson said the mission “was a
terrible time. I tell you it was tough.”122 Thompson said:
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There were so many people there, white people, that were going to stop them
[black students] from going in. There was a big crowd around there. We were
afraid somebody was going to get hurt. We couldn’t have any of those kids get
hurt and some of those people [white crowd] might have if given the chance.123
Trooper Thompson described one of the people, “a railroad man” who “lived
across the street from the school.”124 According to Thompson, “He came over and told
us, ‘If you all will leave here and that National Guard will leave here, I have got a twelvegauge pump shotgun and there won’t be no nigger enter that school.’”125 Thompson, like
the Guardsmen, deflected any criticism of his manhood by emphasizing physical danger
and his role in defending white society from chaos and lawlessness. This construction
preserved his personal sense of honor and enhanced his claim as a moderating force.
While the Arkansas National Guard and the Arkansas State Police guarded the
school, the school board appealed to Judge Davies for relief from integration. The
Arkansas chapter of NAACP’s lawyer, Wiley Branton, said that because of the extreme
nature of the controversy, “I desperately needed the assistance of more experienced civil
rights lawyers.”126 The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund concurred and
Thurgood Marshall agreed to help Branton in Little Rock.
On September 3, Central High School opened with no black students in
attendance. The school board, evasive in accepting responsibility or blame, asked the
federal court for further "instructions" as to how it could proceed with Faubus’s

123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Branton, “Little Rock Revisited,” 260.
70

Guardsmen now in place.127 Judge Davies met with the school officials in a five-minute
hearing that evening, heard their meager protests, and then ordered the school district’s
Plan of Integration to be implemented. He said that he took at face value Faubus’s
statement that the Guardsmen would be “neutral troops.”128
Faubus’s indecisiveness, or perhaps coyness, was certainly the principal reason
the Guardsmen knew so little about their orders. If up to this point they were unsure
exactly what they were being ordered to do, it was because Faubus himself had not made
a clear decision himself. During a press conference on the afternoon of September 3,
before the Davies hearing, Faubus told reporters that “I have instructed the Guard to
maintain peace and order and that they may use their discretion . . . as it relates to the
peace and stability of the community.”129 Responding to a direct question as to whether
he ordered integration stopped, Faubus, incredibly, had decided to put the decision in the
hands of his military officers: “it will be left to the decision of the commanders. There is
a good possibility there will not be any integration tomorrow.”130
Faubus obviously was waiting for delay orders from Judge Davies and when they
did not manifest, as he explained in Down from the Hills, he gave the Guard “new orders”
just “shortly before midnight, September 3.”131 The initial mission parameters, Faubus
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stated, required “more specific orders.”132
Faubus said he based this decision on reports from “the Guard, the State Police,
and other sources,” which he said led him to believe that “grave danger” still existed at
Central High, even with 270 National Guardsmen deployed there along with virtually the
whole contingent of Arkansas State Police and a large number of Little Rock Police
Officers.133 He bemoaned the lack of federal assistance in keeping the peace, and that the
federal government was “taking no responsibility.”134
Faubus was enraged. He had been betrayed by the federal government, Judge
Miller, and Blossom and the Little Rock School Board. Arkansas liberals blamed him,
and then abandoned him. Yet, the firebrand “segs” cheered him on and fed him a steady
diet of conspiracies and threatening omens. Hold up in his mansion, he brooded. Late the
night of September 3 his choices ran out. It would be easiest, he determined, to protect
everyone if the black students “were denied entry to the school.”135 By making this
decision the person he was out to protect first and foremost was himself.
General Clinger, in his statement to the FBI, explained that while he had been
given verbal and written orders on September 2, in a conference with Faubus just prior to
midnight on September 3 those orders “were made more specific.”136 General Clinger
stated that he “interpreted these instructions to be a more specific mission from the
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Governor of Arkansas to prevent violence and preserve order.”137 Faubus had hoped that
by calling out the Guard for fear of violence, the court would put a stay on integration
and he would secure the “cooling off period” he so desired. Then the litigation regarding
the various segregation laws Arkansas had passed in 1956 and early 1957 continue while
the schools stayed all white. But for the second time, Judge Davies ordered immediate
integration.
It seems likely that violence would have occurred at Central High without the
presence of a peacekeeping force. Based on the statement of Guard and State Police
personnel, it was entirely reasonable to move forces into place to protect the school and
its students. However, when Faubus issued his new orders to the Guard to prevent
integration on September 3, he sealed his deal with the devil. The deployment of the
Guard was really a two-pronged approach – the first to stop violence, the second to stop
integration. Faubus could have accomplished the first and still complied with the court,
thus nullifying the need for the new orders. This action would have prevented Faubus
from defying the federal court and accomplished integration with the approval of much of
the country, and the world, as well as some sizable portion of his own state. As
Eisenhower himself said “I do not criticize you for calling out the Guard—our only
difference is that I would have given them different instructions.”138 However, Faubus
certainly knew that to use the Guard to “force” integration would have opened him up to
criticism by the CCC as an integrator and race traitor, and, he feared, would have ended
his political career. In trying to have it both ways, Faubus jettisoned his moderate
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credentials. But his insistence that the Guard was neutral in the process had unintended
consequences: it helped create space for a definition of southern masculinity which
protected white society while complying with federal orders.
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CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATION WEDNESDAY
September 4 dawned mildly for a late Arkansas summer. It was unseasonably
crisp and cool early in the gauzy rays of dawn, but the temperature rose like anticipation
throughout the remains of the day and the air steadily became more humid and sticky.
The stately campus of Little Rock Central High framed in leafy oaks, its reflecting pool
colored as the perfect cerulean blue of the sky above, its elaborate façade a juxtaposition
of Corinthian Columns, Gothic arches, and buff utilitarian brick, a sort of working-class
aspiration for greatness.
The morning air of the quiet neighborhood, heavy with the scent of gardenias and
fresh cut grass, was pierced by the ugly screech of heavy truck brakes and the reek of
diesel exhaust. Doors slammed, gruff voices barked orders. Khaki and olive drab
indicated the change of the guard. Like interchangeable parts the exhausted soldiers were
trucked out and fresh ones slipped into place. The cordon deformed and then reformed.
“Cover down! Cover down!” and after a few seconds pause “Attention! Parade Rest!”
The wall of soldiers fixed to the curb, stuck fast to their post, eyes shaded by their helmet.
With clubs in hand the officers prowled the lines, the grounds, and in time, the crowd
which formed slowly in ones and twos across the street.
For the white students, the soldier’s arrival had shattered the school year of 1957.
The GIs, happy to be any place but here, was a foul blot upon the sacred high school
scene, upon what the seniors considered their “enchanted domain.”1 As one female
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student said about the whole situation, “This was our senior year, why are you messing it
up?”2
Those held most responsible for “messing it up” were gathering their forces, too.
State NAACP president Daisy Bates had taken it on herself to personally coordinate the
integration process and had arranged for the students to meet at her home and then
convoy to Central High together.3 The details are rather sketchy, but at some point as the
court cases over Central High played out Bates decided the NAACP would help support
integration most by mentoring the selected students. She appeared at a meeting, Sunday,
September 1 in Virgil Blossoms’ office and declared she would mentor the students who
would lead integration at Central High.4
Bates was a noted activist in Arkansas, introduced to southern racial savagery
early in life in the southern Arkansas town of Huttig when she learned her mother had
been raped and murdered by three white men.5 She raged at her station in white society,
against the loss of her mother, and perhaps in self-loathing, too, but eventually she would
come to understand from her kind, loving, and powerful adoptive father that while she
should not hate white people for being white, neither should she suffer indignities for
being black.6 Some years later she married L.C. Bates, a friend of her father’s, and a
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journalist.
Shortly thereafter the couple moved to Little Rock and in 1941 took ownership
the Arkansas Free Press, which became a powerful voice in Arkansas for the equality of
African Americans. After responding to a report of police shooting of a black soldier
from nearby Camp Robinson, she reported that a black soldier in uniform stood and
watched as the dead soldier was taken away, removed his service cap and threw it to the
ground and stomped it, saying “Why should we go over there and fight? These are the
sons of bitches we should be fighting.”7 She then led the State Press on a month’s long
crusade against Little Rock police brutality.8 In her words, the effect of the papers’
campaign was profound as “Little Rock actually began to gain a reputation as a liberal
southern city.”9 Bates had her first taste of success, and had learned that the monolith
could be moved.
Bates had been active in civil rights circles since taking the lead of the Arkansas
branches of the NAACP in 1952. She also served on the board of the Arkansas Council
for Human Relations with white moderates Harry Ashmore, Edwin Dunaway, and Fred
Darragh.10 Bates was hardly a giant, at 5’3” and 100 pounds, and seemed an unlikely
warrior.11 But she was a natural leader, intelligent, level-headed, and utterly fearless. She
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was described as bold, passionate, fiery, even combative. Dunbar Ogden described her as
“pushy, aggressive, outspoken.”12 She was ready to defend herself, too. She and L.C.
went about armed. Bates often bragged of keeping her .32 pistol, “Old Betsy,” oiled and
ready.13
Armed, forceful, and relentless, the Bates’ confronted the status quo in Little
Rock in a time when much of the black community either declined to participate, or flat
out abandoned the NAACP and its plans. Bates’s assistant, Ozell Sutton, said the pair
were “as condemning of complacent black leadership as they were of what they
considered to be reactionary white leadership.”14 The couple faced a barrage of attacks
from Little Rock’s white community, including threatening phone calls, burning crosses,
and a rock thrown through her plate glass window with a note which said “Stone this
time, dynamite next.”15 In the face of it all, her supporters said “she had guts.”16
The group met the morning of September 4 at the Bates’ home. It was one of the
first group meetings of this resolute and truly exceptional group of black youngsters.
Their leader was Earnest Green, Earnie to the other black children, the lone senior in the
group. Son of a Little Rock school teacher, he was tall, smart, a bit shy. Green was
“coolheaded and serious,” having supported his family upon the death of his father. He
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possessed the single-mindedness and sensitivity necessary to navigate the minefield of
Central. Easygoing and affable, he could easily defuse tense situations with his infectious
grin, but it disguised a penchant for salty language and a clear understanding of the peril
the group faced.17 Motivated in part by his experiences with “petty segregation” in Little
Rock, Green was a willing activist even though he thought that because of Little Rock’s
moderate race relations he might experience “a few bumps, but certainly nothing as it
turned out to be.”18 Like the other young men in the group, Earnest was told in a meeting
by Superintendent Blossom that “You are not to date – or even look at – our girls.”19
Perhaps the most recognizable, and possibly the most despised of the black
children by the white community, was Minnijean Brown. Tall, confident, and
extroverted, Minnijean would have been in the popular set in most any school in
America. She had a penchant for making friends but sadly was about to enter an
environment in which her personality was no asset, but rather, a liability. “Her
unconcealed feeling that she was equal to the white students at Central, that she belonged
there,” Terrence Roberts said, “offended the white students more than any of the other
black students.”20
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Thelma Mothershed was an honors student at Dunbar Junior High, and though she
had a heart problem, her parents eventually relented and allowed her to attend Central.
Thelma suffered a mild heart attack the first day of integration at the school, though the
students agreed to keep that to themselves. According to Bates, the segregationists must
have had a “spark of decency in them” as they didn’t harass Thelma as much as the other
students.21 Described by Roberts as sweet and pleasant, he also noted that she was “tough
as nails in the trenches.”22
Jefferson Thomas, nicknamed “Jabbo,” was the group’s comedian, and though
“quiet [and] soft-spoken,” he was quick-witted and always ready to dispel a tense
situation with his sense of humor. Once when they were having a terrible day in the
school, Jefferson turned to Melba and broke the tension by saying, “smile, you're on
Candid Camera.”23 He was a gifted track athlete and had been president of the student
body at Dunbar Junior High. His sensitive demeanor probably made him a target for
more abuse than any of the other black students, but deep down, Roberts said, he had “the
heart of a lion.”24
Gloria Ray was the youngest child of two black professionals in Little Rock. Her
mother was a sociologist for the Welfare department and her father a retired
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horticulturalist. Gloria, an honors student, wanted to be an atomic scientist.25 She signed
up for Central without discussing it with her parents. Fiercely determined, Gloria,
according to Roberts, simply ignored the constant harassment at the school.26
Carlotta Walls was the youngest but also the most fearless. He father was a
bricklayer and a WWII veteran, and doted on his daughter, teaching her to be self-reliant.
Her aunt was the librarian of Dunbar Junior High, and like many of the staff at Little
Rocks’ black schools, gave her an icy reception when she found out Carlotta was going to
“that school.”27 Carlotta was athletic, driven, confident, and independent and was taunted
less than perhaps any of the other black students. Roberts felt her honesty and energy
carried her through.28
Melba Patillo was the most outgoing of the bunch. Roberts’ description of her was
one word: diva.29 She aspired to be a singer or Hollywood star and had copyrighted two
songs by the time she entered Central. The war of nerves inside Central wore on Melba
particularly hard. She and Minnijean were both good friends and like many teenage girls,
adored being the center of attention. Sometimes depicted as being haughty and
outspoken, Roberts said she simply did not “suffer fools gladly.”30
The group left the Bates’ to meet two blocks from the school where city
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policemen and a group of black and white ministers an interracial group of ministers
planned to “offer themselves as a moral shield of protection” in case the crowd was
hostile.31 These were Rev. Dunbar Ogden, Jr., his son David, and two black ministers,
Z.Z. Diver and Harry Bass. Once assembled, the group “squeezed past the olive-brown
trucks and half-tracks blocking the street at Central High” with Rev. Ogden in the lead.32
The Bates stayed back observing, careful not intrude less their presence upset the
growing and menacing crowd.
As the group approached the Guard cordon, Ogden described the Guardsmen as a
menacing presence, standing “every three feet . . . rifle at the ready – hard-eyed, helmet
low, back to the school, on guard.”33 The contingent of students and ministers made their
way to the Guard lines directly in front of the school where they were stopped by
Lieutenant Colonel Marion Johnson, the troop commander at the school.
Johnson was a twenty-year veteran of the Guard. Born in Utley, Arkansas in
1911, his mother died when he was only seven years old and he spent most of his
formative years in the home of his maternal grandparents. He married in 1932 while
attending Arkansas State Teacher’s College in Conway, Arkansas, and later taught school
in various rural school districts. He joined the Army National Guard in 1937 and by 1940
had attained the rank of sergeant. He was commissioned an officer during World War II,
served in Alaska in the Aleutians Campaign and returned to Arkansas where he worked
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in various teaching and educational positions. Johnson was the senior battalion
commander of the state’s 153rd Infantry Regiment in the fall of 1957 and he was selected
by Gen. Clinger to lead the operation at Central High.34
Rev. Ogden asked Johnson, “Are you here to see that these children enter this
school or to prevent them from entering?” Johnson motioned to the students with his
nightstick and announced that “The school is off-limits to these people.” When asked
further about the situation, Johnson said “During the night my orders were changed by
the governor.”35 Johnson then turned and walked back through the cordon, leaving the
“young black intruders at the mercy of hundreds of hostile white people.”36 Johnson later
said of the duty that it was “an uncomfortable situation” for the Guardsmen.37
At approximately the same time as this conversation was occurring, Elizabeth
Eckford stepped off the city bus and into a veritable lynch mob. Because Eckford’s
family did not have a phone, Elizabeth Eckford was not notified about the gathering at
Bates house or the gathering at the school. Instead, she arrived alone for what she
believed was going to be her first day of school at Central High.
Eckford was tiny, barely over 5’ tall, but intelligent and a voracious reader, she
hailed from a poor family. Her father was a laborer and her mother worked for the
Arkansas School for the Blind and Deaf Negro. Raised in Little Rock, Elizabeth was the
favorite of her grandfather, Oscar Eckford, a WWI veteran and owner of the local grocery
34. Information provided by e-mail, Johnson’s nephew Kirk Jennings; Arkansas National
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store.38 Elizabeth was also terribly shy, a loner, uncomfortable among crowds and strange
people, a fact which only magnified her horrific plight that day as she approached the line
of some 270 Arkansas National Guardsmen ringing the school.
As she stepped off the bus and walked to the corner of Fourteenth and Park,
expecting to find safety from the segregationist crowd, Staff Sergeant Don Crain, from
the 116th Security Police Squadron of the Arkansas Air National Guard stopped her.
“Our orders,” he recalled, “were to use whatever force necessary to turn them away.” The
orders were explicit that there were to be “No niggers in the building.”39 He claimed,
unlike the other Guardsmen, and in contravention of orders that day, that his rifle was
“locked and loaded.”40
As it turned out, the only force necessary was for the airmen to stand shoulder-toshoulder and hold their rifles at port arms, blocking Eckford’s path. As she approached
the corner Crain said nothing, he simply stood holding his rifle as he pointed for her to go
back across the street. As Crain explained it, “so much happened at once there on that
corner, you know the photographers, the crowd, the black kids. It was, it was . . . just a
bunch happened there within a few minutes . . . [it] was an exciting time out there . . . you
know, we had the adrenaline flowing.”
One Guardsmen nearby gave her the time, another told her, “very politely,”
Doyne Plummer said, that she needed to see the commander. None of the other
Guardsmen spoke to her. No one explained that she could not enter their lines. No one
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offered to escort her to the commander. Instead, in silence, the soldiers blocked her way
and then pointed for her to cross the street where the surly crowd had noticed her and was
beginning to turn threatening.
Eckford began walking toward the entrance of the school a block away, a
threatening crowd growing as it seethed behind here. At that point, Plummer, explained,
“some people followed, shouting profanities and so forth.” He said, “if I was her at that
point, I would have felt a little bit frightened, because something could have happened. I
would have been frightened . . . but we were there and watching very closely.”41
Plummer, reflecting on Eckford’s walk that morning said, “I think we should have had
some guardsmen around her, escorting her, instead of letting her walk basically alone
down [to the bus stop].”
In fact, the Guardsmen were frightened. Lt. Col. Johnson, reflecting on potential
for danger that day said, “You bet your life the potential was there.”42 Johnson said,
“There were a few [people] that were there just to stir up any trouble they could,” and
that the crowd was “hostile to us . . . which is very unusual, for a local crowd to be hostile
to the National Guard in any way.”43 He explained that the reason they were hostile “was
they did not know what we were going to do.”
Johnson’s assistant was Major Joseph J. Milhoan from Hartford, Arkansas.
Thirty-seven years old at the time, Milhoan had also been in the Guard twenty years and
served six years active duty during WWII as an infantry platoon leader. He stated of his
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observations at Central that day that “I personally believe that there would have been
bloodshed if the National Guard had not been on duty.”44 Milhoan said “the people were
up in arms and there would have been violence if we had not formed a strong line [at the
school].”45
Don Crain also said the crowd was in a dangerous mood. Crain said, “I think they
were . . . inflamed. And that did concern me. Yes, it did concern me.” He described the
crowd as “pretty testy that morning,” as “angry” and “cross” and explained that “their
tempers were running pretty high.”46 Lt. Col. William Page, the Assistant Adjutant
General, who was at the school on occasion, also felt that “there would have been
violence – extent unknown.”47
Asked if the crowd would have hurt Eckford without the Guard’s presence, Crain
said “a few would have, yes.” He had spotted a couple of people he knew personally as
troublemakers. One was E.A. Lauderdale, board member and leader of the Capital
Citizens Council. Lauderdale was later arrested and imprisoned as the ring-leader of
Labor Day bombings in Little Rock in 1959.48
According to Roy Reed, a phone call campaign had begun the day before
integration began in order to generate to generate a crowd of protesters; the callers said
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they were doing it at the request of Governor Faubus.49 The confirmed presence of the
White Citizen’s Council leadership at Central High on September 4 lends credence to
their organized involvement in the protests at the campus.
As Eckford walked the length of the two blocks in front of the school the crowd
grew behind her. It was enraged, aggressive, and surged up behind her, swirling with
dark, brooding figures shouting, “Lynch her! Lynch her!” Others said “Go home nigger!”
and “Go back to Africa!” Eckford looked for help, but found no sympathy. One woman
spat upon her. She turned to try and enter the school a last time but the line of soldiers did
not move and so she had no choice but to continue on toward the bus stop at Park and
Sixteenth. During this walk Will Count snapped the famous photo of Hazel Bryan
snarling behind Eckford.
However, shortly after this the crowd began to dissipate. Johnson said once the
crowd understood that the Guard was going to turn the black children away that the
Guard “had their support a hundred percent.”50 Several Guard officers left the lines with a
few troops and ordered the crowd to stay back. Television footage shows the presence of
several guardsmen – some in khaki uniforms, others in olive drab fatigues – walking
beside and behind Eckford as she made her way toward the bus stop.51 School
Superintendent Virgil Blossom also related that “a few young spectators had attempted to
lunge at the Negroes, only to be seized by the soldiers, searched for weapons and then
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thrust back into the crowd.”52
According to the Arkansas Gazette as Eckford walked to the bus stop “a woman .
. . was pushed back by a guard officer.”53 As Elizabeth sat for 35 minutes surrounded by
a crowd of people shouting obscenities and threats a “guard officer told the crowd to
move back and it complied.”54 When Terrence Roberts later appeared across the street
and approached Elizabeth, “one white youth moved toward him but was held back by
Guardsmen.”55
Footage from CBS reporter Robert Schakne’s insensitive attempt to interview the
traumatized Eckford clearly depicts at least three guardsmen, one standing directly
behind Eckford and facing the crowd behind her, nightstick in hand.56 One Guard officer,
Maj. Lilburn Harris, assigned Sgt. William Corker to protect Eckford until she boarded a
bus.57 Corker stood directly behind Eckford, armed with a carbine and thirty rounds of
ammunition. He said he was frightened because “there was menace in the air.”58 Corker
said he wanted to console Eckford, and could see the tears running down her cheeks, but
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felt to do anything to support her would have been unwise in such an angry crowd.59 This
evidence confirms Historian Grif Stockley’s assertion that “the presence of the National
Guard saved Elizabeth Eckford from attack.”60
The Guardsmen succeeded – barely – in keeping the peace that morning. Doyne
Plummer, reflecting on that morning said, “I wouldn’t say that we were the most
disciplined unit in the history of the military,” but he added, “I think in that day and age,
just our culture and make up and such . . . we knew that this was military, and there was a
chain of command, and you obeyed your chain of command.”61
The Arkansas National Guard response was ad hoc and unorganized as the threat
to Elizabeth Eckford materialized, but it was clearly unwilling leave her to tender mercies
of a racist lynch mob. While they personally held feelings that were not in agreement
with integration at the school, they also were required to follow orders from the governor
to keep the peace. They were ordered there to protect people and property in the vicinity
of the school and closely supervised by experienced and high-ranking officers. In
addition, if they had refused to save Eckford they could have made no claim to contest
their manhood in the face of the segregationist insults. By protecting Eckford in the face
of a “hostile” crowd they demonstrated that it was a “color-blind” and “law and order”
approach which protected the south, not extralegal violence.
The guard also dealt with other “threats” in the operation. General Clinger and Lt.
Col. Page were present in the early phases of the operation. The two were completely out
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of their depth with the media circus that developed at the school. Neither had much
military education or a staff of public relations officers to advise them. They
demonstrated an almost unbelievable lack of tact and public relations skill. The two
participated in an ill-advised episode of dressing down the press corps at Central High for
what they perceived as “endangering the preservation of peace.”
The two highest ranking Guard officers objected to the newsmen interviewing the
vocal and ardent segregationists gathered at the school. Page told several reporters,
including noted New York Times reporter Dr. Benjamin Fine, “Why do you want to select
those people who are so damn radical?”62 In a rather amateurish and naïve attempt to
restrict what they saw as unfair reporting, the ranking officers attempted to restrain and
even censor the reporters on the scene, threatening the newsmen that they could be
“ceased, evicted, and possibly held.”63
According to Fine, Clinger told him in a private conversation, “you better watch
out or you may get your head smashed.”64 The Race Beat described this conversation as
fatherly advice.65 However, Clinger did not forget Fine’s actions. He later reported in his
statement to the FBI that the journalist had tried to incite the crowd.66 Lt. Col. Marion
Johnson later told Fine, “The governor said we’re going to have peace, and that’s what
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we are going to have.”67
However, the Guard brass was not the only ones who felt the newsmen were
sensationalizing the event. The Race Beat described the news coverage as so hot, so
visceral, so hungry for images and a story that it was not “clear what was real and
spontaneous, what was engineered and manipulated.”68 Guardsman Doyne Plummer
recalled his unit was upset about the news coverage and its inciting of the crowd:
They were trying to outdo each other, trying to out headline the next person. And
during most of the time I was out here, like I said, there was as many news media
. . . as there was white people . . . I feel like some of the media probably
encouraged the white folks, [took] them aside and talked to them and said “What
are you going to do about this?”69
Of course, these objections were not just that the crowd was being encouraged to
display a “photogenic tizzy” for the newsmen, as some claim it was.70 Rather the real
problem was that the news coverage was reporting the scene without a middle-class
Southern filter, that is, it was reporting to the world a raw, unadulterated southern racial
temper.
This was not the Sunbelt South of an Atlanta or Savannah Junior League, not the
romantic “midnight and magnolia” South, the South of fine manners and gentility, or
even the folksy and neighborly South of Lil’ Abner and Mayberry. This was the real
South on display, an incensed South in full view for the all world to see, and with
television cameras rolling for the first time. It was angry, loud, vicious, one notch down
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from the run-of-the-mill spectacle lynching of the previous generation. It was entirely fair
to describe Eckford as being the near-victim of lynch mob, and while the description
suited Guardsmen when it satisfied their claims of defending lawn and order, they felt it
was a less acceptable depiction in the hands of unsympathetic outsiders.
Naturally, such a depiction did not set well with the law enforcement personnel
present. Arkansas State Police Trooper Buren Jackson said, “It wasn’t as bad as what the
press displayed. They would take one incident and blow it up on the front page of the
paper. You were there and you knew there weren’t any lives in danger. There might have
been if there weren’t officers there.” Jackson described one incident:
There was an old black guy in a pickup truck that came through there. He worked
on lawns and he came through in an old pickup truck with rakes and things in the
back. He didn’t know what in the Hell was going on. He just got lost. Those old
rednecks got to beating on that truck and rocking it a little bit. National television
and every press agency were there and they would blow an incident like that up
even though the rest of the time was a dull day.71

For a southern State Trooper accustomed to that sort of treatment of black
citizens, this may have seemed comical or routine, but it certainly was no laughing matter
to the victim, or to those outside his level of racial callousness. To newsmen this was not
a “dull day.”
Nevertheless, the reporter’s did occasionally cross a sacrosanct line. They inserted
themselves into the story, and perhaps even intentionally ginned it up in order to report a
more exciting story. At one point the cameraman for CBS television reporter Robert
Shakne missed the shot of the enraged crowd as Eckford passed them. Shakne waited

71. Buren Jackson, interview by Michael Lindsey, taped interview.
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until the cameraman was ready and then shouted to the crowd, “Yell again!”72 In doing
so, “the lawn at Central High had become the set, the television reporter had become the
director, and the demonstrators had become his actors.”73
Air Guardsman Peter McKissak reportedly witnessed another such occurrence:
We had several officers, the Adjutant General was there and several high
ranking officers, there was a little guy approximately 5’ 4” or 5’ 5’’, a
photographer for Life magazine. At a service station across the street there on the
corner on 14th street, there were probably 40 or 50 adults over there gathered up
there waiting to cause trouble of some kind. That little photographer, with two or
three cameras hanging around his neck, would go over there and get them all
stirred up and when they were about ready to get their hands on him, well then he
would run back across the street behind the line of troops that were standing there.
So, I don’t remember if I told Major Shelton, or maybe one of the other guys
standing by me, but two or three of us discussed it, and Major Shelton came by
and we pointed out to him was happening out there . . . that the reason the crowd
was angry was because that photographer was over there stirring things up, see.
Well, he’d run across the street and then turn around and then take pictures of the
angry crowd. Those pictures were published in Life magazine. So Major Shelton
went up there and told the General [Clinger] what was going on. The General told
that guy and said ‘now you can stay here or you can stay over there, but the next
time you go back over there you are not coming back here.’ That was the end of
that, you know, that kind of cooled the crowd down over there.74
Guardsman Carl Gaines made a similar observation about the inappropriate
conduct of the reporters, saying, “The news media was all over us. They were constantly
running up, sticking a mic in your face, wanting to know ‘what are your comments’ and
stuff like that . . . Life and all the major, major networks were there. All the magazines
were there.”75

72. Roberts, Race Beat, 161.
73. Ibid.
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75. Carl Gaines, interview by Arkansas National Guard Historical Branch, taped
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Neither General Clinger nor Lt. Col. Johnson ever attempted to use the National
Guard to disperse the crowd at the school. Blossom claimed that the Guard “abetted” the
crowd at Central High, and there may be some validity to that claim, though Page denied
that was the case, saying, “I do not subscribe to Blossom’s statement.”76 Major Milhoan,
Johnson’s assistant in command, felt this was “ridiculous.” He said if Blossom “had
stood guard for 12 to 18 hours on the street he would have . . . [seen] that the Guard
prevented violence.”77 Johnson, in discussing this particular element of the operation
argued that as long as the crowd did not break the law or become violent it was allowed
to stay, just as Governor Faubus had intimated.78 The fact was there were not enough
troops to disperse the crowd had the Guard been ordered to do so.
Whatever their reasons for not dispersing the crowds, there is little doubt that the
conflict with the press reflected poorly on the Arkansas Guard as a whole, both from the
viewpoint of the newsmen, and all across the nation. The U.S. Army did not fail to notice
this. On September 27 the U.S. Army ordered the newly federalized troops: “No efforts
should be made to control the news media representatives on public property so long as
they do not [original emphasis] interfere with the carrying out of the military mission.”79
Over the next few weeks, as the courts and politicians struggled for some sort of
way out of the situation, the Guard stood by at Central High. Within a few days the

76. Virgil Blossom, It HAS Happened Here (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959),
209; Wachs, 2.
77. William R. Wachs, correspondence from Col. Joseph Milhoan.
78. Marion Johnson, interview by William R. Wachs, taped interview.
79. Arkansas National Guard Command Report, Appendix 2, Annex C, September 28,
1957
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crowd disappeared and the numbers of troops dwindled down to a little more than dozen.
With little chance of danger, the Guardsmen relaxed, representing anything but military
efficiency. With no threat or danger present, the Guardsmen took breaks on the front
lawn, where they could be seen sleeping and generally acting lackadaisical. As one
historian put it, “the troops did not even attempt to keep a semblance of military
comportment and socialized with the high school girls.”80
Doyne Plummer spent several days on the campus after the initial crisis died
down. He said they mostly spent time relaxing under the school’s shade trees. “We would
gather under those trees,” he said, “and we would have our water and maybe some snacks
. . . The thing I remember most about Central High was sitting under the trees and
learning to play hearts. That is the way we passed the time.”81 Hot, tired, and bored, the
Guardsmen lost all semblance of military bearing, and this minor unprofessional lapse
eventually came back to haunt the military and its charges for the remainder of the
operation.
Central High students, a number of whom would later materialize as the gravest
threat to the black activists, watched the lax Guardsmen with disgust. Craig Rains, a
Central High student, said of the Guardsmen, “We made fun of them . . . there was no
discipline among the National Guard members.”82 Rains explained how the students and
Guardsmen interacted on the campus:

80. Wachs, “Off Guard,” 397.
81. Plummer, interview.
82. Ralph Brodie and Marvin Schwartz, Central in Our Lives: Voices from Little Rock
Central High School 1957-1959, (Little Rock, AR: The Butler Center for Arkansas Studies,
2007), 154.
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The National Guard [included] some of the students from Central High, who,
eighteen years old, had just joined the Guard, probably went to summer camp that
summer. And they found themselves with rifles, standing there, face to face, with
their fellow classmates . . . it was a funny feeling to see your friends there, with
guns, on the campus. And they were very uncomfortable about it, too. . . They
didn't know how to react, what to do, they were just following orders. And it was
very lackadaisical; it was almost a joke to some of them. They laughed about it.
They were very casual about it. And they were not as strict and disciplined in their
actions as the federal troops that were going to follow them.83
Central High student Charles Oakley recalled thinking of the Guardsmen that “we
might be in tough times if we were counting on them to defeat the Red Menace.”84 An
article in the school newspaper, The Tiger, made clear that the laid-back soldiers were not
admired by the student body. The article said of the Guardsmen:
. . . there is the one who, after taking one last look around, retires to his grassy
world of dreams. He can be aroused only by the mention of food or drink. . . on
some sections of the campus [newspapers] become very handy card tables for
those who can’t sleep in the daytime . . . I really don't know what we did for
entertainment before these nice helmeted boys came to our campus.85
A nearly full-page photograph in the school paper was titled The Big Snooze; it showed a
number of rag-tag guardsmen sprawled out on the grounds of the school, helmets tipped
over their eyes.86
The Central High student body vehemently disapproved of any military presence
on their campus, and particularly of the National Guard soldiers. The exhibition of a
relaxed, unmilitary bearing was a critical mistake and set up both the Guardsmen and the
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Little Rock Nine for many problems in the future, making the job of cowing the
segregationist students much more difficult. The Guardsmen brought much of this upon
themselves.
However, the commentary from the students exposes the contested nature of
southern manhood at Central High. Segregationist feelings, revealed in their derogatory
comments aimed at the Guard, sought to delegitimize the Guardsmen as protectors and
soldiers. They laughed at them and mocked them, suggested they would be of no help
against the “Red Menace,” and referred to them as “boys.” This was justified in part
because the soldiers were not acting as soldiers, because they demonstrated a lax attitude
in their duty, and therefore opened themselves up to criticism from the group which most
resented them, even when the black children were safely absent. However, these same
students later fiercely battled with the Guard for control of the school. Their comments
then should be read with some consciousness of self-justification of the students’ later
actions.
The context of these criticisms is that the southern man was expected to be
disciplined, and if he failed, his manhood was instantly stripped away – or at least, the
student claimed, they were justified in claiming such. In later exchanges in the halls of
the school the students repeatedly tried to provoke the soldiers into an undisciplined
response. Guardsmen displayed professionalism, honor, manhood, by refusing to
respond, and over time the taunts and attacks ceased. It might be that the Battle of Little
Rock was as much about reifying a post-WWII southern manhood in the Civil Rights era
as it was about beating back federal interlopers.
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CHAPTER 5
SKILLED, TOUGH, AND READY AROUND THE CLOCK
From the standpoint of the U.S. Army in 1957, with nearly a million men in
uniform serving around the world from Saigon to Berlin, the whole planet – willing or
not – fell under some sort of Army hierarchy.1 The United States fell under the control of
West Hemisphere Division and its Continental Army Command, or CONARC.
CONARC itself was split into various subdivisions, one of which was the Fourth U.S.
Army, its headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas.2 The Fourth Army, as
it was called, controlled a multitude of other subordinate commands, among them U.S.
Army Military District, Arkansas (USARMDA), whose commander was Major General
Edwin Anderson Walker.3
The picture of a sober military commander, what Harry Ashmore called “a model
of aloof correctness,” the tall, lanky Walker was born on November 10, 1909, in Center
Point, Texas, a small rural farming community.4 He possessed a rigid military bearing
and presented himself as an unflappable character. His favorite expression was "check," a
word one journalist said “he snaps to indicate a mission has been accomplished or that he
understands his orders.” During World War II, Walker reported to the duty officer at the
headquarters of a new unit to which he was assigned, but was informed upon his arrival
1. “Military Personnel on Active Duty: 1798 to 1957,” Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1957, United States, Bureau of the Census, 736.
2. Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas (Histories Division, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1967), 19.
3. “Walker to Head Arkansas Military District,” Hope Star, July 3, 1957, 3.
4. “Gen. Edwin Walker, 83, Is Dead; Promoted Rightist Causes in 60's,” New York
Times, November 2, 1993.
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that he was unqualified, since he had not completed paratrooper training. When Walker
heard this he turned and grabbed a parachute from a nearby table, and then boarded a
plane full of paratroopers about to depart on a training jump. As it was taking off, he said
to a subordinate, "How do you put this thing on?" He received a few minutes briefing on
the device, then jumped from the airplane, landed safely, returned the parachute to the
training officer, and said “Check.”5
Walker’s brusqueness disguised a rather heartless concern for others. Years later,
when Walker was commanding general of the 24th Infantry Division in Germany, a
soldier at a duty desk received an early morning call from the general. Walker told the
young soldier that he needed another driver sent to his quarters to retrieve him because
his driver had just “parked in the garage and committed suicide.” The soldier said, “I will
never forget the nonchalance in his voice.”6
Walker has been called “the Forrest Gump of General Officers” for his lengthy
and bizarre career.7 Walker graduated 229th out of 296 from the United States Military
Academy as a lieutenant of artillery in 1931. During World War II he led a commando
unit called the 1st Special Service Force, a composite unit of Americans and Canadians
which was specifically trained for amphibious, airborne, and mountain warfare. The unit
fought in Alaska and Europe, mostly in Italy and southern France. A book about the unit,

5. “He Guards the Peace,” New York Times, September 25, 1957, 18.
6. Bob Rowen, “Right vs. Left Politics in the Cold War and the Improbable Saga of
Major General Edwin Walker,” CUNY Graduate Center to the New York Military Affairs
Symposium, May 29, 2009.
7. Ibid.
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The Devil’s Brigade, was later made into a movie.8 In a strange coincidence of history,
Walker’s commando force and the 206th Coastal Artillery and 153rd Infantry Regiment
of the Arkansas National Guard served together for a few weeks on the assault on Kiska
Island, in early August 1943.9 Walker ended World War II in Norway, processing
German prisoners of war. During the early days of the Korean War he found himself in
Georgia where he helped establish and train the first students at Fort Benning’s new
Ranger Training Center, which was built in part to emulate his World War II commando
unit. Later in the Korean War he commanded the artillery on Heartbreak Ridge and led a
regiment in the Third Infantry Division.10
In August 1957, Walker arrived in Little Rock, with a reputation as a “soldier’s
soldier,” proud of his recent promotion to Major General.11 It is probable that Walker
found himself in Arkansas because he had plenty of combat and command experience
and needed to “punch his ticket” in an entirely state-side administrative role. However,
his new position must have felt like a rather significant demotion from his previous plum
assignment as artillery commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.12 While in

8. Robert A. Black, A Ranger Born:A Memoir of Combat and Valor from Korea to
Vietnam (New York: Random House Publishing, 2002), 58; Rowen, “The Improbable Saga of
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National Guard in the Aleutians in World War II (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press,
1992), 313.
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(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 141; Rowen, “The Improbable Saga of Major
General Edwin Walker.”
11. David Talbot, Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2008), 72; “Second Star for Gen. Walker,” The Kerrville Times, May 7,
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Hawaii he had lived on officer’s row among the marvelous colonial plantation-style
homes at the beautiful Scholfield Barracks on Oahu, site of the James Jones novel From
Here to Eternity. The Oahu base had large and lavish training facilities and thousands of
hardened troops for generals to march hither and thither in endless training cycles.
Walker’s new assignment in Arkansas, however, was in a small, stifling, and non-descript
office building in downtown Little Rock. His staff was tiny and inexperienced. There
were no lavish officer quarters either; for perhaps the first time in his life he found
himself in a modest apartment without so much as an aide.13
Walker’s tasks as the head of USARMDA were entirely perfunctory, consisting
mostly of administrative duties within the state. He controlled the budgets for a number
of small Army Reserve programs and units. He oversaw training, judiciary issues,
building rents, leases, and any number of other managerial tasks common to stateside,
non-combat duties. The artillery unit he left in Hawaii consisted of 5,000 men. In
contrast, the small headquarters in Little Rock had fewer than 70.14 In short, Walker had
fallen from commanding a large combat force in sunny Hawaii to riding a desk in
backwater Arkansas. The former commando, Ranger instructor, and decorated combat
veteran had landed about as far from a Cold War battlefield as possible, or so he probably
thought.
However, only a month after his arrival a buzz began in the upper echelons of the
U.S. Army about the situation in Little Rock. The first mention of the U.S. Army
monitoring the Little Rock situation came in the period August 28 through September 3,

13. “Military District Chief Named,” Arkansas Democrat, July 2, 1957.
14. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 66.
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the time in which rumors persisted of a potential Faubus action and his subsequent calling
out of the Guard. The 112th Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC) at Fourth Army
Headquarters in Texas provided surveillance of the situation by news reports.15 Fourth
Army stayed in communication with CONARC in regards to activities in Little Rock.16
On Thursday, September 5, 1957, as newspapers reported the failed attempt at
integration and Faubus’s use of the Guard, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D.
Taylor suggested the Army begin to monitor the situation and study plans in case a
response was needed.17 Taylor was a West Point graduate and former commander of the
101st Airborne Division on its famous parachute jump into France on June 6, 1944. After
World War II he served as commandant of West Point and then moved swiftly up
through the ranks, being promoted to Chief of Staff of the Army by Eisenhower in
1954.18
A renowned military scholar and tactical visionary, Taylor was also a vocal critic
of the massive retaliation strategy and “New Look” policy which Eisenhower and
Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson endorsed. This New Look was principally an
economic consideration, rooted in a desire to hold military spending down in the face of a
growing Cold War threat. According to official Army history the policy meant that “The
Air Force increased the size of its strategic bombing forces, spending huge sums on new
15. Command Report, Fourth Army, September 1 to November 30, Box 2, Folder 7,
Operation Arkansas, NARA.
16. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 19.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. The position of Chief of Staff was the senior position in the Army, analogous to the
previous position of Commanding General. The Chief of Staff commanded the Army and served
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body organized in 1947 to create unity in American strategic goals
within the U.S. Department of Defense.
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bombers and missiles. The Navy concentrated on developing a new submarine-launched
nuclear missile known as the Polaris, and the Army sought to perfect tactical nuclear
weapons to support the soldier on the battlefield.”19 For the Army this New Look meant,
in the eyes of planners, an economical reduction of the size of the conventional Army – a
substitute of tactical nuclear weapons for conventional forces. In Secretary Wilson’s
formulation, this would provide “a bigger bang for the buck.” 20
Taylor disagreed. A fierce advocate of what later came to be embraced in the
Kennedy administration as “flexible response,” a doctrine which envisioned the use of
smaller, rapid moving airborne units inserted into combat hot zones in faraway places to
prevent or intervene before the situation evolved into a major combat operation.
“Airborne troops,” Taylor once said, “appear to be an ideal force to police the free
world.”21
Taylor’s provenance in creating mobile infantry units had started almost from the
beginning of his tenure as Chief of Staff. He had green-lighted the creation of the
experimental “Sky Cav,” a successful helicopter borne unit tested at Fort Polk, Louisiana
in 1955, during Operation Sagebrush, the largest Army military maneuvers since World
War II. At Sagebrush the Sky Cav – actually the Reconnaissance Troop of the 82nd
Airborne Division – moved about the battlefield by helicopters and small planes and

19. Richard W. Stewart, Ed., American Military History, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.,
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acted as a “small, heavily-armed blocking force.”22 Taylor, who visited the unit during
the maneuvers, considered the quick-reaction force a great success. It made four
successful leaps behind enemy lines. The unit was the germ of an idea to make an “Air
Fighting Army” which could more easily move about a deadly nuclear battlefield,
dispersing in the face of heavy opposition, and converging as necessary to strike at weak
points.23
As the Army struggled to find its niche in the Cold War buildup, Secretary of
Defense Wilson invested nearly half of Army research funds in rocketry and nuclear
weapons. He ordered Taylor to request “newfangled items with public appeal,” rather
than the small arms, helicopters, trucks, tanks and other more practicable weapons Taylor
would have preferred. Under such conditions, Taylor was forced to make a virtue of a
vice.24 Taylor ushered in a veritable “airborne revolution” in the Army. The first such
unit to be organized in keeping with Taylor’s vision was the newly reconstituted 101st
Airborne Division, re-established at Fort Campbell, Kentucky in September 1956. All
other Army units followed.
The Screaming Eagles were re-established under new requirements for
survivability on an atomic battlefield, wherein it was presumed that chaos and confusion
would reign and the weapons would destroy any firm battle line. Arranged in a
checkerboard fashion on the battlefield, instead of concentrating in tightly packed units,
the units were to “fight dispersed, and in all directions,” to reduce the impact of a nuclear
22. James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on
Terror (Lincoln, NE: U.S. Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc., 2005), 71.
23. Ibid., 73.
24. Williamson Murray, Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st
Century (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 2011), 43
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strike.25 Thus the infantry and armored divisions were rearranged into the Pentomic
Division, which utilized self-sufficient battle group formations with a large five-unit
structure rather than the old triangular structure of World War II. Taylor explained the
concept of this reorganization as follows: “The [five pentomic] infantry regiments . . . are
administratively self-contained, air-transportable units organized essentially like the
groups in the airborne division,” and most importantly, each new unit would have
“atomic-capable weapons in its standard equipment.”26 These smaller more
maneuverable and self-sustaining units, essentially airborne-type units equipped with
tactical nuclear weapons, were considered much more capable in a combat environment
in which mushroom clouds dotted the landscape. Although one historian called the
unpopular and short-lived experiment “a great stillborn transformation,” the Pentomic
division was really a forebear, at least in concept, of the helicopter-borne Airmobile
divisions that served in Vietnam and after.27
Pentomic divisions were also to be issued a new offensive capability – tactical
nuclear weapons as standard equipment. Army soldiers would carry with them into battle
these mighty new weapons, fired them from artillery pieces, over-sized bazookas
mounted on jeeps, and eventually as man-portable nuclear landmines. Putting nuclear
power in the hands of Army grunts was the ultimate democratization of warfare, and a far
cry from placing the weapons under the command of field grade officers in aircraft, ships,
and (later) missile silos. Taylor’s tactical nuclear forces essentially argued that the
25. Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 62.
26. Gordon R. Young, The Army Almanac (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1959),
5.
27. Murray, Transformation Concepts, 44.
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average guy from New York, Toledo, or Atlanta could be trusted with the awe-inspiring
power of the atomic weapon. This demanded a new level of trust, and an Army emphasis
on discipline and professionalism. Taylor had found a way to elevate the lowly Army
dogface at a time when shiny Air Force jets and Navy “weapon systems” dominated the
public eye, the military-industrial complex, and demanded Congressional budget dollars.
The next question was how to get them into action.
In September 1957, Taylor created the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), which
was to act as the Army’s worldwide mobile reserve force. Kept at a high state of training
and readiness, divisions assigned to STRAC were widely considered to be the elite of the
Army. The first line units were the 101st at Ft. Campbell and the 4th Infantry Division at
Ft. Lewis, Washington, with the 82nd at Ft. Bragg, and the 1st Infantry Division at Ft.
Riley, Kansas as their back up.
STRAC, and particularly the airborne units within the corps, had a far-reaching
impact on Army culture. The term STRAC came to be adopted Army-wide, and in soldier
slang it was interpreted as Skilled, Tough, and Ready Around the Clock. Further, to the
cocky, hard-nosed, aggressive troopers, any soldier, unit, or activity recognized as being
outstanding or superior was “strac.” The mentality of an aggressive professional, once
confined to the Airborne in the pre-1950s Army, with its distinctive exercise (the pushup)
and its slow, lung-searing run (the Airborne Shuffle), became part of the broader Army
culture by the 1950s, in no small part because of Taylor and his Pentomic and STRAC
concepts.28
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When observers in Little Rock commented on the smart, tough, paratroopers,
what they saw was actually the culture of STRAC in full view of the American public for
the first time. Arkansas National Guardsman were shaken the first time they encountered
the hardened troopers at Camp Robinson; one young Guardsmen recalled seeing the
airborne troopers snap to attention with a ringing war cry of “Blood and Guts!”29 After
nearly a year of hardening in Army training, the men of the 101st had been honed to a
razor’s edge.
Although STRAC was in its infancy in Little Rock, and had not yet been
officially unveiled as an Army force, it was a major public relations event for the Army.
When STRAC was officially revealed to the public in May 1958 – while federalized
Guardsmen were still at Central High – the 101st's public relations officer made no secret
about its capabilities. The officer said that it could apply force ranging "from the prick of
a bayonet to tactical nuclear weapons," a clear reference not only to its Cold War image,
but to the 101st’s well-published use of the bayonet in Little Rock.30
In 1957, the 101st's home was Fort Campbell, Kentucky, which straddled the
border with Tennessee. It was, like many southern military bases, “an island of
integration in a sea of Jim Crow.”31 The units were fully integrated, with black NCOs
sometimes giving orders to white subordinates and even a few black officers moving up
into the ranks. The base itself, even base housing, was desegregated – although most
29. Roger Vaughn, interview with Shawn Fisher, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
October 1, 2007.
30. Paul Downs, of Springfield, Arkansas was cut slightly by a 101st bayonet on first the
troopers arrived in Little Rock. See “Army Reveals Powerful Secret Fighting Corps,” Syracuse
Post Standard, May 21, 1958, 2.
31. James E. Westheider, The African American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in
Arms (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 10.
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white soldiers with families could easily get approval to live off base in a city eager to
serve them.
Black troopers were dealt the same humiliating treatment common to AfricanAmericans throughout the segregated south. Outside of Fort Campbell, however, was
Clarksville, Tennessee, as segregated as any other southern city. Despite its close
economic relationship with the U.S. Army base, black servicemen were simply “negroes”
off post, and unwelcome. Sgt. Sidney Brown, of Birmingham, Alabama, remembered
Clarksville as being “very segregated,” at that time. Clarksville police stopped him and
asked him one night, “What are you doing here, boy?” Brown was in uniform, with the
Screaming Eagle division patch on his shoulder. He told them he was heading back to the
post and they told to him leave town and never come back.32 White restaurants, hotels,
and other establishments, refused service to black troopers, and they were forced to ride
in the back of city buses if allowed at all. The local hospital was excellent, but white
only; black families had to travel to Nashville for the same level of care. Clarksville did
not integrate “public facilities such as theaters, schools, restaurants and pools" until
1963.33 As a testament to Clarksville’s racial tension, schools in the city did not integrate
until 1973.34
General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of State,
and born in New York, started his Army career in the late 1950s. He reflected upon his
experiences with the “lunatic code” of the South when going off-post from Fort Benning,
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Georgia, as a young black Army lieutenant in a paratrooper outfit: “I could go into
Woolworth’s in Columbus [Georgia] and buy anything I wanted, as long as I did not try
to eat there. I could go into a department store and they would take my money, as long as
I did not try to use the men’s room. I could walk along the street as long as I did not look
at a white woman.”35 But in the end, Powell, perhaps reflecting how many of the cocky,
swaggering black troopers felt, said, “If I was going to be confined to one end of the
playing field, I was going to be the star on that part of the field . . . I did not feel inferior,
and I was not going to let anyone make me believe I was.”36
Even on post, certain elements of segregation still crept in. The post’s Masonic
lodge was segregated, as was the Veterans of Foreign Wars post.37 Even certain elements
of the school system for the soldiers’ children were segregated.38 Fort Campbell’s on-post
school system extended to only elementary and middle school students, and was
integrated. Fort Campbell bussed the high school-age students to Clarksville schools,
which were at that time segregated.39 Thus, white soldiers in the 101st travelled to
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Arkansas under presidential orders to integrate an Arkansas high school while the
soldiers’ own children went to a segregated school in Tennessee.40
Sidney Brown recalled that as the 101st assembled at Fort Campbell in September
of 1956, the new white recruits fresh out of boot camp were not as keen on integration of
the Army as the older men. Black troopers were few, as integration had just begun in
earnest and few black soldiers knew they could join the elite unit. Most of the white
NCOs, Brown said, were World War II and Korean War veterans. Many had seen combat
in Korea, where the success of integrated combat units was well-known. “Combat has a
way of changing a person,” Brown said. “If you are going to sleep while I cover your
butt, and I’m going to sleep while you cover my butt, we have to trust each other.”41
For this reason, the NCOs of the 101st – whom Brown said were largely “plow
boys from Georgia, Alabama, Texas, Mississippi” – were not too concerned about
integration, but about getting their elite troops trained and ready for combat.42 Brown felt
that service in the Army was a step up from rural farm life for many of the whites with
which he served.43 The Army provided free housing, medical care, decent pay, and the
opportunity for promotion and a nice retirement check; more security than picking cotton
back home. The white soldier’s professional aspirations then muted any open displays of
racial hostility, and thus black soldiers experienced fewer problems on duty than they

40. A Study of Schools Serving Military Families in the U.S., G-30.
41. Brown, interview.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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might encounter when off-duty. There was no real sense of social intimacy with their
white comrades-in-arms, however.
In fact, discrimination in the Army of the 1950s was such that, as one sociologist
put it, “day-to-day relationships off the job are usually one of mutual racial
exclusivism.”44 As one black soldier told a researcher, "A man can be my best buddy in
the Army, but he won't ask me to go to town with him."45 Brown said when troopers
arrived in town on a weekend pass, “We went one way and they [the white soldiers] went
the other.”46 Integration of Army units, including the 101st, worked best “on-duty vis-'avis off-duty, on-base vis-'a-vis off-base, basic training and maneuvers vis-'a-vis garrison .
. . and combat vis- a-vis non-combat.”47 Although the unit may have been integrated, “the
behavior of servicemen [resembled] the racial (and class) separatism of the larger
American society, the more they are removed from the military environment.” White
soldiers, for instance, told racial jokes, felt black troopers made use of “racial
discrimination to avoid disciplinary action,” and claimed to enjoy the company of black
soldiers as individuals, but said they "can't stand them in bunches."48 On those bases with
more than one NCO club, one of the clubs would be implicitly designated as the “Negro
club.”49
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Brown insisted, however, that racial tensions simply did not exist in 101st. It was
too disciplined, too focused on a higher goal – that of being an elite unit. “We were all
volunteers in the airborne, everybody wanted to be there,” Brown said.50 The NCOs and
officers were “fair, and that is all I cared about,” he said.51 The general feeling, one white
officer explained, was that "on a jump, you don't care what the person's skin color is, as
long as he can fire his weapon and cover your ass."52
The 101st, then, was a construct of a particular time and place. Its hierarchy,
views, social structure, manpower, goals, methods and so forth were derived from and
rooted in a Cold War mentality that molded them into the fighting unit that was able to go
to Little Rock and perform a very contentious mission. The Army reflected much of the
color-blind sentiment so common in America’s racial discourse, but the military had the
added benefit of a hierarchy that enforced professional ethics and attitudes in ways the
civilian world simply could not. It was not a perfect social organization by any means,
and the environment directly outside of Fort Campbell was openly hostile to black
troopers. It may seem to observers like the last place in which the champions of
integration could have been fashioned. Nevertheless, the time and place created a group
of men more suited to the unlikely duty given them than at any time before, and perhaps
since.
On the same day Taylor suggested the Army follow the integration crisis, he
discussed the issue with his staff and then dispatched Army lawyer Col. William G.
50. Brown, interview.
51. Brown, interview.
52. Sean Webby, “School integration, 1957: Student, soldier share bond,” San Jose
Mercury News, September 10, 2007.
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Easton of the Judge Advocate Corps to assist Walker in legal matters relating to Little
Rock. Easton, Walker, and officers from Fourth Army Headquarters then met on
Monday, September 9, at Fort Chaffee, near Fort Smith, Arkansas, to discuss tentative
plans for a possible military operation in Little Rock.53 Thus began a long, torturous
process of ironing out chains of command, strategy and tactics, and accumulating
resources for what proved to be an exhausting nine-month mission.
In concept, the chain of command for the operation proved to be surprisingly flat,
a clear sign Walker was going to be kept on a tight leash. At the top, of course, was the
President, followed by Wilber Brucker, Secretary of the Army. Next was Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, in his role as Army Chief of Staff. Taylor remarked of the command structure for
Operation Arkansas that “neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were involved, nor, I might add, did they want to be.”54 Presumably this is because the
mission was so fraught with political problems – namely the southern legislators who
were segregationist firebrands as well.
Below Taylor were a number of other generals and various commands. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS), Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman,
was largely responsible for overseeing the planning process. The Operations section in
DCSOPS, responsible for managing and conducting military operations was headed by
Brig. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, who frequently corresponded with Walker. From there the
command chain flowed down to the Fourth Army in San Antonio, which worked in close
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coordination with Gen. Walker as acting commander of U.S. Army Military District,
Arkansas, in terms of logistics and personnel. Walker would assume command of troops
in Little Rock, including both federalized Guardsmen and or other federal forces, if
necessary.
Practically speaking, however, Walker received marching orders directly from
Taylor, Brucker, and Eisenhower. In fact, Taylor was so careful that Walker would not
misunderstand his orders, or deviate from them, that he assigned Gen. Earle G. “Bus”
Wheeler to act as his “personal representative in Little Rock.”55 Throughout the crisis
Wheeler shuttled back and forth between Little Rock and D.C. and at times, it seems, had
to apply a steadying hand to Walker. The Army found the chain of command situation
“so sensible that it not only became the basis for the contingency planning that evolved
over the next two weeks, but it also formed a standard pattern that the Army followed
when confronted with similar situations in subsequent years.”56 Walker, on the other
hand, was not so pleased. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the chain of command
arrangement in a telephone conversation with Gen. Pachler on February 26, 1958, saying,
“Who am I dealing with? You, Eddleman and the Secretary? . . . . I don’t think there is a
chain of command. First I think I’ve got to deal with one person, then I find myself
dealing with another.”57
Early on the planners settled on a dual force structure. At first Army planners
suggested the Arkansas National Guard could be called to federal service, and it would
55. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 26.
56. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 41.
57. Memorandum for Record, Telcon Gen. Pachler to Walker, February 26, 1958, Box 1,
Journal 4, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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handle the mission alone, with regular Army forces in support if matters warranted it. 58
However, the initial plan was shelved for a number of reasons. First, the Guard units in
the vicinity of Little Rock did not possess the numbers or skills required to deal with a
civil disturbance. According to the U.S. Army Field Manual on Civil Disturbances (FM
19-15), “military police and infantry” were the units most desirable for this sort of duty,
and they were not available in quantity in Little Rock.59
For instance, although the 118th Air Police Squadron of the Arkansas Air
National Guard could have served in that duty, it barely had 50 men. At Central High
hostile crowds had numbered between 300 and 1,000. Since the other units in the area
were not infantry or military police, Guard units that could respond to the call would
necessarily need to travel a considerable distance. Travel times to Little Rock could take
several hours, not counting the time needed to constitute the forces, brief them, and
deploy them. So cumbersome was the process that General Walker estimated it would
take twelve hours to gather and deploy approximately 1,000 Guardsmen.60 By the time
Guard units had been called into service, it was unlikely they could rapidly assemble and
move into the city fast enough to be useful.
A second issue was what FM19-15 called “sympathy of troops.” This section of
the Army manual stated, “Individuals whose backgrounds indicate possible disaffection
should not be assigned to duty in the affected areas.”61 At a Pentagon meeting on

58. Initial Operation Arkansas Report, November 30, 1957, Box 5 Folder 10, USARMD
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September 10, Taylor inquired on this matter, to which the Fourth Army responded by
conducting a survey of the Arkansas National Guard the very week elements of the Guard
were then encircling Central High School enforcing Faubus’s order to prevent
integration.62 The survey was completed and delivered to Taylor on September 16.63
The survey, conducted by members of 112th Counter Intelligence Corp, revealed
a degree of uncertainty about the loyalty of the National Guardsmen and other state
forces. The survey stated, for instance, that in the state “there is no evidence of a general
belligerency toward the decision of Judge Davies.”64 Further, it stated that some in the
Little Rock Police Department felt they had been “treated in a ‘high-handed manner’ by
Governor Faubus and resent[ed] such treatment.”65 In addition, the survey noted
Guardsmen “would accept calls to either duty (State or Federal) if so ordered.”
However, according to Operation Arkansas, 80% would respond to a call up if
they were “not required to enforce the court order”; 75% of the Guardsmen said they
would serve if called upon to enforce integration; 65% stated they would respond even if
called to “oppose other state forces . . . local police, state militia, volunteers, etc.”66 For
his part, General Walker determined that 10% of the Guardsmen were of “undetermined

62. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 31.
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loyalty.”67 Thus, the survey revealed the majority of the Guard personnel would support
integration, even in the face of opposition from fellow southerners. Given that an August
1957 national poll concluded that 75% of southerners were against school integration,
this is a noteworthy response.68 The Guardsmen seemed to be more in favor of doing
their duty than they were in favor of opposing integration.
Still, the very existence of the survey revealed the Army was wary of the Guard
and unsure of its loyalty. From the survey it could be expected that some 10-35% of the
Guardsmen might not answer the call to federal duty. Clearly the Army also feared that a
portion of the Guardsmen might actively resist integration – perhaps even in some
organized fashion under the command of Governor Faubus. In fact, Gen. Walker initially
planned to send all the Arkansas National Guard units in the vicinity of Little Rock to
Fort Chaffee, some 200 miles away.69 Presumably this would have prevented Faubus
from initiating a state call-up of the local Guardsmen in an effort to block integration by
any federal troops. Walker wanted to “freeze people in place” of “undetermined loyalty,”
thus preventing interference from Faubus.70 The Deputy Chief of Staff’s office eventually
scrapped the idea, but consideration of such a plan demonstrated the extent of Regular
Army mistrust of the Guard. Later in the planning stages, Eisenhower would express his
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own concerns, saying that using the National Guard in Little Rock might force Arkansans
to fight “brother against brother” on the streets of the capitol.71
It is important to note, too, that this mistrust was not just in response to Faubus’s
recent actions. In 1957, many state Guard units – and southern ones in particular – were
segregated or completely off limits to blacks, despite President Truman’s order to
integrate U.S. armed forces in 1948. In 1961, for instance, blacks made up less than 1.5
percent of the total National Guard forces in the United States.72 In contrast, the 101st
Airborne, like the rest of the Army in 1957, was integrated. A total of 114 black enlisted
men of the 101st Airborne Division were flown from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky; there were
virtually no black officers in the unit, however.73
All of these factors -- the Army manual warning about “troop sympathies” during
civil disturbances, the findings of the CIC survey, Walker’s estimates, and Eisenhower’s
own concerns about fratricide -- combined to create an air of “substantial uncertainty” as
to whether Guardsmen could adequately perform the mission or would follow orders of a
federal call-up.74 Further, the bellicose language of Southern politicians added to the
tension around Guard loyalty. One politician stated if the government tried to send in
federal troops, "I'd proclaim a state of insurrection and I'd call out the National Guard and
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then we'd find out who's going to run things in my state."75 As the official Army report
put it, “uncertainty about how the Arkansas National Guard might respond clearly
affected all the contingency planning and was a primary factor making necessary
consideration of the use of regular army units.”76
At the Pentagon meeting on September 10, the planning was substantially revised
from Walker’s initial brief of calling only a few units of Arkansas National Guard to
enforce the president’s orders.77 Almost immediately the Pentagon decided an active duty
unit should be designated as a backup. While there were many plans and discussions to
use other units, the generals settled fairly early on the 101st as the natural choice. Led by
the best officers and comprised of the best and most aggressive men – only volunteers
were accepted into parachute training, and the unit was the recipient of lavish training
and constant rigid evaluations – the paratroopers were an elite unit hand-crafted by Gen.
Taylor himself.
The 101st was also easily sliced into a smaller unit – a single battle group –
capable of moving quickly via airlift because its base had its own airfield, Campbell Air
Force Base, and was ready to be deployed to any hotspot in the world in less than four
hours as part of STRAC. The 101st was only two hours flight time from Little Rock Air
Force Base, meaning the troopers could load the aircraft and travel to Little Rock faster
than National Guard in the same county could assemble and truck to the school. No other
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sizable Army base or unit was close enough to rival this capability. The paratroopers
conformed in every way to Taylor’s desire to have just such a unit ready for a national
emergency, and the paratroopers were immediately ordered to begin civil disturbance
training in accordance with FM19-15. This order was formulated as normal training
exercises; the troopers themselves had no idea that by beginning training in civil
disturbance on September 10, they were preparing for operations in Little Rock.78
The unit selected within the 101st was temporarily designated Task Force,
Operation Arkansas and was composed of the 1st Battle Group, 327th Airborne Infantry
Regiment, the unit on rotation for the Immediate Reaction Force within the division at
that time. The commanding officer of 1/327th was a highly regarded paratrooper officer,
Col. William A. Kuhn, he had been the assistant commander of the 327th during its jump
into Normandy on June 6, 1944, and fought with the unit across France and Germany.
During the war Kuhn had earned the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf
Cluster, and two Purple Hearts.
Born in Montana in 1911, Kuhn attended college in Wyoming and enlisted in a
cavalry outfit in the Wyoming National Guard in 1931; he eventually earning a
commission in the National Guard in 1938. When his National Guard unit was called to
active duty in early 1941, he was one of the very first volunteers for the Parachute School
at Fort Benning, Georgia and was assigned to Dog Company, 507th Parachute Infantry
Regiment. Although he apparently did not serve in Korea, he spent much of this time in
military education; he had just completed the National War College when the 101st was
reorganized in 1956 and he took command of the 1/327th.
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The 1st Battle Group, 327th Airborne Infantry Regiment had been in near
constant training when it was tasked with the Little Rock mission. The training focused
on ROTAD (Realignment and Organization of The Airborne Division) as part of Taylor’s
Pentomic concept and had a very high level of morale; units such as the 101st tended to
create an esprit de corps that drove the unit to excellence. According to its 1957
yearbook, the unit had a busy calendar of football, basketball, and baseball games in the
base leagues, as well as pistol shooting matches and other training activities.79 Much of
the year was occupied with field problems, the unceasing war games that tested the
ability of leaders to make decisions and set objectives and of the troopers to accomplish
those missions.80
Army headquarters ordered Col. Kuhn to conduct a “personal reconnaissance” of
Central High on September 12.81 According to Arkansas State Trooper Wayland Speer, a
“general [sic] in charge of the 101st” was stopped and identified by the Arkansas State
police: “He came through a roadblock I was on. We stopped cars that circled more than
twice. We looked him over pretty good when he came by the second time. He circled
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three or four times, so we stopped him and got his identification and wrote it down . . .
so, he did come down and make preliminary plans to bring the 101st.”82
Though neither the State Police nor Faubus attached any significance to this at the
time however, the National Guard officers did. The Arkansas National Guard troop
commander at the school, Lt. Col. Marion Johnson, and his executive officer, Maj.
Joseph Milhoan, Jr., noted that there were “two Army officers dressed in civilian
clothing,” one of which was General Walker, who reportedly told Milhoan he was “just
surveying the area.” This indicated to the Guard brass that “federalization was
imminent.”83
There was still much to be worked out – including securing aircraft for the
movement of 1,000 troops from Ft. Campbell to Little Rock, as well as other logistical
issues, such as housing, rations, and ammunition. Legally, the Justice Department had
decided United States Code, Title 10, sections 332 and 334 provided for the President to
use the militia “to enforce the laws of the United States whenever he considers that
unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages make it impracticable to enforce
them by the course of ordinary judicial proceedings.”84
In addition, the Army needed to develop a plan to bring the Arkansas National
Guard into federal service. The Army eventually settled on AR 130-10, regulations that
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allowed the President to “Call” the Guard into federal service. This process preserved
military unit distinctions and did not prevent the troops from “ETSing” (ending term of
service, as their contracts expired), whereas the “Order” to federal service did. In Army
jargon, the Order procedure was for circumstances of extended and protracted war, while
the Call procedure was more appropriate for a local or regional emergency such as Little
Rock. Once this was decided, the Fourth Army began drawing up paperwork for two
situations – a Call of only certain units of the Arkansas National Guard and a Call for all
units of the Arkansas National Guard.85
On September 20, the same day Judge Davies ruled that Faubus and the National
Guard must cease interference at Central High School, Walker visited the Pentagon to
finalize plans for the impending operation. Both Walker and the Fourth Army
headquarters presented plans. After some discussion, the details were hashed out. The
airborne unit of approximately 1,000 men would be transported from Ft. Campbell,
Kentucky, by Air Force planes to Little Rock Air Force Base, at which time General
Walker would assume operational control of the paratroopers. A smaller group of
airborne troops driving trucks would bring a “land tail” from Ft. Campbell to Little Rock.
Fourth Army units in Texas and at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas provided administrative and
logistical support since Walker’s headquarters in Little Rock was too small for such a
large operation. Fourth Army support included such details as aircraft for medical
evacuations – a clear indication the Army thought open combat on the streets of Little
Rock was possible – and the continued use of intelligence support from the 112th
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Counter Intelligence Corps, which expanded its numbers from 20 to 30 in order to
monitor the increasingly volatile situation in Little Rock.86
The plan was still necessarily vague since Eisenhower had not intimated how
many troops he would call or whether he would call active duty or National Guard troops,
though Army planners expected the Guard would be the primary force and regular Army
troops would be called in as a reserve force. Meetings at the Pentagon finalized some of
the other details in regard to air transport with an eye toward decreasing the response
time as much as possible. In addition, one of the wise decisions made during this
timeframe was the creation of a large public information office (PIO), which doubled the
size of the USARMD office and brought in three senior public information officers to
handle press requests and other public information concerns.87
At the final meeting in Washington on Sunday, September 22, the Army high
command gave Walker his final orders, specifically that there would be no martial law.
The Little Rock police were to retain their authority in the city. The Army also settled
upon Walker’s title. He would be called Commanding General, U.S. Army Military
District, Arkansas; he had initially titled himself Commanding General, Federal Forces
Arkansas.88 Walker then left Washington and visited the commander of the 101st, Major
General Thomas L. Sherburne, Jr. at Fort Campbell.89 Col. Kuhn was informed he begin
Alert Phase ALFA, putting the 1/327th Airborne Battle Group on high alert – locking it
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down in isolation from the rest of the base as a security measure. Preparations were also
made to depart in two hours in accordance with division standard operating procedures.90
One of the discussions at the meeting in Washington had profound implications
for the operation, not in its success per se, but in its reflection of the federal government’s
understanding of the ultimate goals it was being called upon to support in Little Rock. All
the top level brass of the U.S. Army met on Sunday morning, September 22. This
included all those subordinate to Gen. Taylor – Generals Eddleman, Wheeler, Pachler,
and Walker, plus Colonels Alfred, Easton, and others within the Western Hemisphere
Division. All were white men who had spent most of their careers in a segregated
military. According to Coakley, the briefing paper they produced, “reviewed by General
Eddleman,” instructed the officers of the 1/327th Airborne Battle Group to “use utmost
discretion in making some decrease in the colored strength of your task force . . . those
arriving at destination should not be used operationally in the city where they have direct
contact with the populace.”91
The brass had decided it would be unwise to put black troops on the cordon line
around the school or to use them in the forces held in reserve behind the cordon. They
were not to be seen or photographed. This decision may have been made with sensitivity
for the insults and jeers the black troopers would have experienced because of the
segregationist crowd, or with the goal of easing tension in the city, and perhaps even with
safeguarding black troops themselves who, it was intimated, could have been “shot in
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broad daylight as they stood facing the [segregationist] crowd.”92 It certainly would have
been bad politics since even without black troopers being featured on the cover of Life or
Time, the White Citizens Councils were within days of the 101st’s arrival printing racist
cartoons depicting black troops engaged in “forced race-mixing.”93 Whatever the reasons,
it resulted in what was to the public eye in Little Rock a “white” military unit.
Eisenhower himself would say this was necessary “as a matter of expediency.”94
The decision to do so, however, did not apparently come from Ike or the Army,
but the Department of Justice.95 Undoubtedly this advice came from FBI agents who
observed the mob action at Central High on September 4 and the days following, a view
which was confirmed by events the next morning. In the previous weeks, according to
Brownell, “The FBI was on the spot at Little Rock . . . they gave us hourly reports on
what was happening.”96
However, this view was essentially no different than Faubus’s or Eisenhower’s –
that segregationists must be appeased, that “inflaming” them would lead to uncontrollable
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violence, and that the prudent course was to bow to their sensitivities; black troopers in
full view of the white protesters would be irresistible targets and, presumably, draw fire
or otherwise incite violence. Dead or injured black troopers could have damaged highranking Army officer careers as well. In short, black soldiers on the front lines at Central
High threatened the success of the operation.
Therefore, by removing black troops from the front lines of the operation, the
Army not only bowed to those who feared segregationist backlash, but it also insulted the
men in uniform and undermined the very nature of equality in the process. By insisting
the Army was protecting them, it also argued they were incapable of conducting
themselves as properly as the white soldiers. In a confrontation between black troops and
white segregationists, the idea seemed to be that black troops could be baited into acting
in ways white troops could not. While it was explained in a color blind matter, the Army
clearly did not trust its black troopers to be as sensitive and disciplined as white soldiers.
The policy did not end at Little Rock. In 1962, the Department of Defense used
the same policy of “stripping” units of black soldiers during the suppression of riots at the
University of Mississippi. Gen. Earle J. Wheeler, by then promoted to Army Chief of
Staff and certainly aware of the “success” of the Army operation in Little Rock, sent
personal orders to his subordinates to “Keep Negro troops in base camps or
administrative support duties.”97 President Kennedy approved the order, and Attorney
General Robert Kennedy made personal calls to Army officers ordering them to keep
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black troops separated from southern whites.98 The integration of the Army was hardly a
concrete issue then. Soldiers could and were repeatedly segregated based on
administrative fiat over concerns about potential problems in domestic missions. This
was hardly any way to treat dedicated servicemen and was, as it turned out, highly
resented by the black troopers involved.
Nevertheless, this policy was forced on the 101st, and not something that
originated within it. Taylor’s creation was a very special unit. The nation’s first elite,
racially-integrated unit, disciplined and hardened under the tutelage of legendary WWIIera officers and salty Korean War veterans, was shaped specifically to deal with national
emergencies unlike any unit which had come before. Its first test required especially
steely nerves because the enemy was not Russian soldiers but unruly white southern high
school kids.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MOB
With the Army plans fully ready, it fell to Arkansans to make their move. On the
next morning of Monday, September 23, pursuant to Judge Davies orders from the 20th,
integration began at Little Rock Central High. Management of the process shifted from
Faubus to Little Rock Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann. A lifelong citizen of the city, he
had learned the city block by block while delivering ice for his father’s business; he had
also been an officer on the staff of Adm. Chester Nimitz during WWII. 1 He publicly
stated over the weekend that the police could handle the situation. "The eyes of the nation
and the world will be on Little Rock Monday,” Mann said. "We will be cast in a different
light than during the past 18 days,” adding, rather ironically as it turned out, that “military
force will be at an end."2 Asked if he was going to provide help for the black students to
enter the school, Mann said, “We’re not running an escort service.” He added, “We’re
expecting order on Monday.”3 Privately, however, Mann was not so confident.
Faubus left the state over the weekend and journeyed to Sea Island, Georgia, in a
National Guard airplane for the Southern Governors Conference. He left the state in the
hands of Lieutenant Governor Nathan Gordon, who had been in that position since 1947.
Born in Morrilton, Arkansas, Gordon was a pugnacious and principled lawyer and a
former member of the Arkansas National Guard, having enlisted in D Battery, 206th
1. Douglas Martin, “Woodrow Mann Dies at 85; Sought Troops in Little Rock,” New
York Times, August 9, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/09/us/woodrow-mann-dies-at-85sought-troops-in-little-rock.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed July 26, 2012).
2. “Little Rock Mayor Promises Firm Action to Keep Order; Will Not Block Integration,”
Great Bend Sunday Tribune, September 22, 1957, 1.
3. Ibid.
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Coastal Artillery in Russellville in 1935. Gordon attended law school at the University of
Arkansas in Fayetteville, then enlisted in the Navy and became a pilot in 1941.4 As a
member of the famed Black Cat squadron in the Pacific, he won a Medal of Honor for
rescuing downed airmen in terrible sea conditions while simultaneously being fired upon
by Japanese guns on the coastline a few hundred yards away.5
According to Gordon, on Sunday, September 22, “Three city officials” -- Mann,
Blossom, and Little Rock Police Chief Potts – all “telephoned him at his home in
Morrilton and asked for 150 Guardsmen on a ‘standby basis.’”6 Gordon contacted Gen.
Clinger, who agreed to assemble men at Camp Robinson. Gordon then told Clinger, “If
the troops were used Monday, they were to be used not to keep Negroes from going in or
out of the school, but to keep order.”7 However, Gordon agreed to send the Guardsmen
only if Mayor Mann sent a written request.
Thirty minutes later, Mann called back, having decided he did not need the Guard
after all. Gordon was livid, and with reporters listening by his side, he told Mann, "You
asked me to contact Clinger and see if he could get the men together. I don't want you to
call up here and ask me to give you help and the next thirty minutes change your mind."8
Mann explained, rather cryptically, that he only wanted to know if the Guard would be

4. Matt Schudel, “Nathan G. Gordon; Navy Pilot, Arkansas Lt. Governor,” Washington
Post, September 14, 2008.
5. Ibid.
6. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, September 23, 1957, 2.
7. Ibid.
8. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2.
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available.9 Nevertheless, Gordon did arrange for the Guardsmen to be ready the next
day.10
For their part, Little Rock Police Chief Marvin Potts and Assistant Police Chief
Gene Smith planned to have thirty-five “hand-picked men” at the school, along with
“service pistols, riot guns and tear gas.”11 Smith’s plan was simply to escalate the
response from men in his own department, up to sheriff's deputies, to state police, and
finally, to the National Guard.12 Faubus’ assistance required a written request to State
Police director Herman Lindsey. This letter secured, the police department had the
benefit of approximately fifty state police officers on Monday morning.13 Police planned
to keep traffic moving and to prevent crowds from gathering, but the police leadership
told reporters, “as long as crowds look peaceful and do not make any threats of violence
there probably is nothing they can do.”14 The police were preemptively taking the same
course Johnson and the Guard had at Central on September 4 – lawful crowds were
acceptable, while violence and lawlessness were not.
Mann and the police leadership had wanted to use water to control the crowd, but
Fire Chief Gann Nalley called Mann Sunday morning and said "I can't go along with my

9. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2.
10. Appendix 2, Annex B, Arkansas National Guard, Command Report, Camp Robinson,
3.
11. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2.
12. Ibid.
13. Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New
York: Simon and Schuster, Jan 9, 2007), 169; Orval Faubus, Down from the Hills (Little Rock:
Democrat. Printing & Lithographing Company, 1980), 274.
14. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2.
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firemen using water on a crowd . . . I'm not being disrespectful to you in any way, Mr.
Mayor . . . It's your decision. If you officially order me to supply the men and equipment,
I'll have to do it, but you'll get my resignation." Nalley told Mann, "You're liable to kill
someone. I'd even hesitate to turn water on a nigger — much less a white person."15
Mann was either convinced by Nalley of the dangerous nature of the fire hose or
unwilling to see Nalley carryout his threat to resign, but incredibly Mann did not order
the fire chief to supply the men and equipment, even though his police leadership told
him, "Without water, we just can't do it."16
With the Guard withdrawn, and the Department of Justice unwilling to help, it fell
to Assistant Police Chief Gene Smith and the officers of the Little Rock Police
department, along with troopers of the Arkansas State Police, to make sure the black
children could attend school. Mann met with the department at 5:30 A.M. on Monday
morning in the wood-paneled meeting room of Little Rock’s Board of Aldermen. Initial
reports over the weekend had pegged the “hand-picked” number at 35, but apparently
apprehension was running high because Mann reported there were “75 blue-clad Little
Rock policemen” at the morning meeting.17 According to Mann Chief Potts and Assistant
Chief Gene Smith briefed the men.
Smith told his officers that morning, “If there is any person who is not willing to
preserve the peace and protect these students, now is the time to leave; nothing will be

15. Woodrow Wilson Mann, “The Truth About Little Rock, Part 8,” January 28, 1958.
16. Ibid.
17. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2; Mann, “The Truth
About Little Rock, Part 8.”
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said or done to you.”18 None of his officers left, giving Smith every reason to believe he
could trust his men to hold the line outside of the school. This instance is remarkable
because, as school superintendent Virgil Blossom explained, the police officers “were
overwhelmingly opposed to integration.”19 Mayor Mann then “spoke a few heartfelt
words -- thanking them for their cooperation and courage.”20 He said the officers “no
doubt agreed with the majority of our citizens who do not believe in school
desegregation. Some of them would probably have friends in the crowd that gathered
outside Central High. Yet there they were, prepared to do the job, realizing that they had
to live up to the uniform they wore.”21
Though Faubus was AWOL on Monday morning, the hard-liners with whom he
had aligned himself were not. At 7:30 AM the barricades at the north and south end of
Park in front of Central High were virtually empty, but within an hour a force 1,000
strong had converged on the school, though 100-150 were press and an unknown number
were simply curiosity seekers. Mann reported there were about 350 persons at the south
barricade and about 450 at the north end. Among the crowd were noted hard-liners,
including “several members of the League of Central High Mothers,” such as Mrs. Clyde
Thomason.22 Others identified were noted segregationists Arthur J. Bickle and Rev.
Wesley Pruden, who screamed, “That’s what we have got to fight – niggers, communists,
18. Little Rock Police Department: History and Personnel (Paducah, KY: Turner
Publishing Co., 2005), 48.
19. Virgil T. Blossom, It HAS Happened Here (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959),
102.
20. Mann, “The Truth About Little Rock, Part 8.”
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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and cops.”23 According to Reed, “many members of the crowd on September 23 were
organized segregationists from east Arkansas and beyond the borders of the state.”24
As the crowd swarmed around the police checkpoints, Little Rock Police Officer
Tommy Dunaway, who had been with the department only nine months, took off his
badge and said “I’m through.”25 He left the police line. Dunaway was the only officer to
quit despite calls from the crowd for others to do the same. Immediately after Dunaway
left the line outside Central High, the crowd took up a collection for him amounting to
some $140.26 Assistant Police Chief Gene Smith reiterated to his officers the importance
of their duty, reportedly telling them, “if any sonofabitch even [thinks] about falling out
[I’ll] shoot him in the back of the head.”27
Smith was a Little Rock native and a graduate of Central High, where he had been
a football player. His willingness to side with protecting the Little Rock Nine and
enforcing the integration order made him “a traitor like no other white southerner.”28
Governor Faubus once referred to Smith, who eventually became the Little Rock Chief of
Police, as a man who had been “bought and paid for to see that integration [was]

23. Roy Reed, Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville:
University of Arkansas Press, 1997), 227; Little Rock Police Department, 225.
24. Ibid.
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effected.”29 As Smith stood on the line his neighbors were irate, one saying, “What about
it Gene, did you let the niggers in when you were in school?”30
Tommy Dunaway, interviewed on September 25 by special agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, claimed he told fellow officers before the riot at Central High, “I
would resign before hitting anyone except in self-defense,” although he did not reveal to
the FBI Smith’s offer to decline the duty without punishment.31 He went on to describe
the events that occurred immediately before his public resignation: “I saw officers pulling
a woman back from the curb into the street and they put her in a police car. I recall some
people jibing at me, calling me Tommy.” Dunaway, speaking in a color-blind code,
admitted the ultimate reason for his resignation. He said he had discussed leaving the
police department with Smith the week before the riot for “personal reasons” and
admitted, “I know a lot of people in that area [around the school], and I am a graduate of
Central High school.”32 Dunaway, a former Mid-South Golden Gloves heavyweight
champion and college football player, told reporters, “I’m a Southerner . . . it’s not that
I’m against integration so much. If it can be worked out peacefully I imagine Southern
people would go along with it . . . without its being forced down their throats.”33

29. Little Rock Police Department, 48.
30. Blossom, It HAS Happened Here, 105.
31. “FBI Interview with Little Rock Policeman Tommy Dunaway,” September 25, 1957,
http://scipio.uark.edu/
cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/digitaltest&CISOPTR=524&CISOBOX=1&REC=6.
(Accessed online December 27, 2008).
32. Ibid.
33. “Don't Want to Lose Friends, Says Badge-Throwing Trooper,” Associated Press,
September 27, 1957.
135

As a newly hired officer in a department he was already considering leaving, he
quit in the face of heated opposition to integration. Nonetheless, he tried to preserve his
“honor” by presenting a masculine defense for his actions, claiming he was defending the
Little Rock populace, and especially white womanhood, by his refusal to commit
violence in the name of integration. Like Smith, Dunaway desired communal respect, but
he lacked the sense of obligation and dedication Smith possessed. Nor was he willing to
make claims of overt racism. It was precisely this version of southern manhood that the
Army feared; if only a few Guardsmen defended their masculinity as Dunaway had at
Central High, the black children would have been in even more danger.
While Chief Smith was haranguing his police department and facing down an
increasingly dangerous crowd which threatened to go home and “get their shotguns” or a
rope, a force of 150 National Guard troops waited twelve miles away at Camp
Robinson.34 At Gordon’s request they were on a five minute alert and “were to move to
Central High School on Mr. Gordon’s order if the situation could not be handled by the
Little Rock Police.”35 Gordon told reporters, "If it becomes evident that the National
Guard is needed, I will call them out."36 As the morning unfolded, Gordon said he was
listening to the radio reports of the scene and “hoping for the best and preparing for the

34. Blossom, It HAS Happened Here, 105.
35. Appendix 2, Annex B, Arkansas National Guard, Command Report, Camp Robinson,
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worst.”37 He told reporters, "I have to wait for an official request from the city
authorities, and I've had none so far."38
As rioting continued throughout the early morning the black students arrived
under police escort at a side door. Carlotta Walls recalled, “The mob was back . . . they
were not going to give up their fight easily. But neither was I.”39 The students could hear
“two, four, six, eight, we ain’t gonna integrate” and a host of other degrading terms and
chants as they walked into the school. Inside the students met Vice Principal Elizabeth
Huckaby, given their schedules, and directed to their classes.
As they did so the crowd outside was screaming, “The niggers are in the
school!”40 One woman outside the school railed at the police officers “Where's your
manhood? . . . Why don't you do something to get these people?” after which she “then
collapsed into sobs as she wailed: ‘My daughter’s in there with those niggers. Oh, my
god! Oh, God!’”41
The mob was furious and searched for someone to punish. Black reporters Alex
Wilson, James Hicks, Moses Newsome, and Earl Davy, as well as “Yankee” newsmen
and Life staffers Gray Villet, Francis Miller, and Paul Welch were all attacked and beaten
by the xenophobic rioters. The attacks launched against Alex Wilson were especially
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vicious. A crowd of rabble-rousers surrounded him and punched, kicked, and choked
him. One hit him in the head with a brick.
A former U.S. Marine and high school principal, Wilson was a respected
journalist, having won the Wendell Wilkie award, the highest honor in black
journalism.42 In describing the attack by one of the attackers, Wilson said, “Thanks to the
Marine Corps training, I was able to shake him without sustaining injury. He backed
away with a half-brick . . . yelling: ‘Run, damn you, run!’”43 Wilson did not run. Instead
he picked up his hat, creased it, and walked away.44 Wilson said of the attack, “I am not
bitter. If my effort to help bring human dignity in its fullest sense to the oppressed
minority here is successful, then the welfare of all will be enhanced.”45 That night,
however, Wilson was a little less inclined toward non-violence. He stayed up with L.C.
Bates at the Bates’ home in expectation of an attack, “weapons at the ready.”46
In an interesting case of mutually supportive inspiration, Carlotta Walls remarked
with admiration after seeing the news reports of the attack on Wilson that he “stood his
ground.”47 Roberts said of the attack on Wilson, “his unwillingness to run, his refusal to
allow the mob to see his fear, was inspirational.”48 In Wilson’s mind, he later said, was
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Eckford’s own dignified unwillingness to run in the face of the mob which followed her
down Park Street.49 Wilson’s health suffered badly from the attack, however, reportedly
contributing to his untimely death from Parkinson’s three years later. Despite all the FBI,
state troopers, and Little Rock Police Department personnel on duty and clear pictures of
the perpetrators, no one was ever prosecuted for the attack on Wilson.50
Incredibly, the call for reinforcements from the Guard never came. Mann later
wrote a twelve part series for the New York Herald Tribune entitled “The Truth about
Little Rock.”51 He mentioned many details about the city’s planning for that Monday and
the terrible activities occurring that day. He did not mention the plans with Gordon for a
standby unit of Guardsmen, he did not mention why he did not want to use the Guard,
and he did not mention why he did not contact Gordon to send in the Guard instead of
having the black children removed from the school. On a five minute standby the Guard
could have made it to Central High in fewer than thirty minutes, perhaps in as few as
fifteen minutes. There was ample time to do decide whether and when to deploy the
Guard, as fighting at the police barricades lasted from just after 8:00 AM to about noon.
In Mann’s telling of the story there is simply no mention of the arrangement at all.
Others, too, omit the details about the emergency Guard force. In A Southern
Moderate Speaks, Brooks Hays mention he met with Mann, Ashmore, former Governor
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Sid McMath and Blossom on Sunday, September 22, at Woods’ home, but he does not
mention the call to Gordon or why the group refused to utilize the Guard.52 Instead he
mentions that the group considered calling Gordon to request federal troops from Fort
Chaffee – or U.S. Marine Reservists from Little Rock or the Air Force Military Police,
presumably at Little Rock Air Force Base.53 But he makes no mention of the Guard at
Camp Robinson. In Hearts & Minds, Harry Ashmore was equally mum on the troops
available at Camp Robinson. Oddly, he says that he suggested Senator Fulbright contact
Faubus and convince him to “make state police and National Guard troops available to
back up local authorities.”54 Hays, however, insists Ashmore wanted “no other military
action than federalizing the National Guard,” and incidentally, “with the withdrawal at
Christmastime [sic] of the last of the paratroopers, that is exactly what we had.”55
Evidently the National Guard was desirable as long as it was not under Faubus’ control.
Blossom in It HAS Happened Here, mentions Gordon, but only obliquely, through
a statement from Faubus, writing that Gordon “would have to use his own judgment”
about calling out the Guard. Blossom relates that Faubus “referred to a report that city
officials had asked the Lieutenant Governor to put the National Guard on a stand-by
basis.”56 In the book, Blossom never admits such a request was made by him or anyone in
the group, only that it was reported to have been made. However, he does not mention
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that the group met at Woods’ home that Sunday, or whether it considered requesting the
Guard on Monday rather than send the black students home.
Hays does relate a conversation with Mayor Mann about “troops” that Monday
morning, however. Hays called the mayor to check on the situation at the school, and
Mann confirmed he had received a request from Chief Potts for the need of “150 soldiers
as soon as possible.”57 Mann, in his account, never mentioned this call. Potts mentioned
150 soldiers – exactly the force which was on standby at Camp Robinson, the one Potts
himself had called Gordon to request be made available. According to Hays, this call
from Potts occurred during the height of the fighting outside the school. In fact, Hays
says Blossom asked him, “Are the troops coming or aren’t they?” later stating “The
safety of the children depends on it.”58 It is this desperation, revealed in Potts request for
150 troops, and of Blossom’s urging, that compelled Hays to contact Sherman Adams,
White House Chief of Staff. Adams replied, of the request “That’s all the information I
need.”59 Hays believed this call helped convince the Eisenhower administration to send in
federal troops.60 Around noon, Blossom called Arthur Caldwell in the Justice Department
to request federal assistance, estimating the size of the crowd at 1,500.61 Nevertheless, the
Guard at Camp Robinson stayed put.
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The police removed the students after only a few hours inside the school. During
her third period class, Walls heard a knock at the door. Her teacher told her, “Carlotta
Walls, get your books and follow the gentleman outside.”62 Once there she saw a
uniformed officer who urged her to hurry: “Follow me,” he said.63 She hustled quickly
down stairs along with the other black children and was ushered into one of two waiting
police cars inside the shop class of the school. There she was shoved onto the floorboard
with a blanket thrown over her. Terrence Roberts remembered being told to hold
schoolbooks against the windows. One of the cops, possibly Gene Smith, told the driver,
“Put your foot to the floor, and don’t stop for anything.”64 As the cars sped out of the
shop’s garage doors, Roberts could hear “the voices screaming for our blood.”65 Roberts
said the group was more in danger that morning “than at any other time during the school
year.”66 The students were taken home to their panicked parents. NAACP officials
informed them to await further instructions.
To be sure, the situation outside Central High was very dangerous. Fighting and
assaults had occurred all morning long. The crowd had become a mob, and the police
were hard pressed to control the mass of segregationists. Yet no one in the Blossom
group – Mann, Ashmore, Hays – or even Chief Potts was willing to make an official
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request to Gordon for the Guard to be called to Central.67 During a situation with
potentially fatal circumstances for the black children at the school, the Lieutenant
Governor and the emergency Guard force sat idly by awaiting the call.
Why did the Blossom group avoid mentioning the existence of the troops in their
recollections? First, to do so would have opened the group up to criticism for not
requesting the Guard, and most certainly for calling on the federal government instead of
the force at Camp Robinson. In addition, the group could have been criticized for
endangering all the school children – black and white – by not utilizing every resource
available to control the mob. It is also possible they felt calling the Guard would have
been at least a tacit admission that Faubus was correct in predicting violence would result
if the school was integrated, even if, as they believed, he had a hand in promoting the
violence. After all, they had just testified in federal court that they felt the school could
have been integrated without a problem if Faubus had not intervened.
Many people believed Faubus was aware or even the mastermind behind the
violence, even before Ashmore’s narrative cemented that storyline. In the afternoon
papers the United Press reported Gov. Theodore McKeldin of Maryland, a Republican, as
saying. "Faubus wrote the book, set the stage, and directed the play for today's unhappy
occurrences in Arkansas. Even across the miles from Sea Island he gave the cues to his
players in screaming headlines predicting violence.”68
In this context, Blossom and his supporters were simply responding to a
hardening of lines which resulting in the perception that the only viable alternative to the
67. “Little Rock Mobilizing Law Officers,” The Galveston News, 2; Hays, A Southern
Moderate Speaks, 172.
68. “Gov. Faubus Says Ike Can't Do It,” Hutchinson News, September 24, 1957, 1.
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integration problem at Central High was action by the federal government. Federal action
provided two advantages. First, it proved the quickest and most sure method of removing
Faubus from the equation. Given his ability to “evade” the courts and encourage the
segregationists while doing nothing for which he could personally be held responsible,
federal intervention seemed a necessary action. The second and certainly more important
issue had a more strategic focus. In requesting and receiving federal troops to intervene in
Little Rock, they would serve notice to other southern states that they could not postpone
integration forever. Sooner or later, the federal government would act. In fact, many
participants understood that the situation had been moving inexorably to this
confrontation.
At 3:44 PM, Mann sent the first of several messages to the White House pleading
for federal intervention. He cabled the president, declaring that while the police had made
a “valiant effort,” the black children had been removed. Mann stated flatly that the mob
at the school was “no spontaneous assembly, it was agitated, aroused, and assembled by a
concerted plan of action.”69 He told the president, “The manner in which the mob was
formed and its action, together with the presence of Jimmy Karam, leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Governor Faubus at least was cognizant of what was going to take
place.”70 Mann, of course, did not mention the Guard force which was available but
which the group had chosen not to call upon.
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Here Mann’s request intersected with long-running plans within the Eisenhower
administration. According to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the Department of
Justice had been researching when the U.S government could legally get involved:
We found out there was there were two things that were necessary for the federal
government to intervene and to have its action upheld by the Supreme Court. One
was that the local authorities must ask for . . . help and the other was that there
should be . . . widespread rioting or imminence of widespread rioting . . . Little
Rock in our opinion was the first place where the conditions were fully met . . . it
made a good test case to prove that the federal government was supreme in this
area.71
What the Justice Department wanted was a clear cut way to act and to make an
example of recalcitrant southern leaders. Brownell said, “We felt that this was the test
case that had to be made in order to dramatize to everyone that when it came to a
showdown the federal government was supreme in this area. The constitution required
compliance with desegregated school orders of the Brown case.”72 Brownell, however,
insisted the request from Mann was “spontaneous.”73
Whatever the case, Lt. Gov. Gordon and the Guardsmen stood ready. They
certainly could have put down the mob and kept the black children in the school that
Monday. Gordon, when asked about the mayor’s denial of his request for putting the
Guard on standby, said he would not "take Mann's word for anything. Monday, to be
polite, I said his statement was not correct. Today I say he is a liar."74
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There seems to be no evidence of collusion between the Blossom group and the
Eisenhower administration in order to bring federal troops into Little Rock. However, it
seems clear that Blossom, Ashmore, Mann, and the others willfully refused to call the
troops that were available to put down the mob at Central. Had Mann called Gordon the
Guard force, along with the police and state troopers, could have secured the school and
protected the integration process. It seems likely that the Blossom group knew this and
did not call Gordon for that reason – instead, sensing Faubus’ hand in the crisis, they
called his bluff and moved over him, to the federal level.
President Eisenhower was moved by the “disgraceful” mob violence at the school
on Monday. His plea for calm over the weekend had gone unheeded. He characterized the
mob as “angry” and “stirred up by . . . Governor Faubus,” whom he said was “refusing to
lift a finger to support the local authorities.”75 Certainly he was influenced by reports
from Mayor Mann in Little Rock that Faubus’ associates had potentially been involved in
the riots. From Newport, Rhode Island, Eisenhower issued Proclamation 3024 at 6:23 PM
which, citing U.S. Code Title 10, sections 332, 333, and 334, commanded “all persons
engaged in such obstruction of justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse
forthwith.”76 Authorities from Little Rock to Washington then sat awaiting the response.
The Army’s counterintelligence reports from that night do not depict a city under
siege, though they do reveal “a high state of tension in the city, though there were no
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genuine race riots.”77 A “genuine” race riot may not have occurred, but there was strife.
A particularly disturbing report, however, which was not mentioned in Walker’s
memorandum was the appearance of the often mentioned “caravans” which were
reported to be coming to Little Rock in support of segregation. A desk officer reported at
2:25 AM that a caravan of thirty cars had been stopped by police in Little Rock. One man
was arrested, and a shotgun and shells were discovered.78
The next morning Gen. Walker sent a report based on observations at 7:00 AM.
He described the city as “half awake and normal,” with only a single state police car at
the school and a dozen citizens present. Walker said, “there were isolated incidents in the
city up until one or two o’clock which then died down.”79 However, the reports from the
Army were not the only ones reaching Washington.
Beginning in the early morning hours of September 24, Mayor Mann continued
his campaign to elicit help from the federal government, based on yet more ominous
portents at the high school:
Chief Potts, on duty at Police Headquarters, gave me the first radioed reports from
big Gene Smith at Central High: the crowd already was larger than it had been at
the same early hour Monday. Cars were coming in from all over the state. Men in
the growing mob once again carried bricks, brass knuckles, an occasional
brandished knife. The situation had obviously not cooled overnight.80

77. Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas (Histories Division, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1967), 52.
78. Memo “Re: Incidents of Violence in Little Rock, Arkansas,” dated September 24,
0245, Box One, Journal One, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
79. Memo dated September 24, 1957, Box One, Journal One, Operation Arkansas,
NARA.
80. Mann, “The Truth about Little Rock,” New York Herald Tribune.
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Lt. Gov. Nathan Gordon again assembled the emergency National Guard force at
Camp Robinson at 7:30 AM.81 With a discussion of calling for the Guard that morning,
according to Mann, Ashmore said: "For God's sake, we can't go back to Faubus. That, as
we've agreed, would be the worst thing to do. We have to have Federal troops."82 Mann
undoubtedly spoke for the group, saying:
I felt quite certain that the organized effort to justify Governor Faubus' ‘law and
order’ call-out of the National Guard again was showing its true colors. The mob
was to be kept hungry for blood. It now seemed clear that no incident, no
violence, no bloodshed would be bypassed in an effort to "prove" Faubus' point,
and bring him again on the scene as a "savior of the people" — and as a popular
candidate for a third term.83
The group certainly felt requesting the Guard would have undermined their
position and reinforced Faubus’. Whatever else they intended, Hays, Blossom, Mann,
Ashmore, and the others were now locked in a battle with Faubus over public opinion. In
fact, Faubus, ever eager to capitalize on the situation, viewed the calamity as vindication.
He told reporters: “It is not in good taste for me, your governor, to say I told you so, and I
would leave it to others to judge if the events of today justify what I did in calling out the
National Guard to protect the peace.”84
Whether Faubus was involved in planning the mob actions, whether he knew and
did nothing, whether he had an informed hunch, or whether he simply guessed the results
of integration more accurately than his political adversaries, integration at Central High
had been a disaster. Roy Reed, in describing the old mountaineer’s political shrewdness,

81. Appendix 2, Annex B, Arkansas National Guard, Command Report, Camp Robinson,
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82. Mann, “The Truth about Little Rock,” New York Herald Tribune.
83. Ibid.
84. “Faubus Challenges Ike on Using Troops,” Arkansas Gazette, September 24, 1957.
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used a favorite backwoods term of Faubus’ to explain his feat: he had “out-slickered
them” to the detriment of everyone involved – except himself – and they knew it.85
Despite the president’s proclamation the night before, Mann and Blossom had
already determined that the black students should not attend school until their protection
could be guaranteed. The Blossom group was back to square one, trying to decide exactly
how to proceed with protecting the school. Smith’s police reports were not encouraging:
they had arrested a few protesters, including a couple who were armed, that morning, and
nearly fifty others had been charged for vandalism and racial violence elsewhere in the
city overnight.86
As the crowd continued to grow at Central, Mann called the White House to
report on the crowd’s disobedience of the presidential proclamation and urged
Eisenhower to send federal assistance. Mann told Maxwell Rabb, the White House
assistant on minority issues, "We are really going to have a bad situation. As far as I'm
concerned, we need action as quickly as possible. We need Federal troops."87
The White House returned Mann’s call around 8:30 AM and told him to send a
telegram requesting federal intervention. Mann did so, with input from the White House,
and sent the telegram at 9:15 AM. In a telegram described as “hysterical” in tone, he
described the scene “with more than a little exaggeration.”88 Mann’s message stated,

85. Orval Faubus, Down from the Hills (Little Rock: Democrat. Printing & Lithographing
Company, 1980), 83.
86. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 176
87. Mann, “The Truth about Little Rock,” New York Herald Tribune.
88. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son 176; Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in
Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 46.
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“The immediate need for federal troops is urgent . . . People are converging on the scene
from all directions . . . Situation out of control and police cannot disperse the mob. I am
pleading to you as President of the United States . . . restore peace and order in
compliance with your proclamation.”89
In response, Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10730 just after noon,
Washington time. This act not only sent active duty Army troops into Little Rock, but it
also federalized -- or as Mann put it, “deFaubused” -- the Arkansas National Guard.90
While Mann, Blossom, Ashmore, and the others who had foreseen the necessity of
bringing federal troops may have believed that “the mob” was the prefect pretense for
such action. However, their motivations and methodologies can be subjected to a fair bit
skepticism because they already had troops available if the police were overpower – the
troops of the Arkansas National Guard, standing by at Camp Robinson.
The question remains, that If the black children were so endangered at Central
High that they needed to be removed from the school that day, why did Mann not bring in
the Guard troops? The answer seems that by not doing so the group ascertained what it
wanted – the trumping of federal over state law when it came to issues of integration.
This result was admirable, but the means was questionable. It was a terrible political
game to be playing with the lives and psyches of the black children and their families, not
to mention the black newsmen attacked at the school. A great many people were
endangered by the Blossom groups’ refusal to deploy the forces needed to put down the
mob.

89. Mann, “The Truth about Little Rock,” New York Herald Tribune.
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CHAPTER 7
FORT CENTRAL
At 7:00 AM on September 24, 1957, the phone rang at the headquarters of the
1/327th Airborne Battle Group of the 101st Airborne Division in Fort Campbell. The
1/327th had been on Alert Phase ALFA since the afternoon of September 22. The caller
informed the desk officer to move to Alert Phase BRAVO: prepare for immediate
departure.1 The paratroopers’ mission was a go.
Ike had settled on Taylor’s 101st Airborne troopers and the nascent STRAC effort
in part because “they could show that the Army could respond within (six) hours.”2 One
cannot be certain whether the president believed this was a demonstration of domestic or
international significance – or both. Nevertheless, the first test of Taylor’s rapid reaction
force concept and the Army’s newest and most elite (and racially integrated) unit was
against racial extremism within its own borders. Moreover, the professionalism and
celerity of the airborne trooper’s arrival and the orderly assembly of the Guardsmen
proved American troops could handle Cold War threats.
In accordance with STRAC requirements and the standard operation procedure
for the 101st, one of the five battle groups in the division was designated the “alert” battle
group. In Alert Phase ALFA, this group was ready for deployment in two hours, and one
of the five companies within the battle group was at all times on Alert Phase Bravo – a
thirty minute alert, ready for immediate movement to the nearby airfield. With the call,
the Airborne Battle Group suddenly began to move at a frenetic pace.
1. 101st Airborne Command Report, Box 5, Folder 10, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
2. The parentheses here are original to the document. Telephone calls, September 25,
1957. DDE's Papers as President, DDE Diary Series, Box 27, Sept. 1957.
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First Lieutenant David Gossett was eating breakfast at the units’ chow hall when a
jeep driver found him and told him the orders.3 They sped back to the company area, neat
rows of comfortable, modern, brick barracks – a far cry from drafty wooden WWII-era
barracks. All around the barracks soldiers prepared for battle. Some troopers were rushed
through the chow hall for a last hot meal, while others secured their weapons from the
unit armory, gathered rucksacks and equipment bundles, conducted final inspections.
Amid terse orders from loud sergeants, and after several final checks of equipment, the
group marched out to a waiting line of cargo trucks which took the unit on a short drive
to Outlaw Field, the airstrip at Fort Campbell Air Force Base.
There the men assembled into “sticks” for boarding the planes immediately as
they arrived. Stick was an administrative term for divvying up the men of companies and
platoons into an assigned aircraft – in this case sixty-six men for each C-123 coming
from Sewart Air Force Base in Tennessee. In the vicinity of the flight line, sergeants
barked orders and hustled the men into formation by sticks. Officers, in the meantime,
attended final briefings and studied their specific company’s orders. They were each
given a large sealed manila envelope – which for security reasons was not to be opened
until the aircraft had taken off.
The average GI in the ranks could not have guessed where he might be headed,
but rumors were rampant. Some thought Cuba, others Lebanon, or Germany. Most were
simply excited to be deployed. To the soldiers, deployment meant a time of testing, a
chance to prove one’s mettle, and perhaps even the opportunity to shine bright enough to
earn accolades, which would boost ones reputation among his peers and earn decorations,
3. David Gosset, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas, July 18,
2012.
152

perhaps even a promotion. Garrison duty was dull and wore down the unit’s fighting
edge. The prospect of moving to a dangerous situation undoubtedly brought butterflies as
well as an adrenaline rush. This was the stuff for which the young soldiers lived.
Like most Army operations, it was a “hurry up and wait” affair. They rushed into
position for the arrival of the planes, but it soon became apparent their departure was not
imminent. There had been a snafu at Sewart Air Force Base. The Air Force did not get
the word to send out the aircraft, so the troopers waited in anticipation for interminable
hours.4 Finally, at 12:45 P.M. the first of twenty-six aircraft thundered overhead and
touched down onto the airfield at Ft. Campbell. The men immediately loaded as the twinengine C-123s sat at idle, their big props churning the air as the Pratt and Whitney radial
engines coughed and rumbled. The paratroopers boarded at lightning speed. By 1:26 PM
the planes were in the air, departing in formation at crisp one minute intervals.
Once in the air, officers aboard each aircraft stood and faced the anxious troopers.
Ripping open the manila envelope, the officer read from classified orders prepared over
the last three weeks. Germany? Cuba? Beirut? No one knew. The officers removed the
orders and read from a sheet titled “ALL AIRCRAFT LOAD COMMANDERS.”
The officers read “You are now enroute to Little Rock, Arkansas for the purpose
of suppressing domestic violence and to establish and maintain order in the disturbed
area.”5 The men looked at each other in disbelief. Private First Class Hezekiah Brown, a
nineteen-year-old black paratrooper from Pritchard, Alabama, at first thought the

4. 101st Airborne Command Report, Box 5, Folder 10, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
5. “Briefing for Exercise Fallout III,” Headquarters, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th
Infantry, Ft. Campbell Kentucky, September 24, 1957, Box 5, Folder 10, Operation Arkansas,
NARA.
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announcement was a joke or that perhaps they were going to perform a practice jump in
Arkansas and return to Ft. Campbell.6
According to Private Brown neither he nor many of the black troopers thought
Eisenhower would ever act in favor of the Brown decision. The announcement of the
troopers’ mission soon struck home, though. “We were amazed and in shock,” Brown
recalled.7 "I was so excited," he said, "that I could go and help my people."8
Brown had joined the airborne during his basic training in Fort Dix, New Jersey,
after he saw an immaculately uniformed paratrooper with silver wings on his chest. He
talked with the white soldier and was told to forget it, that “negroes were too afraid to
jump.”9 He took this as a direct challenge and volunteered for paratrooper training,
completed the grueling course, and earned his silver jump wings. In the days before U.S.
Army Special Forces, the paratroopers were the elite of the Army. He said graduation
from airborne training was “the greatest day of my life.” Through that accomplishment,
he felt like he had “moved to a higher level.”10
A little over a year later he was on the C-123 headed toward Little Rock. The
officers read the orders, which lectured the troopers about their duties at the school:

6. Interview with Hezekiah Brown, 101st Airborne, The Army Channel, YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTTGo64RpDU (accessed July 19, 2012).
7. Ibid.
8. Robert Kelly-Goss, “Remembering Little Rock Central High School's Civil Rights
legacy,” The Daily Advance, September 02, 2007.
9. Hezekiah Brown, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
September 20, 2007.
10. Brown, interview by author.
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(1) Conduct must be above reproach. A sharp, neat appearance must be presented
to the public at all times.
(2) Military bearing, snap, and precision indicates how well you are trained.
(3) You must be alert. Pay attention to your leaders and respond smartly.11
These orders made a careful effort to enforce military comportment, which was
non-existent among the Guardsmen at Central High in the previous weeks. With no
opposition at the school after the first day or so, news coverage of the Guardsmen
depicted bored, lounging, lax soldiers. The Army was having none of that.
The battlegroup of the 101st which deployed to Little Rock was perhaps the finest
unit in the U.S. Army at that time. From the beginning the unit took serious the
importance of the mission, and the dedication and professionalism of the unit stood in
stark contrast to the amateurish Guardsmen. The Army leadership, tasked with a mission
it would later term “a burden” and “onerous” did everything in its power to prepare for
and properly execute Operation Arkansas.
The 101st troopers were told, “you must make the best military impression upon
those who are creating the disturbance.”12 A good military impression not only created
hesitancy in those inclined to combat the troops, but also summoned some sympathy for
the soldiers deployed into a difficult situation. It netted the unit and its commanders a
good reputation for a successful mission. A poor military impression, however, would
only encourage attacks and criticism, and damage the careers of the commanders and
prospects for mission success.

11. “Briefing for Exercise Fallout III,” Headquarters, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th
Infantry, Ft. Campbell Kentucky, September 24, 1957, Box 5, Folder 10, Operation Arkansas,
NARA.
12. Ibid.
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The orders also made careful use of the concepts employed in Field Manual 19-15
on Domestic Disturbances, which referred to a military “display of strength.”13
Encouraging paratroopers to display “snap” and to present a positive “military
impression” reinforced the idea of the “strength” of the paratroopers in the eyes of all the
observers in Little Rock. The briefing stated:
You will be instructed to make a display of force as is practicable. The display of
force may have the effect of accomplishing everything desired. Should it prove
ineffective, you will have to seek out the leaders of the disturbance. The operation
must be accomplished if at all possible without bloodshed. Action will be firm yet
courteous. Troops will exhibit an attitude of restraint, realizing that all unlawful
crowds contain many curious and harmless citizens.14
The Airborne commanders and planners were reading straight out of the U.S.
Army Civil Disturbances manual, something the Arkansas National Guard had failed to
do. The leadership inculcated in the troopers the need for self-control in dealing with the
civilians. The orders, communicated a sensitivity, though never explicitly, that a number
of the paratroopers were personally against integration, and so cautioned against needless
violence against “harmless citizens.” In fact, the initial briefing to troopers aboard the
aircraft was explicit: “under no conditions will firearms be used.”15 Southern leaders and
segregationists later tried to make political hay out of the invasion of the south by “the
bloodthirsty 101st,” the so-called “occupation” of the South and the Second

13. FM 19-15, 57.
14. “Briefing for Exercise Fallout III,” Headquarters, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 327th
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Reconstruction. However, from the very beginning the professional officers and troopers
were simply following, to the letter, Army doctrine on dealing with domestic
disturbances, including the admonition to operate first and foremost as a means of
psychological intimidation.
After a two-hour flight, the paratroopers landed at Little Rock Air Force Base at
3:30 PM. They were prepared to play exactly by the book. Like all professional soldiers,
they knew “the book was the book. You could play with it – make it better based on your
own experience – but on basic tactical matters it held proven principles.”16 Throughout
the mission they never veered from the “school solution.” There were several reasons for
this strategy. First, military field manuals were depositories of military wisdom. The
book acted as a cultural repository, the tribal code of warriors passed from one generation
to the next. Learning the manual meant absorbing the mass of information previous
generations of troops had learned the hard way. Second, the more unusual the mission,
the more likely commanders, officers, and NCOs were to cling to the guidance in the
book. There was no safety in “winging it” during a dangerous situation. Finally, the strict,
rigid implementation of the proscribed solution from a manual was good insurance
against accusations of misconduct. As careerists, the leadership knew there were serious
professional ramifications for doing a poor job in Little Rock. Thus, they hewed closely
to published Army procedures, protecting themselves from possible recrimination.
The major contributing factor to the 101st’s success, thus, was spelled out in the
in-flight briefing. Throughout the operation their discipline, snap, and military bearing

16. David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American
Warrior (New York: Touchstone, 1989), 284.
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made the mission successful, even if Washington and all other political leaders worked
directly against them in often surprising ways. Civilians around them sensed, if nothing
else, a commitment to accomplish the mission. Dressed in polished Corcoran jump boots
and creased uniforms, carrying themselves erectly with a direct military bearing, the élan
and spirit within the unit reassured the children, black and white, and the teachers and
staff at the school, and discouraged the segregationists. That these were largely
superficial displays mattered little; they had a huge psychological impact and represented
a tremendous contrast to the disheveled and lax Guardsmen.
For their part, the 101st – nicknamed the Screaming Eagles for the distinctive
eagle on their shoulder patch, reacted to the mission in a generally positive manner. The
young soldiers were trained to be aggressive and eager to test themselves against danger
of any kind. They were unlikely to demure from violence or resistance, no matter the
situation. However, the response was not unanimously positive because a large number of
the troopers were southerners. Secretary of the Army Wilber Brucker, in his response to
Senator Richard Russell’s demagogic statements in criticism of the operation, pointed
this out in a letter, saying “these men are enlistees and draftees from all 48 States of the
Union, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. A large number of these men
are from the South and many are from your own state of Georgia.”17
Private First Class Noel Johnson, from Minnesota, was a nineteen-year-old
radioman in the headquarters company of the 1/327th. He remembered at least one of his

17. Letter from Sec. of Army Wilber Brucker to Sen. Richard Russell, Box 4, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
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fellow paratroopers was visibly angry about the mission.18 When the aircraft landed at
Little Rock and the troopers disembarked, Johnson watched him unsling his pack and
rifle and throw them down on the flight line forcibly in disgust. Johnson recalled that an
officer or NCO took away the soldier, but Johnson did not learn what happened to him
over the outburst.19
First Lieutenant Marty Sammons, from Steubenville, Pennsylvania, was the
twenty-two year old son of a steel mill worker. He had grown up with a certain form of
segregation peculiar to his hometown: "Where I grew up the Irish went to St. Peter's; the
Italians went to St. Anthony's; the Polish went to St. Stanislaus, the guys who weren't
sure went to Holy Names; and the blacks went to Ulysses S. Grant Baptist.”20 Sammons,
a former Merchant Marine, had a promising boxing career until he was sidelined by too
many blows to his nose. He joined the ROTC at California’s Santa Clara University and
graduated in 1956. Newly married, he volunteered for the 101st Airborne Division
because he had been told paratroopers were not assigned to posts in Korea and he was
loath to leave his new wife for a yearlong tour on the DMZ, which was common among
Army units at that time. He and his wife Rosemarie shipped out to Ft. Campbell in 1956,
but found the segregated society outside the gates of the integrated base bewildering.

18. Noel Johnson, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas, September
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“She thought the ‘colored’ sign above the laundry,” he said, “referred to the clothes that
were washed there.”21
Sammons was assigned to the battle group’s mortar battery. He recalled that a
number of the paratroopers in the unit were southerners and were personally not much in
favor of the mission when it was announced onboard the aircraft. “We shouldn’t be doing
this,” they grumbled to him. “They said they had not joined the military to help black
kids get to class,” he recalled.22 Nevertheless, he said, “they did their duty.”23 Further, the
unit scuttlebutt, according to Sammons, was that Kuhn and perhaps some of the other
officers might suffer professionally for the mission. Because of the southern politicians in
Congress, the officers had heard “whoever took these kids in down there could kiss his
career goodbye.”24
For his part, Hezekiah Brown said he knew some of the white troopers were
“going against the grain of what they deeply felt inside.”25 However, he stated that they
“were carrying out an order as a soldier and defending the rights of people.”26
Upon arrival at Little Rock Air Force Base the troopers quickly deplaned and then
loaded onto trucks. Col. Kuhn called the Little Rock Police Department to request entry
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into the city and to secure an escort to the school.27 Arkansas State Troopers met the
military trucks at the airbase and escorted the convoy into town, where they received a
chilly reception. As the convoy rolled into town with wailing police sirens in the van,
hundreds of citizens looked on, and a crowd gathered at the school.28 According to State
Trooper Bill Miller:
We led that 101st Airborne Division into Little Rock . . . On the way in, the
[Army officer] in charge of this convoy was right behind us in a jeep. He started
flashing his lights at us, so we stopped. He came up there and said, “You are
going to have to do something . . . people are throwing rocks at us along the
road.” People [in Little Rock] were hot, you just can’t imagine how hot they were.
He said, “You are going to have to put a stop to it.” [Trooper] Mack [Thompson]
said, “Hell man, you have got a thousand men back there and there are just two of
us. Why don’t you stop it?” He just threw up his hands and got back in the jeep.
We came on into town without any more trouble, but people along the way were
throwing rocks at them.29
Army intelligence reports gave a sense of the response. Some were simply
shocked at the awesome spectacle: “My God!”30 Arkansas Air National Guardsman
Doyne Plummer recalled the surreal experience of watching the convoy as it entered the
city:
They were coming in jeeps and their equipment over the Broadway Bridge and it
was one vehicle group, one group, after another . . . it was obvious they were
ready for battle, like going into a war zone. And I thought something to the
effect, “What is happening to this world?” You know? Like some of the things
happening, the terrorist attacks and the different things that you couldn’t believe

27. “Troops Take Up Stations,” The Washington Observer, September 25, 1957, 5.
28. “No Jeers, No Catcalls This Time,” The Afro American, September 28, 1957, 2.
29. Bill Miller, interview by Michael Lindsey, taped interview.
30. Journal File #44, Box one, Journal One, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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would ever happen. “What has happened to this world that the 101st Airborne is
coming to Little Rock, Arkansas?” . . . It was just a weird feeling.31
Superintendent Virgil Blossom arrived at a meeting at Army headquarters in
downtown Little Rock that evening. He said, “The place was buzzing with activity. A full
staff was on duty, guards were on the doors and there was an air of tension.”32 He entered
a meeting room and met Gen. Walker and Gen. Wheeler. In the meeting, Wheeler told
Blossom, “As we see it, this problem has two phases. One is psychological and one is
real. There will be a certain number of what might be called sight-seers to handle. But
there will be others ready to cause trouble. We have come with a lot more men than we
will need and we will be able to exert absolute control of the situation.”33
Blossom said, “There was a rumble of heavy wheels” and then he looked out to
see “the Broadway Bridge, [and] a glimmering streak of lights in the growing
darkness.”34 As the military procession thundered by, Wheeler told Blossom, “We don’t
want anybody hurt. We hope they realize the extent of our strength and will not try
anything.” Wheeler then emphasized to Blossom, in a firm tone, “those Negro students
are going into that school.” He then asked, “Where will we find them tomorrow
morning?”35
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Reporters who watched the scene as the soldiers occupied the school grounds
were awed. NBC newsman John Chancellor commented, “As they marched in the clean,
sharp sounds of their boots clacking on the street was a reminder of their professionalism
. . . there was something majestic about the scene: it was a moment at once thrilling and
somehow frightening as well.”36 One reporter described them as “silent, grim-faced, not
like troops going on maneuvers, more like men moving into battle.”37 Another reporter
who watched the troopers occupy the school said, “I'd hate to tangle with those birds."38
There were some jeers at the soldiers, but for the most part the crowd which
gathered on the sides of the road or near the campus to watch the convoy was quiet. One
spectator in the crowd said “I’m not coming out in the A.M. Those troops look too well
disciplined.”39 A group of teenagers jeered the troops until a burly sergeant approached
them and told them, “Quiet Down!” The teens complied and according to the reporter,
were quiet the rest of the night.40
Private Hezekiah Brown jumped down from the 101st’s truck in front of the
school. He said, “I was terribly excited. I was happy I was part of this,” fully intending to

36. Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House
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take his place on the campus, a sergeant approached him and told Brown, “Soldier, get
back on that truck!”41 Brown returned to the truck disappointed and somewhat confused.
“I just made the assumption at that point in time,” he said, “that we [the black
troopers] were also going to guard the school.”42 Another black paratrooper, Sergeant
Sidney R. Brown, said the black soldiers resented being excluded from the mission, but
the men were somewhat comforted by their commander, who told them, “The most
important thing was getting those kids to school.”43 In fact, the Army felt the use of black
troopers was “unnecessarily proactive” given the “acute” nature of race relations in Little
Rock, though the Army insisted that the decision was not “derogatory in any way to the
Negro soldier.”44 According to the official report, 114 black troopers were segregated
within the 1/327th in this fashion.45
The press noticed the “negro troops” among the paratroopers stayed in the trucks.
Moses Newson, writing for the Baltimore Afro-American inquired about the issue. He
reported, “Operations headquarters appeared more than mildly interested in explaining
the failure to use colored members of the battle group.”46 Newson said, “Although the
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Army denies bowing to Dixie customs in letting the colored troops sit this one out, it is
obvious officers feel their use would create dangerous antagonisms.”47
The chief of the public information section for the U.S. Military District during
the operation was Col. Lawrence J. M. Hulhall, on loan from the Third Army
Headquarters. He spoke with Newson. While Mulhall was a well-respected officer with
experience handling various administrative issues in Italy during WWII, he had been an
officer in the Pennsylvania National Guard, serving in the 109th Field Artillery.48
According to Newson, Mulhall said not using the black troops was a “strategic
measure.”49 He believed Gen. Walker “had a responsibility to the individual troopers as
well as to the mission. He is using his troops in a manner which he considers best to
accomplish his mission.”50 Asked how the individual trooper felt about it, Mulhall said
“It depends on the individual trooper. If he is intelligent, has good common sense, and is
interested in the welfare of his race and his country, he understands the situation.”51 He
stated, quite disingenuously as it turned out, that “there is no noticeable effect on the
morale of the colored troops . . . though there is always a hero or two who are
disappointed when left out of any action.”52 Newson noted some blacks troops were at
the Army Reserve Center at the University of Little Rock, and a few black troops had
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been seen in military vehicles in the area around the high school.53 Virgil Blossom was
told the black troopers were to be used if it became “necessary to protect Negro children
at their home,” which may have been the local commander’s judgment, but no Army
documents support the claim.54
Blossom described the school as a “five-story building built on seven different
levels and with six city blocks of lawn and athletic fields. Inside, many corridors are long
and narrow and, in so large a building, difficult to supervise.”55 Managing security at the
massive educational complex was a challenge for school staff and paratrooper, but it
became increasingly difficult as the number of soldiers was reduced and more control
was placed in the hands of the school staff.
As the black troopers departed and the others unloaded and took positions around
the school they transformed the campus in short order from “the Nation’s Most Beautiful
High School” into a military stronghold. Radio installations, field phone wire, barbed
wire, and barricades went up in a matter of minutes. Col. Kuhn established his command
post and a bivouac area (for tents and living quarters) behind the school, using the
football practice field and the football stadium. Ammunition, including riot gas
dispensers and grenades, were kept in this area under Kuhn’s personal control.56 The
Army established a radio network between their CP and the Little Rock police. The radio
network included jeep patrols of the 101st and the Fourth Army military police, Army
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vehicles stationed at each of the road blocks thrown up around the school, and the
backpack and handheld radios used by troops in and around the school.57 A “hot loop”
phone line connected the command post at Central directly to Gen. Walker’s office;
Walker himself had a direct line to the Pentagon, as well as a large communication
contingent which included radios, teletype machines, and other such equipment.58 As a
testament to their own realization of the “military occupation” of the school, when
cheering a Central High football game a few nights later, the troopers cheered for “Fort
Central.”59
Kuhn positioned elements from three of his 242-man rifle companies in a cordon
completely around the campus grounds, with two rifle companies held in reserve behind
the school. Three-hundred nineteen men stood on the cordon, and the troopers tried to
present as formidable an appearance as possible. They wore steel helmets, slung gas
mask carriers under their arms, and held the Army’s warhorse rifle, the venerable M-1.60
The weapons were unloaded, however, and ammunition was to be issued only at Col.
Kuhn’s personal order. When asked by reporters if the weapons were unloaded, however,
Kuhn gave no response, giving the impression that the Screaming Eagles were “lockedand-loaded” in anticipation of open combat on the streets of Little Rock.61
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According to Gen. Clyde Eddleman, however, when Gen. Earle Wheeler arrived
in Little Rock he found the 101st with “live ammunition in the rifles” on the orders of
Gen. Walker.62 Eddleman said Wheeler was forced to countermand those orders.63 Yet no
troopers recall the initial order, the issuing of ammunition, or being ordered to unload
rifles. Official military channels do not confirm this story either, although there was a
cryptic reference to who held operational control of the ammunition supply. In a phone
call from Gen. Wheeler to the Pentagon at 2:35 AM on September 25 a report stated:
In accordance with what Gen. Wheeler believes to be the desires of the Chief of
Staff, small arms ammunition is being held under the personal supervision of the
Battle Group Commander and the Guard commander. Gen. Wheeler has a feeling
that this is probably wrong and after he samples the feeling tomorrow may change
the instructions on this matter.64
It could be this matter that Eddleman recalled, though the implication in the
memo seems to be that Walker should have held control of the ammunition supply to
himself, rather than delegate it to the two unit commanders. One could imply that the
suspicion fell mostly on misuse in the hands of the Guardsmen. There is no indication,
however, that ammunition was given individually to troopers, except in two cases. Lt.
Marty Sammons recalled the 101st put snipers on the roof of Little Rock Central High
and they had live ammunition. He also was issued live ammunition for his sidearm when
assigned to payroll duty for 1/327th while in Little Rock. The former is in accordance

62. John Taylor, Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen (New York: Doubleday
Religious Publishing Group, 1989), 213.
63. Ibid.
64. “Memo dated 0235 Sept 25 1957,” Box One, Journal One, Operation Arkansas,
NARA.
168

with FM19-15, which suggested the use of select marksmen “placed at vantage points
where they have good fields of fire.” These men were “to be equipped with radios” and to
return fire if “if sniper fire from the mob is encountered.”65 The latter situation was likely
routine for payroll guards, regardless of locale.
Surprisingly, what proved much more controversial than the brandishing of fullyloaded rifles in the presence of civilians and schoolchildren was the paratrooper’s use of
bayonet. Bayonets were hardly mentioned in any of the pre-planning or operational
details in the command reports produced at the end of the crisis by the 101st Airborne
Division, the Arkansas Military District, and the Arkansas National Guard. None of them
mentioned bayonets as a problematic or sensitive element, only whether they were
employed or not. The Civil Disturbances manual listed the bayonet as the primary
weapon in riot control, “effective when used against rioters able to retreat.” It noted,
“Rioters are not bayoneted merely to force a more rapid dispersal.”66 It was, then,
military standard operating procedures during domestic disturbances which resulted in
the use of bayonets.
The symbolic power of the blade, however, proved to be a tremendous rhetorical
device for both critics and supporters of the President’s actions. Governor Orval Faubus
claimed paratroopers of the 101st were sticking “bayonets in the backs of schoolgirls,”
and “the warm, red blood of patriotic American citizens [was] staining the cold, naked,
unsheathed knives.”67 Faubus’ sensationalism notwithstanding, the bayonet has long been
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a forceful reckoning of soldierly intent, as pure a psychological weapon as exists. The
power, fear, and brutality of the bayonet are such that “the average soldier has an intense
resistance toward bayoneting his fellow man . . . surpassed only by the resistance to being
bayoneted.”68 Thus, the bayonet became an intensifying emotional element in the telling
of the Little Rock story that few could resist. Its use in Little Rock, however, was simply
standard operating procedure in civil disturbances.
The battle group’s 115-man mortar battery was chosen to man security for the
school building itself, in part because it was larger than the forty-four-man platoons
within the rifle companies. By using the mortar battery in this fashion the unit maintained
“unity of command,” meaning the usual officers and NCOs led their men, preserving
relationships the unit had worked so long to establish. The mortar battery guarded
exterior doors (with two men to each) and four officers and thirty-one men patrolled the
interior of the school.69 The mortar battery troopers wore helmets and battle dress
uniforms, and carried rifles inside of the school only on the first couple of days. After this
their appearance quickly softened and they began wearing a soft cap and Class A dress
uniforms with trousers tucked into their distinctive mirror-polished Corcoran jump boots.
70

The interior guard carried only nightsticks thereafter, though the officers wore

unloaded pistols on their belts. In an emergency they could be issued ammunition, but the
weapons, like those of the rifleman on the cordon, were mostly a bluff. There was
substance behind the bluff, however; the Army had overnight flown four soldiers from
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Fort Myers, Virginia, to deliver a tear gas and vomit gas dispenser, as well as supplies of
gas grenades that could be thrown by hand or launched from M1 rifles in case hardliners
wanted to substantively test the paratroopers.71
Capt. Ivan Worrell was a 30-year-old from Logan, West Virginia, and one of the
101st Airborne division’s public information officers.72 Worrell‘s principal aim was to
make sure the division presented itself to the public in the best way possible and to
carefully manage information concerning Army activities. He noted trooper appearance
was so important to the mission that the Army flew the paratrooper’s laundry back to the
military laundry facilities at Fort Campbell, where it was cleaned, pressed, and then
flown back the next day. This flight carried about forty men on short-term passes rotating
back to their home base. 73 Worrell said, "There were no sloppy soldiers on the street. The
soldiers were always sharp; they looked good."74
More troops, including several black paratroopers, were stationed at a nearby
Army Reserve Armory on the campus of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.75 A
National Guard armory in the city was also used by forces, as was Central High’s football
field, Quigley Stadium. The Army placed a number of troops in the city south of the
Arkansas River because FBI reports indicated segregationists had planned to block the
only bridge over the river. If this occurred it would have prevented reinforcements from
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Camp Robinson, located north of the river, from coming into the city.76 Even the Little
Rock Police Department reinforced itself; Chief Potts issued thirty shotguns to his men
during the night in case of any rioting or widespread mayhem in response to the arrival of
the U.S. Army troops.77 By sunrise on the morning of Wednesday, September 25, the
troops were in place and ready for duty.78
As the day dawned, a crowd began to gather. They immediately discerned a
marked difference between the undisciplined Guardsmen, drawn mostly from mechanics
and administrative types at Camp Robinson, and the troopers from the Army’s most elite
infantry unit. In fact, the image could hardly have been starker. One observer noted the
silence of the troopers, which was intimidating, as was the rapid pace at which they
moved – at a run, or double-time, everywhere.79 One person in the crowd said “Nobody
but a fool would mess with those troops.”80 Another said, “I won’t dig around with the
federal troops, but I will dig around with the Faubus boys.”81 The Army effort at cowing
the resistance had proved effective.
At 2:50 PM on September 24, just as the Air Force armada carrying the
paratroopers winged across the Mississippi, Secretary of the Army Wilber Brucker
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telephoned Lieutenant Governor Nathan Gordon. Shortly thereafter a telegram followed,
explaining the authority by which the Guard was being called and the nature of its
mission. 82 General Clinger was notified via telegram at 3:00 PM that all Arkansas Guard
units were now federalized and General Walker was commander of the federalized
forces.83 At 8:00 PM Clinger met at Walker’s headquarters for a conference with Walker
and Wheeler. According to the Arkansas Command Report, Clinger left “with the
concurrence of Chief, U.S. Army Military District [Gen. Walker] . . . . [and] conferred
with the Governor of Arkansas.”84
Faubus held the telegram at the governor’s mansion for several hours. He refused
to act until Clinger visited him. He told Clinger, “I’m not going to act on it,” based on his
belief that it was illegal and improper, and further said, “I’m not going to instruct, advise,
or even assent to your transmission of the order.”85 According to Faubus, Clinger then
said, “Governor, if you tell me not to do so, I won’t issue the order.”86 Faubus
responded, telling told Clinger that if he did not order the Guard federalized, it would be
issued “by some other in the chain of command, even as General Walker says, a
corporal.”87 The two understood that Clinger would have to issue the order to save his
military career, but he would do so without Faubus ordering him to do it.88 This was more
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political posturing by Faubus, as he again sought to mollify the segregationists by not
taking personal responsibility for forced integration. Refusing to call out the Guard
himself meant he could not then be accused of forcing integration at bayonet point.
Faubus recalled Clinger left the mansion around midnight. However, the Command
Report written by the Arkansas National Guard for Operation Arkansas lists the meeting
as lasting one hour.89
Clinger’s position in this situation revealed one of the most interesting aspects of
the Guard in the crisis, which is the dual role of the Guard and particularly the Adjutant
General (TAG). The TAG normally worked expressly for the governor and only came
under presidential command if federalized. However, in order to remain TAG, the officer
in the position was required to please the governor. Clinger was stuck between a rock and
a hard place when he met with Faubus at the Governor’s Mansion. He was being called,
regardless of Faubus’ blustering, into federal service; failure to call out the Guard, then,
was simply an offer to please Faubus, for Clinger could have been court martialed if he
failed to do so. The conference with Walker before the meeting with Faubus certainly
laid out that tension – as the comment about having a “corporal” call out the Guard
revealed. Nevertheless, if Faubus is to be believed, Clinger was willing to either resign
his position as TAG and his commission as an officer or even be court-martialed, in order
to prevent the Guard from being called into service. This seems unlikely given the full
cooperation he gave the Army thereafter.
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Clinger returned to Walker’s headquarters. The DSCOPS Journal of Operation
Arkansas lists a telephone conversation between Pachler and Walker occurring at 8:15
PM, shortly after Clinger left to visit with the governor. The conversation was principally
about Clinger and stated, “If after conference [with Faubus] Clinger still refuses Walker
should . . . request air announcement made by radio . . . [and] might well remind Clinger
he is disobeying a legal order by the president.”90 Nevertheless, Clinger issued the order
to federalize the Guard at 9:13 PM, immediately upon his return from the Governor’s
Mansion. Wheeler informed Washington around 2:30 AM that Clinger had setup a
command post at Camp Robinson for the newly federalized National Guard.91
If Clinger hesitated, the Guard overwhelmingly did not, much to the Army’s
surprise. The men were mostly from 3rd battalion, 153rd Infantry Regiment, which
included units up and down Highway 67/167 from Beebe, Searcy, Batesville, Augusta,
and all the way up to Walnut Ridge. Most were notified by radio and television when
Eisenhower announced the call-up, although the Guard had an elaborate phone for
alerting individual soldiers and officers as well.
At 10:00 PM, the clangor of municipal fire claxons shattered the tranquility of
Searcy, Arkansas, a small town north of Little Rock.92 The sirens were accompanied by
radio and television broadcasts calling all Arkansas National Guardsmen to federal duty
on the orders of the President of the United States. Citizen-soldiers resting at home were
suddenly compelled to action; donning their uniforms, they raced to the local armory
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where they were given orders and issued weapons and formed their vehicles into a
convoy. By 1:00 AM the unit was on the road, heading down Main Street and driving
past the marble Confederate soldier facing south on the courthouse square.
Captain Donald Hedden, a coach at Batesville High School, was thirty-two years
old in 1957 and commander of L Company in Batesville. Drafted in 1943, he served in
France as an artillery observer in the 539th Automatic Weapons Battalion. After
returning from the war, he joined the Guard in 1949, was commissioned a second
lieutenant, and shortly afterward attended the Infantry Officer’s course at Ft. Benning,
Georgia. Hedden reckoned 95 percent of his men responded to the federal call-up within
an hour, and many of his men had responded within twenty minutes.93 Still, a few went
missing for various reasons. One young soldier had gone hunting and trapping in a
wilderness area and could not be located, and thus did not respond to the call for five
days.
As the unit assembled and made ready for transport to Camp Robinson, confusion
reigned. Hedden said no one knew for certain what their orders were. Most everyone
expected a two or three day mission, and then they would return home. Exactly what that
mission was, whether fighting for Faubus or against him, they could not be certain.
Durwood Elms was nineteen and a new father; his son had been born only six
days before. He had joined the Guard the previous year as a high school student when
Hedden handed him the sign-up sheet and told him, “Sign here,” and so he did. “You
were afraid not to sign,” Elms said.94
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Bud Kerr was twenty-five-years-old and an employee at a lumberyard in
Batesville. Like many others, he saw the television announcement that he was to report
for duty. He grabbed his duffle bag and headed to the local armory, thinking he might be
gone for a couple of days. Bernard Sexton was twenty-one and worked at the
International Shoe Company in Batesville. Sexton said it was a total surprise: “We didn’t
know today that we were going tomorrow. We knew tonight we were going tonight.”95
The men assembled, formed up for roll call, collected equipment and supplies, and waited
for trucks from Camp Robinson to take them to Little Rock.
An hour north from Batesville, Dale Hanks was a first lieutenant in K Company
in Walnut Ridge. Summoned by his company commander to the local armory, he told his
wife on the way out the door “it was probably only a practice drill” and that he would “be
back in about an hour.”96 In fact, he would not return for two weeks. Hanks recalled that
“we were not clear whether we were responding to commands from the governor or from
federal authorities.”97 He continued:
As we loaded our vehicles that night at the Walnut Ridge armory, rumors began
circulating. Some of our young men hoped we were going to Little Rock to
confront the “Yankee invaders,” assert our “state's rights,” free Arkansas of
“occupation by federal troops” and restore Central High School to its rightful
owners.98
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Hanks was not keen on this sort of talk since while on active duty he had been a
paratrooper in the 101st himself. Beyond that, he said, “I was satisfied that the argument
between the federal government and Southern states had been settled a century before.”99
Additionally, he felt “10,000 Arkansas National Guard troops would be no match for the
U.S. Army in a street fight.”100
Hanks said most of his men were from Walnut Ridge or nearby Hoxie. They
were, he said, “rice and cattle farmers, unskilled farm workers, truck drivers, construction
workers, sawmill workers, auto mechanics and gas station attendants, with a few
schoolteachers and insurance agents sprinkled into the mix.”101 Though they were not
keen on “federal interference” in their public schools, they loaded their equipment after
midnight and headed toward Little Rock. He said, “Whatever our mission, I knew it was
serious because we were bringing live ammunition.”102 Hanks said rumors were flying on
the trip to Little Rock. Some of his soldiers insisted it was a “communist plot,” others “a
conspiracy between the U.S. Supreme Court and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People.”103
The soldiers left at 3:00 AM on the 25th, rolling into Little Rock around 5:00
AM. Capt. Hedden remembered that as the Guard convoy approached Little Rock it grew
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larger and larger as other Guard units joined them. At some point along the way they
were passed by the 101st division’s “land tail” of twenty vehicles and ninety-nine men
which had driven overnight from Ft. Campbell. They also remembered the frigid ride into
Little Rock.
Kerr said, “It was pretty cold, we didn’t even have a tarp on that thing.”104 The
temperature on the night of the 24-25th was a balmy 55 degrees, but with the wind chill
from traveling at highway speeds in open trucks, it would have been near freezing in the
back of the trucks. In a testament to the endemic shortfalls in the Guard supply chain, the
clothing allotment for Guardsmen did not include cold weather gear, and so most of the
men rode in shirt sleeves. Like Hedden’s men in Company L, the men of Company K
also remembered the freezing journey in the trucks. Bob Guimon of Walnut Ridge said,
“It was getting up into September, and it was pretty chilly.” Bob Rainwater said, “No, it
was cold.” They huddled in blankets for the three-hour trip.105
On the other side of the state, Guardsmen in Fort Smith were responding to the
call as well. Fort Smith, like Little Rock, was involved in the desegregation process itself.
One local school, St. Scholastica Academy, a four-year Catholic high school for girls,
had integrated in the fall of 1952.106 Fort Smith public schools, however, were just
beginning the process of integration in 1957, using a gradual plan modeled on
Blossom’s.107
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Staff Sergeant Anthony Worden was twenty-three-years old at the time and in the
39th Military Police Company in Fort Smith. He recalled he “hadn’t thought a thing
about integration anywhere,” in Fort Smith or Little Rock.108 Like the men of the 153rd,
he too left his home thinking he would check in at the armory and return home in a short
time. Instead, he found the armory buzzing with troops preparing a convoy for the trip to
Little Rock.
The commanding officer of the 39th Military Police Company was First
Lieutenant Jack Lovett. Thirty-four years old at the time, Lovett had volunteered for the
Navy in 1942 and served in the Army Reserves in Korea. Reflecting on his men as they
loaded their vehicles, Lovett said he had “great faith in them. I had no doubt they would
do what they were told to do.”109 As the military police unit moved out in jeeps on U.S.
Highway 40 toward Little Rock, Lovett was not quite sure what would develop, but he
was glad to “serve his country in any way possible.”110
The federalized National Guard began assembling at Camp Robinson in the early
morning hours of September 25. The units “were composed of two battalions of the 153d
Infantry; the regimental headquarters; tank, truck, service, and signal companies; the 39th
Military Police Company; and Company D, 212th Signal Battalion.”111 The Guard troops
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stationed at Camp Robinson were known as the Alert Force, with a total assigned
strength of 1,586 officers and men. Walker sent out formal orders that morning, as well
as instructions for the use of the rest of the 10,000 man force of Guardsmen.112
Thus, by dawn on September 25, there were perhaps 2,500 federal troops in Little
Rock or nearby, all ready to move swiftly into action if a large segregationist crowd
proved ready to fight the 101st. As a testament to Eisenhower’s desire to prevent
resistance through a show of strength, this force numbered nearly ten times the troops
Faubus had called in support of segregation. It was a bold and forceful move in support
of integration. The opening stages of the Little Rock operation demonstrated the high
standards of professionalism of the American military, both its elite and reserve forces –
and even among the southern troops ordered to back a mission few personally supported.
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CHAPTER 7
AMERICA’S DAY
During the early morning hours of Wednesday, September 25, Daisy Bates was
busy gathering her own forces, traveling house to house and contacting each of the nine
resolute children. Army officers informed the school President Eisenhower wanted the
children in school that morning, and soldiers were to arrive at Bates’ home to provide an
escort for them. Bates had initially told Blossom she could not do it, but he told her
firmly, “In the circumstance, you’ll have to.”1 She had virtually no sleep that night as she
and the principals from Horace Mann visited each home to ask wary and nervous parents
to have the children meet at her home for the military escort.
Carlotta Walls needed no prompting. She had watched the television
announcement by President Eisenhower. Afterward her uncle, a World War Two
veteran, called her on the telephone to explain that the unit in Little Rock was the elite
Screaming Eagles. “I was surely in good hands,” her uncle had told her. She said, “For
the first night in a long time, I slept peacefully.” 2
Melba Patillo, on the other hand, also watched the television, and it occurred to
her that “if we needed such brave soldiers, the President and those powerful men in his
cabinet must have agreed that the integration was as dangerous as a hostile enemy in
war.”3 This notion, in fact, was precisely what Blossom, Mayor Mann, and the President
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had determined. She said, in a prescient observation, “It felt to me as though the nine of
us were expected to wage some kind of war to make integration happen.”4
The next morning Carlotta popped out of bed, eager to “see what this elite
military unit looked like.”5 The Walls drove to Mrs. Bates’ home, which was swarming
with “reporters, photographers, neighbors, and NAACP officials.”6 Beals quickly noted
the paratroopers’ “well-shined boots.”7 The boots were customarily worn by soldiers
who had completed parachute jump school and had, therefore, “earned their silver jump
wings.” By custom the parachutists jealously guarded this status symbol and many a
fight began with a non-paratrooper, a so-called “leg,” wearing jump boots into a NCO
club full of Screaming Eagles. Traditionally polished to mirror sheen as a sign of
discipline and pride, the boots were part and parcel of paratrooper culture, and Beals
approved, saying, “Grandma had always said that well-kept shoes were the mark of a
disciplined individual.”8 Beals noted, too, that the soldiers “weren’t much older than I
was.”9
As they gathered at Bates’ home amid family, ministers, officials and a gaggle of
reporters, Earnest Green, reflecting on the day, said:
I think if anything stays on my mind as long as I live, this does . . . the [captain] in
charge of the detail escorting us to school was from South Carolina, he told us
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that. And he had a very thick Southern accent. And he went to great pains to
assure Mrs. Bates and the other parents that were there that he was there to
provide protection. And that seemed, from what I knew about Southerners, so
incongruous, that this guy with this deep Southern accent was going to provide us
with our protection.10
Green realized the incredible irony of the situation. White men from the South
were integrating a southern school under orders of the President of the United States.
There was, despite all other assurances, only the thinnest membrane – one of duty –
distinguishing the rioters from the military men. Though everyone from the president on
down fretted about it to some degree, in practice the call of duty proved to be a mighty
bulwark.
Walls described the triumphant journey to the school: “Black mothers and
fathers, who had been held captive inside their homes for days by the rampaging white
mob, spilled onto front porches, yards, and the sides of streets.”11 To Beals, the people
lined the street as if it waiting for a parade.12 The streets were “graveyard quiet,” Walls
said, as they approached the school, and the long line of soldiers snapped to attention
when the students arrived.13 Walls remembered the exhilaration of being surrounded by
the tough paratroopers as the group walked “off the curb, up the walkway, past the
fountain, up the left set of steps,” and up to the front doors. Beals was both proud and
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sad; proud the nation had finally come to take care of her, sad that it was necessary in the
first place.
Terrence Roberts was aware something “momentous was taking place,” but was
mostly cognizant that “maybe now I would not be killed for simply trying to go to
school.”14 A black reporter who witnessed the triumphant walk up the steps of Central
High that Wednesday morning made a poignant comment: while the riot at Central on
“Monday was white folk’s day,” he said, “today is America’s Day.”15 Green said,
reflecting on that moment as he stood atop the steps at the entryway of the school. “I
guess, given the problems we had getting in there, walking up the steps that day was
probably one of the biggest feelings I've ever had. I figured I had finally cracked it.” 16
Nine black children had faced three mobs, one of them numbering some 1,000 to
1,500 people brimming with the most avowed segregationists in the state – and likely
from surrounding states, judging by police reports – and nearly 300 state militiamen to
make entry into a school the Supreme Court four years earlier had ruled was their legal
right to attend.
Sadly, it had taken their families’ stalwart support, a half dozen NAACP lawyers,
over fifty state troopers, almost 200 city policemen, approximately 150 FBI agents,
nearly three dozen U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps agents, some 10,000 National
Guardsmen, the aircrew of over fifty U.S. Air Force planes and one Army helicopter,
1,000 paratroopers of the elite 101st Airborne Division, and the direct interposition of the
14. Terrence Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock (Little Rock, AR: Butler Center Books,
2009), 109.
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President of the United States to make the moment possible. But, yes, they had finally
cracked it. While their hopes and feelings were buoyed at that moment by their success, it
was not by any means the end of their fight. Rather, it was the beginning of what would
become a new and much more vicious personal battle.
Major James Meyers, from San Antonio, Texas, a “thin, hard man with the glint
of a hawk in his eyes,” stood next to a loudspeaker-equipped radio jeep at Roadblock
Alpha on the corner of Schiller and 14th.17 He turned to a private and ordered him to
address the gathering crowd. “The 101st Airborne Division is here to enforce law and
order. You are instructed to disperse and return to your home.” The crowd did not move.
Someone yelled, “Go to hell!”18 Another said, "Nigger lover," and another "Russian!"
One protestor assured the crowd: "They're just bluffing. If you don't want to move, you
don't have to."19
Meyers, known as “Blinky” to his men, picked up the megaphone and
nonchalantly said, “If you do not disperse now it will be necessary for us to disperse you.
We do not want to take this action.”20 Still the crowd was unmoved. Meyers grabbed the
radio handset from the jeep and made a call to Col. Kuhn, whose call-sign was
Defiance.21 “Hello, Defiance, this is Crossroads Six," Meyers said, identifying himself.
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He requested a platoon from Bravo Company be sent to Roadblock Alpha. Soon a
platoon double-timed a block from the school down to Meyers.22
He turned to the crowd and said again, “You are ordered to disperse peacefully
and return home.”23 The crowd still did not budge. “Why don’t you go home!”24 Meyers
turned to his men and said, "If they want to get tough, we'll get tough.”25 He then waved
the troopers forward.
Earlier the same morning a company of reinforcements for the Screaming Eagles
had awakened in Camp Robinson. They had spent the night in the tiny, leaky, unheated
six-man huts left over from World War Two. The troops ate cold C-rations for morning
chow, grabbed their weapons and gear, assembled for formation, and then loaded onto
trucks for the trip to Central. This was C Company, Charlie Company, nick-named “Cold
Steel Cobras” within the battle group. The reference to cold steel, fittingly enough,
referred to their razor-sharp bayonets, a trademark of paratrooper pride from the very
establishment of the airborne profession. While conventional “leg” infantry might be
satisfied with a dull bayonet, paratroopers – who traditionally prepared for a mission
surrounded by the enemy – honed their blades in psychological preparation for close-in
battle behind enemy lines.
First Lt. David Gossett commanded Charlie Company. Born in Massachusetts to
Scottish immigrants who moved back to the homeland during the Great Depression,
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Gossett spent his formative years as the son of a butcher in Scotland. In 1947 he traveled
to Paris and joined the U.S. Army “because it paid better than the Brits.”26 Five years
later Gossett completed officer training in Fort Benning, Georgia, and after a tour of
combat in Korea found himself at Fort Campbell in command of an under-strength
company in a new outfit, the re-constituted 101st. It was Gossett’s job to get the men
ready for a series of unit ATT, Army Training Tests. They passed, he said, but the
company was full of “green” troopers.27
Gossett’s men were no battle-hardened warriors. Indeed most were just out of
basic training; many had only completed jump school in the days before their arrival in
Kentucky. “Just kids, actually,” Gossett said.28 His immediate predecessor, Capt. Ivan
Worrell, had struggled to build the unit up from just sixty-eight men to the 215 necessary
to get the company to full strength. That full strength also included a minimum of 10%
black troopers.29 Worrell recalled in the months before Gossett arrived that he knew
some of the NCOs in the company were personally against integration in the Army. He
had at least one first sergeant who “was a pretty strong bigot” from Yazoo City,
Mississippi.30 Worrell had to make sure the sergeant would not reject black troopers in

26. Gosset, interview.
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the unit once they had reached their mandatory 10% quota. As Worrell put it, “We
needed them, anybody we could get. I wanted any qualified personnel.”31
As Gossett made the final checks on his troopers before heading out in a convoy
to Central High that morning, he was given “a very unusual order.”32 He was told his
black troopers were to remain behind at Camp Robinson. Although opposed to this,
Gossett had to follow orders. Further, he knew this command to stand down would not
settle well with black soldiers, and the unit might suffer morale problems because of it.
Nevertheless, he gave the order to his NCOs and climbed onto the truck as the black
troopers dismounted and walked away toward the barracks. As the trucks started up, he
turned back and watched one of his black NCOs, a respected soldier and Korean War
veteran, “weeping, just tears streaming down his cheeks.”33 As the trucks rumbled away,
Gossett saw the man rip his medals from his chest. He later learned the sergeant had
burned the medals in anguished protest over the injustice of the situation.34 The
Eisenhower administration’s re-segregation policy was a terrible injustice apparent to
white and black troopers alike.
Within a few short minutes the convoy arrived at Central High, and Gossett
ordered his men to replace a company that had stood on the perimeter of the school all
night. A thousand miles away, the Pentagon was taking advantage of a new technology –
television – to survey the situation at Little Rock. That day CBS broke into daytime
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programming eleven times and NBC broke in eight times.35 Army Secretary Brucker and
Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, anxious for updates about the situation, tuned in
to the broadcasts from Brucker’s office in the Pentagon. Taylor was pleased at the sight
of troopers marching in crisp formations or standing stiffly at parade rest, until he noticed
one soldier. “Why, there’s one man whose belt is undone,” he said, though it turned out
the soldier was taking a break.36
Even though the black troopers had been removed, presumably either to protect
them from violence or to prevent their presence from inflaming the crowd, the diversity
of the troopers was still noted by observers. While the vast majority of the men of the
101st were white, one reporter observed a number of those on duty at Central High were
“Phillipinos [sic [and/or Puerto Ricans.”37 This was also an observation made by some of
the students, who referred to them as “little Chinamen,” saying later, “now I know they
were probably Filipino. But they were Oriental to us. They were Hispanics.”38 The
students in particular saw the use of non-white troops against them as an added element
in the federal invasion. To be occupied by white troops was one thing, but for a few of
the more xenophobic students at Central High, to be surrounded by “foreigners” was
quite another.
As the soldiers stood on the cordon line between the protestors and the school, Lt.
Marty Sammons recalled that the crowd kept verbally attacking the non-Caucasian
35. Gene Roberts and Hank Kiblanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights
Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation (New York: Knopf Publishing Group, 2006), 180.
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soldiers in the unit. “Hey, are you a nigger? Are you a nigger? Is he a nigger? Is he a
nigger?” the crowd yelled at the soldiers, trying to elicit a response from either their
target or the white troopers nearby.39 At one point someone in the crowd spat upon a
respected Hispanic NCO in the unit, a man who had -- according to Sammons -- survived
a number of combat jumps during World War II.40 The well-disciplined airborne trooper
never reacted, but it was a point of extreme consternation among the other men of the
unit. The incident not only revealed the full face of Southern racism, but also caused
them to relish the chance for a bit of reciprocity against the ruffians in the crowd.
One driver passed by the cordon and yelled "Heil Hitler!" at the troops as they
formed up and stood on the perimeter. Calling upon a number of feelings associated with
violation and invasion, student protestors taunted the soldiers, chanting, “Yankees are
niggers painted white,” clearly implying not only the imagery dear to southern
regionalism – the Civil War and Reconstruction – but also that any white men who dared
to integrate were of questionable racial purity.41 This was especially ironic since, as one
officer in the division guessed, admittedly unscientifically, that the unit was 60%
southern.42
One of the most common taunts issued at the soldiers at Central High was
“nigger-lover.” Gunnar Myrdal remarked that because of the hard caste line in the south,
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to be known by this term meant “social and economic death.”43 To the segregationist it
was the ultimate insult leveled at a perceived race traitor, as potent as accusing someone
of fraternizing with the enemy during wartime. Often this type of slur was combined with
further denigrations such as the phrase “mother fucking nigger lovers,” with the
implication being that not only were the white soldiers race traitors, but incestuous as
well. To ratchet their disfavor up one more level, the Bible Belt’s denizens often
appended “god damn” to the phrase, confirming their opinion of the target’s ultimate
spiritual fate. The communication was simply that the soldiers were committing the worst
and most offensive activity imaginable.
Fed up with the ugly nature of the abuse, one sergeant was heard by reporters to
say, “I wish I could – I could go over there and take any three of them and break them in
two with one hand.”44 The sergeant did not follow through with his threat, but the
comment reveals that the men on duty were not automatons. They resented the taunts and
insults and were eager to return the favor, given the opportunity. The soldiers’ orders and
duty prevented them from responding verbally or physically to the hecklers. They
internalized the abuse. One paratrooper, for instance, wrote the initials “MFNL” on his
Presidential Unit Citation medal in a cynical reference to the scorn heaped upon the
distinguished unit by the citizens of Little Rock.
Inside the school, shortly before the arrival of the black children, Superintendent
Blossom called a school-wide assembly, though only approximately 60% of the normal
2,000 students were present. Gen. Walker addressed the students in a speech prepared by
43. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
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Col. Easton of the Judge Advocate Corps. Sternly warning the students that his soldiers
were determined to do their duty, Walker, using language certainly applying to himself
and the soldiers in his command as much as it did his listeners, advised them:
You have often heard it said, no doubt, that the United States is a nation under law
and not under men. This means that we are governed by laws properly decided
upon by duly governed authority and not by decrees by one man or one class of
men. Since this is true, it means that we are all subject to all the laws, whether we
approve of them personally or not, and as law-abiding citizens, have an obligation
in conscience to obey them.45
Walker then advised the students “my soldiers” are “here because they have been
ordered to be here.”46 In this way, Walker signaled rather subtly that he and his men
might not agree personally with his orders. Moreover, his men were in Little Rock
because of external orders, not by their own volition. This reasoning may have convinced
some of those students in the middle, but it did little to mollify the hardliners.
Outside Central High, after the black students entered the school, it was
pandemonium. Marty Sammon, who spent his post-Army career as a professional boxing
referee, said, "I've been to big fights, a Super Bowl, and I've never heard a sound like
this. That scary roar, I'll never forget it, it was like an earthquake."47 Civilians pushed
against the soldiers’ lines, and the sixty-man reserve force in front of the school moved in
to force them back. As the official history puts it, “Certain elements [in the crowd] began
to show open hostility in both words and action.”48
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The FBI had issued photographs to Sammons’s group, which was told to be on
the lookout for Jimmy Karam and his notorious “strikebreakers.”49 According to
Sammons, the reserve force in front of Central High could watch as the small group of
agitators moved from one place on the line to another, shoving and screaming. The
reserve force, stationed at the center of the lines, could easily shift its squads from one
focused area of resistance to another, countering the agitators as they moved along the
cordon lines.50
Eventually the Army commanders on the ground at Central High decided the
crowd was so surly it should be moved away from the school entirely. According to
Sammons, the soldiers had heard rumors that police checkpoints around the school had
confiscated “trunk loads of shotguns.”51 The Army decided moving the crowd a full
block away from the school would prevent them from watching the school and thus might
reduce their incentive to remain. In fact, Eisenhower had communicated this command to
Gen. Wheeler the day before at 6:20 p.m. in a memo stating, “Lines established some
distance from the school, to keep mob a block or two from school, to allow police to deal
inside. Only students and teachers permitted inside school and troop cordon.”52
Thus, the initial action – with citizens standing on the sidewalk across from the
school, similar to the cordon the National Guard had created three weeks earlier – was
48. Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas (Histories Division, Office of the Chief of
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not fully in compliance with the President’s orders. The tactical advantage of moving the
crowd, plus compliance with the chief executive’s request, then necessitated moving all
the onlookers from Park Street back to the barricades erected one block south at the
corners of 14th and Schiller and 16th and Schiller. This “maneuver,” as the official report
called it, created the confrontation resulting in the only two casualties of any note in the
operation.53
The mob was sullen and the aggressive troopers were edgy. Forces had converged
to create a scene rife with tension between the nastiest elements in the city and crack
troops which by this point had been abused to the point they were more than willing to
face them. A reporter on the scene said, "I was near the edge of a skirmish line of troops
moving down the street with fixed bayonets.” A paratrooper began moving toward him
until somebody said, “Hey, he's one of the newsmen!” The soldier bypassed him,
“missing me by a couple of inches,” he said. “For a couple of seconds,” he reported, “I
was staring at the business end of a 101st Airborne bayonet, and it wasn't a very pretty
sight."54
Down at Roadblock Alpha, Meyers had reached his limit. "Let's clear this area
right now. This is the living end!"55 The squad surged forward in unison to break the
ranks of hardliners. They double-timed into position, tucked their M-1 rifles into their
hips, slanted them forward and advanced with ten inches of razor-sharp steel glinting in
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the faces of the protestors. One observer said in awe that in Little Rock, "The force of law
shows nakedly on the point of a bayonet."56
Meyers was still on the horn, “I'll tell you, we're not going to do it on a slow walk
this time."57 A sergeant barked to the troopers, "Keep those bayonets high -- right at the
base of the neck."58 Another “gravelly-voiced sergeant” barked at his men, “Keep those
bayonets at their necks, right at their throats!”59 One black reporter said of the troops,
“There was a determination in their eyes and wickedness in their shiny bright bayonets
which said to the White Citizen’s Council, ‘If you don’t git [sic] this thing is going right
through you.’”60 The crowd soon began to dissipate, and the first skirmish in the battle of
Little Rock was over.
Meyers, from his loudspeaker equipped jeep, continued to admonish the retreating
crowd to move away and “return to your homes immediately.”61 Squads of troopers
moved toward the crowd, and with bayonets slanted forward “walked” the crowds out of
the restricted area. Some in the crowd, however, decided to resist. The first of the
confrontations occurred as the troops began moving citizens off the sidewalk in the
vicinity of Roadblock Alpha at Schiller and 14th, a block south of the school. Instead of
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leaving the area, they took shelter in the yards and on the porches of the homes on
Schiller, saying, “This is private property!”62
Troopers approached what was, except for the seriousness of the situation,
something of a comical sight. Perhaps twenty or more hardcore segregationists, who had
demonstrated and threatened violence only a few days before and who later swore to
never surrender in the face of federal oppression, huddled under a green and white striped
awning on the tiny porch of a small wood-framed house on Schiller Street. They fearfully
clung to the porch as if it were a life raft menaced by sharks. A woman came out and
tried to shoo them off her porch with a broom, saying, “Don’t get me in trouble! We want
no trouble.”63
The soldiers ordered them again, “Move on!” The group refused. Twenty-eightyear-old Corporal Bill May, a Korean War veteran, advanced on one particularly vocal
man. A Missouri Pacific railroad switchman, Clifton E. Blake, a 46-year-old Marine
Corps veteran with “27 months of combat experience in the Pacific during World War II”
would not budge.64 Blake later said he told the soldier, "I was on private property."65 The
soldier told him again to “move on,” and when he did not, May said, "I pushed [Blake] a
little bit with my rifle.”66 Blake claimed he had a “bayonet stuck in my chest. The skin
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was broken, but not seriously.”67 Blake realized the trooper was dead serious and would
have run him through with the bayonet yet he was unwilling to back down in front of a
rowdy group of twenty men and high school boys so he grabbed the rifle “to protect
himself.”68 May said Blake “grabbed the butt of my rifle. That was a mistake."69 A
reporter who witnessed the scuffle said May “quickly reversed his hold on the rifle in
combat fashion and the butt struck Blake over the eye.”70
Blake found himself “knocked to the ground.” He later reported with tremendous
exaggeration that “four or five other soldiers were clubbing [me].”71 In fact, a single wellexecuted butt stroke from May’s rifle toppled him. Blake told an interviewer on
Shreveport, Louisiana, radio station KENT that he struggled with the federal interlopers
and was forced to grab the bayonet a second time to keep from being stabbed.72 Blake
identified his attacker as a “Sgt. Mays” [sic].73 In fact, after Blake was struck to the
ground, May stood over him as he lay bleeding and held a well-honed bayonet at Blake’s
throat. This action broke the stalemate with the recalcitrant crowd.
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With blood streaming from Blake’s forehead, the paratroopers backed off. Blake
was retrieved by his friends and hurried to the hospital, his wife “screaming
hysterically.”74 Fifty years later, May was unapologetic. "He got four stitches . . . they
finally realized we were there for business,” May said. “We weren't fooling around."75
The crowd dispersed without further violence. A reporter asked to use the
homeowner’s phone, but the woman said, “Look at the blood on my steps. Just look there
at that blood. The Yankee soldiers did that. Who are you for, anyway? If you’re for
Eisenhower, you can’t use this phone.”76
Clifton Blake, for his part, claimed he had done nothing at all to provoke the
attack from the soldiers.77 However, minutes before the scuffle, he was reported to have
said, “I advocate violence!”78 Reflecting a bellicose Southern rights narrative, he told
reporters, "This country fought for its independence, and now is the time to begin
upholding it."79
The crowd was apparently not ready for such a revolution, instead contenting
itself with catcalls and jeers. “They’re trying to cram this thing down our throats,” one
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man said. “The South has been occupied again,” said a woman. “What are they trying to
do to us?” said another in the crowd, “bayonets ain’t the way to do it.”80
The second casualty of the operation occurred during another incident near 14th
and Schiller when paratroopers reportedly “stabbed” a slow moving unemployed
salesman named Paul Downs from Springdale, Arkansas. He was told to move as the
soldiers advanced to clear out the gathering crowd. According to Downs, he did not move
fast enough for the soldiers and was stabbed in the arm “to the bone.”81 His remark,
which he said prompted the attack, was, “I’m from the South, and I don’t move very
fast.”82 The Army, however, said, “The wound was a result of a sudden turning
movement on Mr. Downs’ part.”83
After seeking medical treatment at the local hospital, Downs then returned to the
troopers’ lines and made threatening remarks. “Bayonets is just not the way,” he told
reporters.84 “I heard of some women being shoved around. I’m not particularly for or
against integration, but I don’t like to hear about women being shoved around.”85 Downs
then said, “If I have to go get a gun, I’ll make an issue of it. I can’t kill them all, but I can
stop some of them. I’m not going to let them shove women around.”86
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The soldiers promptly arrested him. Downs was expressing the same sort of
southern white masculinity as that of Police Officer Dunaway and C.E. Blake, justifying
his actions – in this case threats of violence – as necessary for the defense of white
womanhood. For its part, the Army conducted official Reports of Inquiry on both the
Downs and Blake incidents, determining the paratroopers “had acted in accordance with
their duty.”87
It is notable that much of the narrative about violence hinged on the threat of
outsiders, not locals. Faubus feared gunmen imported from southern or eastern Arkansas.
Many commentators noted the out-of-town license plates, even ones from out of state, but
of the two people hurt in confrontations with the soldiers, one was a Little Rock native.
Downs might fit the mold of an out-of-town rabble-rouser, but his actions were less those
of a plot by a violent agitator than a vocal protestor caught up in the moment. Despite the
fears, no gunmen surfaced to challenge the troopers.
At about the same time troopers were dealing with Blake and Downs, a black
delivery boy riding a bike and carrying a basket of food had the misfortune of making a
delivery on Schiller Street. He was immediately chased by a gang of forty to fifty white
youths – presumably some of the eighty students who had signed out of Central High in
protest of “niggers in the school.”88 They knocked him down and began attacking him,
but the young man broke free and fled to a nearby house. A white woman came to the
door and let him in, shutting out the white boys. “What are you, a nigger-lover?" the boys
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asked. “No,” the woman replied, "I'm a Christian.”89 They turned their frustration on his
bike, slashing his tires to ribbons, but eventually the youthful lynch mob screamed their
determination to burn down the house unless the woman turned the boy over to them.90
A squad of troops detected the ruckus from their post at Roadblock Alpha and
double-timed down the street, combat boots clattering on the pavement. For a few
moments, the gang of boys looked as if they would stand their ground against the
charging paratroopers. The sergeant in command sensed the impending conflict and,
without missing a beat, shouted to his men, "Fix bayonets! Charge!" as the soldiers ran
toward the boys. 91 The troopers then gave an aggressive war cry, “the bone chilling battle
cry of the famous fighting division that told the German army to ‘go to hell’ at
Bastogne.”92 The boys instantly “broke and ran in every direction.”93 A reporter noted,
“For the first time in a long tense day, some of the troopers laughed out loud.” Others
grinned as the young toughs beat their retreat.94 An officer, most likely Major Meyers,
came along in a jeep, went to the door, and said, “Come on out, sonny – we’ll take you
where you want to go.”95 They loaded up his bike and drove him away. Several
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photographers who witnessed the incident collected $20 to help the young man replace
his tires.96
Further down the street, one reporter noted the paratroopers had apprehended a
high school boy who refused to move along. As the boy sat in a jeep with two
paratroopers towering over him, his friends looked on from a distance and encouraged
him to escape. "Jump out and run," they yelled. "I can't," he said, "I can't. I can't."97 An
Airborne officer heard the jeers, walked to the jeep, and pointedly told the boy: "Do not
get out of this jeep. I repeat, do not get out of this jeep and run away. Do you
understand?"98 The boy nodded in agreement and shortly thereafter was taken to the
detainee holding area behind the school.99
A group of teenagers in ducktails and sideburns made wisecracks at one group of
soldiers; the troopers formed up and stepped forward a single step while shouting their
war cry in unison, “Hah!” According to the reporter watching the episode, the teens
“scattered like startled rabbits.”100 One man glared at the troopers “from a safe distance”
and said, “If they’d put their guns down and come across the street we’d show ‘em who’s
tough around here.”101

96. George H. Watson, Jr., “Nine Negro Students Enter Little Rock's Central High,”
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In another case, reporters watched as a teen refused to move when a line of
troopers advanced on him. The boy pigheadedly stood his ground until one of the
Screaming Eagles approached him and “prodded the sharp end of his bayonet gently into
the small of his back.”102 The prick of the bayonet “did not draw blood — but it
persuaded the youth to retreat in haste.”103
Not everyone was so terrified of the paratroopers, particularly if they intervened
in official business. What one observer termed “an interdepartmental squabble” occurred
when one of the troopers refused to admit a mail carrier through the Screaming Eagles’
perimeter.104 The postman was “walking up a nearby street delivering mail when a
paratrooper thrust his rifle across the carrier's chest and told him to retreat.”105 The
trooper sternly informed the postal carrier that he had orders to keep all unauthorized
people from the school. "Sonny,” the elderly letter carrier told the young paratrooper,
“you'd better get some more orders because Uncle Sam says I'm coming through!" A
nearby paratrooper officer agreed, and the postman went about his business
unmolested.106
This was the sum total of The Battle of Little Rock – at least the “battle” as the
military men saw it. They had challenged the diehard segregationists in their own town
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and defeated them with the minimum of insult or injury. The mission was a resounding
success. President Eisenhower had dropped the federal hammer on segregation and used
overwhelming military force to champion the right of nine black children to get an
education. If blood had run in the streets of Little Rock, it was only a few drops.
One white man stood outside the school surveying the military panoply – the
hovering helicopter, the machine-like movement of platoons and squads, the jeep patrols,
and the rooftop snipers. He told reporters, “Anybody with common sense knows when
they’re licked.”107 Then striking a surprisingly conciliatory and patriotic tone reflective of
many in the crowd that day, he said, “These soldiers are our boys. We don’t want to buck
them. We’re just here to show our protest.”108
The worst nightmares of the military (and Faubus) never actualized. No snipers,
no squads of determined Klansmen with automatic rifles, no bombs, and no mass
violence. Such open assault would have required the hardliners to attack the men in
uniform, “our boys.” In the 1950s at the height of the Cold War, when the South was
immersed in combating the Red Menace, such an act would have been as traitorous to
southern white identity as integration. So much of massive resistance wrapped itself in
just this sort of symbolism – invaders were communists, blacks who agitated for
integration were communists, defense of segregation was defense of liberty and
democracy, and overreaching federalism was fascism.
It should be no surprise then that violence against the soldiers never materialized.
Their image was inseparable from that of America. Interestingly, the soldiers’

107. “Get Tough Policy Introduced,” The Palm Beach Post, 19.
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requirements to follow orders were easily understood by a highly militarized society
brimming with veterans of various stripes. Southern white veterans could identify with
the soldiers’ uniforms, helmets, weapons, activities, and unit structure. The young
airborne soldiers may have been a reflection of the older viewers’ images of their
younger selves. That a few did battle the troopers is less an indication of virulent racism,
which was common around the school that day, than a testament to the individual’s own
personality and private motivations. It is notable, for instance, that most of the resistance
was perpetrated by youthful school-age males who had no military experience and who
very likely were the same students who would re-enter the school and cause the black
children and the National Guard such trouble. Their immaturity certainly contributed to
the conflict.
Nevertheless, the battle, such as it was, exhausted the crowd – if not the troops.
Curiosity-seekers and protesters at the checkpoints around the school greatly diminished
by 10 a.m., and most left the school altogether by noon.109 Still, the “battle” had been
hard fought enough that few thought this was the end of conflict within the city. As the
crowd milled around, one of the onlookers asked a paratrooper officer how long he
thought the troops of the U. S. Army would be on duty at Central High. With only a
touch of hyperbole, as it turned out, he answered, "Indefinitely."110
Back at Camp Robinson, tempers flared among the few dozen black paratroopers
in Hezekiah Brown’s company as they huddled in their tiny, ramshackle barracks.
Humiliated and cast off from the operation, mutiny was on their minds. Some were angry

109. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 80.
110. “The Truth about Little Rock,” Lebanon Daily News, 14.
206

and blamed the white soldiers for denying them the chance to carry out the President’s
orders and protect the children. "A group of angry young men said it was their fight and
we were going to march to Little Rock," said Brown.111 For his part, Brown feared the
white response to such a march. He knew that, despite the elite status of the 101st
paratroopers, they, just like the guardsmen, had not been issued ammunition. With empty
rifles, such a march was doomed and could only end in disaster against racist southerners
armed with “shotguns and knives.”112
Further, Brown believed if the black troopers were present at the school they
would turn the integration issue upside down; the focus, in his mind, needed to be on the
students and not the black soldiers. Yet, as the group talked, the discussion became more
heated. Brown, seeing what was happening, intervened. “I stood and said this was not
something we are going to do,” he recalled. There was much grumbling and expression of
frustration, but the group finally conceded to his firm suggestion and agreed to not take
the matter into their own hands.
Col. Kuhn noted Brown’s role in talking his fellow soldiers out of the march.
Brown was promoted to “acting sergeant” over the black paratroopers in his company
who were stationed at Camp Robinson. The black troopers were officially on reserve,
held back for an emergency, but in fact had little to do at the camp. They performed close
order drill, guard duty, cleaned equipment, and entertained themselves with sports and
card games.

111. Hezekiah Brown, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
September 20, 2007.
112. Brown, interview.
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The black troopers were not completely relegated to the status of bystanders,
however. Perhaps sensing the hit to morale, Kuhn did utilize some of them on the
campus. According to the Army report, three black enlisted men worked at the command
post behind the school, and another five manned a communication outpost at the nearby
Army reserve center.113 Given the strict nature of the orders to segregate the soldiers and
the report that nonetheless black soldiers were used on the campus, Kuhn demonstrated
an intentional and willful disobedience to Washington orders by placing the black
troopers on duty at the campus.
Over the coming days the black troopers settled into daily life at the camp while
the white troopers rotated at the school on a three-day schedule. The black troopers
particularly relished the return of the white troopers to Camp Robinson after a rotation at
Central High. Brown recalled the black paratroopers “couldn’t wait to hear stories” about
the conflicts between the paratroopers and the segregationists at the school.114 The white
troopers obliged and eagerly shared their stories with Brown and other black
paratroopers, thus easing some of the racial tension in the unit.
Though the administration had misgivings about using black troopers at the
school, they were allowed to leave Camp Robinson in their civilian attire on a weekend
pass, and many did so. Over the course of the three or four weeks he spent there, Brown
recalled “going downtown” to restaurants, clubs, and such, “doing what soldiers do.”115
He did not meet any of the Nine, but spent enough time in Little Rock to say he never felt
113. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 52.
114. Brown, interview.
115. Ibid.
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a personal confrontation with whites in Little Rock was imminent. There was, he said,
“no conflict.”
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CHAPTER 9
THE PALACE GUARD
As the black children entered the front door of the school on September 25,
Central High School Principal Jess Matthews greeted them. Gen. Walker was also
present, and the Army took their photograph. The school’s newest students then
proceeded to class, escorted by the interior guard of Screaming Eagles. This use of the
paratroopers was undoubtedly a change of Army plans; the employment of soldiers for
interior guard duty was not within the President’s original vision, anticipating as he had
that the Little Rock Police would “deal inside the school.”1 However, Chief Potts refused
to allow his officers to work anywhere inside the troop cordon.2
The intransigence of the local police chief put the Army in something of a pickle.
Pursuant to orders given to Col. Kuhn by Gen. Walker, the airborne unit was “to provide
security escorts to individuals or groups as desired by this headquarters.”3 The spot
reports from the first morning of integration at the school revealed the Army’s attempt to
follow this plan, but also that had “not been able to obtain cooperation of the local police
inside the cordon of troops. As a result of this situation Army troops must guard school
entrances and some troops must be assigned inside the school to prevent incidences.”4
Potts’ refusal to cooperate forced the Army into the improbable and quite unexpected
1. Handwritten memo, Date September 24, 1957, Box One, Folder One, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
2. Memo from CWO S.E. Walton to DA, September 24, 1957, Box One, Folder One,
Operation Arkansas, NARA.
3. Memo from CG Arkansas Military District to CG 1/327th Battle Group, September 24,
1957, Box Two, Misc. Docs., Operation Arkansas, NARA.
4. Memo dated 0235 hours, September 25, 1957, Box One, Journal One, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
210

situation of using the nation’s elite paratrooper force as bodyguards inside an American
high school. Here was a case of using sledgehammers to break eggshells. The Army
major preparations were for shootings and riots but it soon became apparent that their
duty inside the school was the greater challenge. Although the paratroopers ably won the
“war” outside the school, the new battlefield inside Central High proved to be one that
the Army never truly won.
Melba Beals noticed the paratroopers inside the school: “they were wearing a
different uniform from the combat soldiers outside, but they carried the same hardware
and had placid expressions. As the nine of us turned to go our separate ways, one by one
a soldier followed each of us.”5 Lt. Marty Sammons was one of the four officers and
thirty-one troopers assigned inside duty at the school on that first day. The former boxer
gave his men simple orders. “No one,” he said, punctuating his words, “touches the
kids.”6 Sammons assigned a paratrooper to guard each of the black children and to follow
them from class to class.
As Beals passed through the halls, she noticed that not only were the students
whispering insults at her, but “they hurled insults at the soldier as well, but he seemed not
to pay attention.”7 One of the soldiers introduced himself to her, against strict orders
given to the soldiers to “to keep your mouth shut and your ears open.” 8 He told her that

5. Melba Beals, Warriors Don't Cry: A Searing Memoir of Battle to Integrate Little Rock
(New York: Pocket Books, 1994), 134.
6. Marty Sammons, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
September 24, 2007.
7. Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry, 134.
8. Briefing for Exercise Fallout III, Sept. 24, 1957, U.S Military District Command
Report, NARA, 2.
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he would be waiting outside the class for her. As she sat down in the class, one of the
white students stood up, cursed her, and made known his resentment of the “army boys.”9
Terrence Roberts reported much the same, saying “we were only a few years younger
than the soldiers and I could read the lines of concern on their faces,” but that their job
was made easier by white students who screamed at him that “We will never be in school
with niggers!” and then promptly left school.10
That the soldiers did not enter the classroom was the most obvious of the
military’s many concessions to local authorities during the operation. The troopers were
prevented from entering not only classrooms, but also locker rooms, restrooms, the
cafeteria, and other areas. Little Rock School School board president Harold Engstrom,
speaking on these requirements, said “You couldn't follow every student around with a
guard” into places such as the restrooms and cafeteria, as “there wouldn't be any
integration if you did that.”11 Blossom and the school board wanted as little disturbance
of the normal school routine as possible. Assistant Principal Elizabeth Huckaby agreed,
saying that “as public school teachers and administrators we felt that education was our
major responsibility and integration a secondary problem in the social revolution of our
times.”12

9. Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry, 134.
10. Terrence Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock (Little Rock, AR: Butler Center Books,
2009), 109.
11. Interview with Harold Engstrom, conducted by Blackside, Inc. on October 29, 1985,
for Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (1954-1965). Washington University
Libraries, Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection.
12. Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, Little Rock, 1957-58 (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 78.
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In fact, the school intended to keep the obvious process of token integration as out
of the sight as possible; in keeping with this program, the nine black children were
cruelly prevented by the school from participating in any extracurricular events or
activities.13 The school may have been integrated by force, but school leadership wanted
to pretend as if integration had not occurred. This was the real face of tokenism and
gradualism. The expectation was clear: if any sacrifices were to be made by Central High
students, it would be by the black children.
As Beals noted, right from the outset the soldiers were objects of scorn and
resentment by a vocal minority within the school, the very ones most encouraged by their
segregationist parents, and certainly in agreement with the same element that had skipped
school to rumble with the Army on Little Rock streets. Coercion and threats by the school
authorities, more than the occasional naked intimidation by the soldiers themselves
prevented overt attacks against the black students. The soldiers were ordered not to
respond to verbal attacks and to only act in defense of their charges in the most extreme
cases. This demand, coming out of political necessity, required them to exercise
sensitivity to the unrealistic demands of the school administration and to the complete
inactivity on the part of the local police and the Department of Justice. Without an
aggressive enforcement of peace inside the school -- which might have required the arrest
of students for criminal activity inside the school – the Army mission, and ultimately the
fate of integration, was in dire danger.
Certainly, the Army could have handled this situation. As their actions outside the
school that first day demonstrated, the soldiers’ aggressive actions against the students

13. Roberts, Lessons From Little Rock, 124.
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who opposed them had a good effect. Had the troopers been allowed from the beginning
to seize and evict students inside the school many later problems would not have
occurred, or at least would have materially subsided after a few arrests. After all, the
Army’s “get tough” policy worked against those same teenagers outside the school –
chasing and arresting them in full view of reporters and other citizens, even prodding the
youngsters with bayonets if they proved obdurate. There was clearly no reluctance on the
part of the individual soldiers or officers to make examples of the students if it was
warranted. That they did not do so inside the school was not a decision made by the
individual troopers themselves, but rather as a response to “educational” and political
concerns put forward by everyone from the Eisenhower administration to the Little Rock
school board and the Little Rock Police department. Given this political pressure, the
Army kept its dogs on a tight leash.
But even this acknowledgement simplifies the problems the Army faced. If there
was a major operational shortcoming to military operations in the school it was that the
Army had no “book” from which to consult about providing escort duty to children inside
a high school. To the extent that it had training for such a mission, it was limited to the
use of bayonets in squad formations. Whatever guidance troopers received from higher
command, it proved to be somewhat ham-handed in the face of the cruelty that
segregationist students employed to terrorize the black children. The Army, with Gen.
Walker at the helm, adopted a “hands off” program in relation to the school children, a
position that presumed school authorities would assume the lead role in disciplining
students.
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Without riots or mobs to face, the Army was essentially powerless to act in a
forceful way against the students who wanted to force the Nine out of Central. It was
clearly unprepared for the persistent and well-organized resistance inside the school. As
Ike and the Army realized the soldiers were certainly not the ideal personnel for such
activities. The President envisioned police officers with full arrest powers to assume the
duties inside the military cordon, and they would have been a much better choice. Ike
wanted the soldiers out as soon as possible, but never found a suitable replacement.14
Clearly the soldiers were the wrong choice for enforcing court orders inside the school,
but had they been allowed to act with greater latitude it is likely much of the mayhem
caused by segregationist students could have been curtailed.
Eisenhower’s plan, conveyed to Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker and Gen.
Taylor on September 30 was to force the local police to “maintain law and order,” and to
reduce the presence of the Army in stages.15 This would include pulling “the regulars
back” and then putting the National Guard troops on duty and then pulling them back.16
The main question for Eisenhower was when the federal troops could be withdrawn and
the local police would take over.17
General Walker reported to the Army after a meeting with Chief Potts that police
reluctance “to participate at least on a limited basis does not appear to be justified or
14. Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 14, 1957. Records of the
Office of the Staff Secretary, 1957-1958.
15. Hand-written White House Stationary, dated September 30, 1957. Records of the
Office of the Staff Secretary.
16. Ibid.
17. Hand-written White House Stationary, dated September 30, 1957. Records of the
Office of the Staff Secretary.
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warranted” and that the possibility of segregationists elected to the city council was used
by “police officials to avoid the fulfillment of their full responsibilities.”18 Despite the
pronouncement by Mayor Mann that the police “acted valiantly” to protect the black
children that Monday, they seemingly abhorred the idea of arresting and jailing the high
school toughs, inexplicably telling the Army that the police department did not possess
authority to “physically restrain children.”19 Walker found the local police unreliable and
all but useless, and communicated to Washington that police officials were constantly
contradicting the other.”20
Without the local police, there remained the possibility for FBI or U.S. Marshals
to become involved the integration effort. However, this too was never seriously
considered. Interestingly the discussion seemed to be most focused on a wholesale
replacement of the Army, rather than a hybrid mission in which the Army worked outside
the school and marshals on the inside. This arrangement would have had the advantage of
bypassing Potts and putting Justice Department muscle behind the nascent Civil Rights
program. There is no indication that Brownell or the Justice Department was willing to
go this far, and they seemed rather happy to let the Army handle the political hot potato
in Little Rock.21 Walker repeatedly asked for marshals to replace his troops, but the

18. Undated memo entitled “Exclusive for General Wheeler from General Walker,” U.S.
Army Military District Command Report, Operation Arkansas, NARA, 10-182.
19. Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas (Histories Division, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1967), 117.
20. Memo of Record, October 3, 1957, Box One, Journal One, Operation Arkansas,
NARA.
21. Herbert Brownell and John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General
Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 211-212.
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Secretary of the Army, certainly well-informed of the administration’s decisions,
rebuffed those suggestions.22
The predominant thinking seemed to be that the movement would be from U.S.
Army troops to National Guardsmen to local or state police, forcing, as the Army
reported it, “local people to stand up and be counted.”23 However, the Justice
Department, led by U.S. District Attorney General Osro Cobb informed the Army that his
department was “reluctant to bring any federal cases.”24 So while Brownell and the
Justice Department encouraged local enforcement, it demurred entirely from its own
obligations. In the end, by not aggressively arresting and prosecuting teenagers inside the
school for assault or harassment against the black children, the whole program of
integration was jeopardized.
As the operation at Central began to calm the next day, the Army immediately
sought to find a way out by handing its duties over to the federalized troops of the
Arkansas National Guard. Gen. Walker wanted to institute a “phased reduction” with the
objective of a “return to normalcy as soon as possible.”25 Walker lifted the troop cordon
around the school, allowed traffic to flow again on the streets around the schools, and
reduced troops inside the school by approximately ten percent.26

22. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 195.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 183.
25. Command Report, U.S Army Military District Arkansas, Operation Arkansas,
NARA, 5.
26. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 104.
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The next stage was to make use of the National Guard troops that had assembled
at Camp Robinson. Despite initial Army concerns, there was virtually no overt resistance
to the federalization orders on September 24. Across the state the Guardsmen responded
as they would to any other call. Arkansas Army National Guard numbers totaled 8,611,
of which 7,998 (93%) had reported by September 24. The Alert Force – the units of the
Guard called to Camp Robinson and used throughout the school year at Central High
School – had a total of 1,586 men. On September 25 it reached 1,240, or 78%, and by
October 1 it had reached 92%. All of these percentages far exceeded the 75% that the
Army survey predicted. This would lead U.S. Army historians to later say that among the
Guardsmen “there were no reported cases of refusal to report.”27 In addition, fewer than
half a dozen of the Guardsmen assigned to the Alert Force at Camp Robinson were
charged as AWOL.28 By all indications, those soldiers who answered the call also stayed
on duty.
The Guard response to its orders was of immense concern to Washington
leadership as they planned to leave Little Rock in rapid fashion. After sampling the
Guard’s feelings, however, the Army’s conclusion, delivered to General Andrew J.
Goodpaster, President Eisenhower’s Defense Liaison Officer in the White House, was
that the National Guard’s attitude on September 25 was one of “indifference and

27. There is some question as to the accuracy of the Guard accounting. In regards to daily
strength counts, Coakley concluded that “National Guard units revealed almost total unfamiliarity
. . . with Active Army regulations” regarding daily manpower counts. Coakley, Operation
Arkansas, 121.
28. Arkansas National Guard Command Report, Appendix 3, Annex E.
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acceptance.”29 The biggest concern the Army could detect among the Guardsmen was a
practical one – most of the soldiers were concerned with losing money during the
deployment.30
If the daily duty reports indicate that Guardsmen were resigned to do their
mission, they still had other avenues by which they could avoid the task. For example, the
Alert Force at Camp Robinson had a number of Guardsmen make claims of “hardship
cases.” These were filed by Guardsmen (and sometimes family members or employers)
seeking to have their duty suspended. This included educational hardship cases for “153
college students, 222 high school students, 10 college teachers, and 5 high school
teachers” as well as 190 general hardship cases – individuals claiming exemption from
service due to personal or occupational situations in their civilian life.31 This amounted to
12% of the Alert Force. The men were replaced on a “man-for-man basis” from various
National Guard units around the state in an effort to disperse the impact on any one
Guard unit and its attendant community.
For the vast majority of Guard units that were not directly part of the Alert Force,
the federalization meant little more than reporting to the local armory in their home town
every morning and afternoon, with a couple of hours in the evening for training classes.
These so-called “sidelined units” replenished the Alert Force was with new men as
personal leave, medical leave, or hardship cases necessitated. The troops not in the Alert
Force knew they were being held out of the reach of Faubus, and they apparently resented
29. Handwritten note dated September, 25, 1957. Records of the Office of the Staff
Secretary, 1957-1958.
30. Ibid.
31. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 131-132.
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the indignity of having their loyalty questioned. As one commentator put it, “Guard
officers [spoke] bitterly of [this situation] . . . as little more than a degrading form of
‘house arrest.’”32
While the educational hardship cases were innocuous, and all were eventually
released, one might suspect that of the 190 hardship cases in the Alert Force, some were
ardent segregationists seeking to avoid doing their duty. Apparently the Army anticipated
this situation. The Guard handled each hardship claim on a case-by-case basis, ultimately
approving only 48 out of the 190 for release from duty.33 Capt. Don Hedden employed a
simple methodology for this – he required each man to write a letter explaining why he
needed to be released from his duty. He reported that only a small percentage of men
submitted such letters and that he did not approve all of them. Over fifty years later, he
felt that his men were resigned to do whatever they were ordered to do and did not try
avoid their duty.34
In fact, many of the hardship claims were legitimate; Guardsmen were needed for
their civilian jobs; cotton farmers, in particular, needed to start picking cotton just when
they were deployed. They risked losing a whole year’s livelihood. The Daily Citizen of
Searcy, Arkansas explained that “a number of Searcy businesses have lost the services of
from two to four men, thus making any sort of normal operation impossible,” including
the newspaper, which “had been forced to heavily curtail its operations due to the loss of

32. W.D. McGlasson, “The Forgotten Story of Little Rock,” The National Guardsman,
August 1958, 25.
33. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 134.
34. Donald Hedden, interview by author, taped interview, Batesville, Arkansas, July 5,
2012.
220

two men.”35 The paper cautioned employers “to be patient with their employees serving
with the guard [sic] whose only fault is that they volunteered to serve their country
without realizing that it might include justice department battles along the Arkansas
River.”36
Lt. William Cook’s employer, Yarnell’s Ice Cream in Searcy paid his full salary
while he was deployed for nine months at the school.37 Albert Yarnell, who performed
double-duty that year in both by filling both Cook’s sales manager position and his own
as general manager recalled that a number of local businesses also paid their employees
while the men were in Little Rock.38 Not all employers were that supportive. One said
“This is going to hurt the National Guard . . . one of the first questions I’ll have to ask a
prospective employee will be do you belong to the guard [sic].”39
Retention numbers – that is, the number of Guardsmen that re-enlisted during the
time of the integration crisis – also reveal Guard feelings toward the integration mission.
Approximately 300 enlistments in the Arkansas National Guard expired each month in
the fall of 1957; the Guard brass reported in January 1958 that 120 Guardsmen had not
re-enlisted because of integration, with another 700-800 “threatening” to do so.40

35. Searcy Daily Citizen, October 3, 1957, 5.
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Assuming the reenlistment tallies from October, November, and December when
calculating the 120 non-reenlistees, those opposed to integration and refusing to reenlist
constituted 13% of the total reenlistments during that period. By comparison, the 700-800
who had reportedly threatened to not reenlist represented approximately 10% of the total
Army National Guard force, a number which approximated Gen. Walker’s pre-operation
estimate that 10% of the Arkansas men were of unknown loyalty.41 However, either those
threats never materialized or recruitment filled the gap because by May 1958 the Army
National Guard numbers rested at 7,930 versus 7,998 on September 24, 1957. Guard
recruitment and retention was, apparently, relatively unaffected by the integration
mission.42
Thus, the Guard’s manpower strength reveals an organization willing to do its
duty far beyond Army expectations. In addition, the judicious handling of the hardship
cases demonstrates that the organization sought to prevent Guardsmen from refusing to
support the mission. This strategy avoided a situation in which Guard members could
bypass the duty simply because of their personal feelings about integration.
While the Guard’s response to the call-up provides some illustration of the
organization’s resistance to the integration duty, the words used by the participants in the
crisis are perhaps even more revealing. On September 24, 1957, President Eisenhower
informed the nation of his orders to deploy the 101st Airborne to Little Rock, saying,

41. Box 3, Folder 8, Walker’s Plan, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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“Our personal feelings have no bearing on the matter.”43 These personal “feelings” were
of course a direct reference to those in opposition to the integration of Central High
School.
Historian David Nichols notes that while the president “sought common ground
with the white southerners by using certain language, especially the word ‘our,’ . . .
critics would later portray [this] as pandering to the south.”44 In fact, Eisenhower’s
remarks anticipated the broader consensus within the Arkansas National Guard as well.
Writing a few days before Eisenhower’s statement, during the period in which the state
Guardsmen were keeping the Nine out of the school, Air National Guard Major Douglas
Shelton, stated: “Men in the Arkansas Guard have minds of their own, and opinions of
their own. Among the Guardsmen there are those who believe in integration and there are
those who are firm segregationists . . . How they feel as individuals about integration is
unimportant.”45 On September 28 the Arkansas National Guard headquarters, calling
upon own Eisenhower’s words, told its recently federalized Guardsmen that “Our
individual feelings towards those court orders should have no influence on our execution
of the mission.”46

43. Marian D. Irish, “The Organization Man in the Presidency,” The Journal of Politics
20, no. 2 (May 1958).
44. David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil
Rights Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 198.
45. Unpublished, undated article, National Guard Bureau files, Washington, D.C. Major
Douglas Shelton, “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick,” 17.
46. Arkansas Command Report, Annex C to Operations Order Number 1, September 28,
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On the issue of how the Guard responded to the mission, Air National Guardsman
Don Crain said, “Naturally, being a southerner, I was not for integration . . . most of us
were in the same opinion . . . we wouldn’t do anything to further it [personally]. . . but no
one was going say something about it [officially].”47 William Cook said of his unit,
“There were a lot of mixed feelings . . . I think the general consensus was that it’s not
really our business to question orders, and we are going to obey our orders.”48 Roger
Vaughan said, “I know some of them [were] against [integration], but you had a legal
obligation to fulfill.”49 Eulan Simpson had similar observations: “I don’t know of anyone
that was mad [about the orders] . . . you accepted your job and carried it out.”50 Pete
McKissack said, “when you were given an order, you did your very best to carry out that
order. Whether you agreed with it or not was something else. You did what you were
told.”51 Budd Kerr said the duty was never questioned: “In the military you don’t
question authority. I’m sure some of us were unhappy. Whatever authority is governing
you, you don’t question it.”52 Don Hedden was company commander of the Batesville,
Arkansas unit at the time. He said, “Military orders take precedence over feelings.”53
Hedden recalled that his troops “acted in a military manner and did the job they were

47. Don Crain, interview by author, taped interview, October 17, 2007.
48. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, October 5, 2007.
49. Roger Vaughan, interview by author, taped interview, September 28, 2007.
50. Eulan Simpson, interview by author, taped interview, October 19, 2007.
51. Kinsely McKissack, interview with Arkansas National Guard Historical Branch,
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52. “Nine Recall Nine,” Batesville Guard, September 24, 2004.
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intended to do.”54 Some of the soldiers may well have resented their duty, but they were
resigned to do it. Records and reports from all three organizations – the 101st, the
Arkansas Military District, and the Arkansas National Guard – bear no indication of
mutinies, formal protests, or other forms of overt resistance from any of the participants.
From the low-ranking soldiers who spoke of “following orders” to the command
staff at Arkansas National Guard headquarters there is good reason to believe that the
Guard was willing to perform the mission. One report, dated September 29, stated that
the chief of staff of the Arkansas National Guard – a Col. Poreman – and other members
of the command staff at Camp Robinson had received reports from personal friends about
a telephone campaign that was encouraging a boycott of the high school organized by
Mother’s League of Central High School. This boycott, according to the Guard officers,
“is in direct relation to the meeting at the Governor’s Mansion held yesterday.”55
That Guard officers came forward with this information reveals an officer corps
willing to side with Army orders rather than Gov. Faubus. The state militiamen were in a
significant bind; had word gotten out that the governor’s own officer corps was siding
against him, it might cost the officers their plum positions in the headquarters at Camp
Robinson. Further, had Faubus gotten word of this betrayal, it is possible that any of the
ranking men may have lost their chance at becoming the next commander of the
Arkansas National Guard once Clinger stepped down.
While the military planners may have worried about how Guardsmen would act in
the particular situation of Faubus and the operation in Arkansas, in general the Army
54. “Nine Recall Nine,” Batesville Guard.
55. Memorandum, RE: Mother’s League, CHS, September 29, 1957, Box One, Journal
One, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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perhaps more so than any other organization in the United States understood how its
soldiers would likely act during an integration situation. This is because it had conducted
a sweeping and thorough study of integration during the Korean War, a study known as
Project Clear. In the spring of 1951 the Army tapped the Operations Research Office of
Johns Hopkins University to conduct “a study of Army utilization of Negro
manpower.”56 This study was conducted over the following month. It included “twelve
hundred interviews” and “detailed questionnaires returned by twelve thousand officers
and men” from troops in Korea and Japan and from “ten Army posts in the United States
in a period of four months,” with the final report submitted in the fall of 1951.57
Based on its findings, Project Clear recommended that the Army “use every
opportunity to move toward complete integration in as short a time as practicable” and
that “the pressing fears of soldiers in all-white units proved, for the most part, to be
groundless.”58 The report found that tokenism was a disastrous policy, but large scale
integration seemed to work without any significant problems. Lt. Col. Harry S. Ashmore,
the Gazette’s editor, visited Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during the Korean War buildup and
observed integration firsthand as the aging frontier fort became a training facility for
1,000 raw recruits each week, turning them into basic soldiers in just thirteen weeks.59
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Ashmore watched as a “backcountry Mississippi [white boy] would find himself in a
training battery where a black boy slept in the next bed, bathed under the next shower
head, and ate at his elbow in the mess hall.”60 He reported that one old colonel from
Louisiana told him over a drink in the officer’s club that “I would never had believed I’d
live long enough to see the cavalry give up its horses. Letting Negroes come in the front
door is nothing compared to dismounting George Patton.”61
Of particular importance to National Guard in Arkansas is that the data from
Project Clear was broken down into categories based on geography and unit types:
Southern, Northern, Northern National Guard, and Southern National Guard.62 This
categorization revealed that southern guard units were the most resistant to integration,
but they also showed that in the face of firm leadership and clear orders the soldiers
seldom raised “overt” objections of any type. Observers reported that “integration worked
in the Army through a strong institutionalized command structure,” and that despite
objections soldiers followed orders regardless of their personal feelings about unit
integration.63 One example from a Project Clear questionnaire illustrates the soldier’s
thinking:
A white sergeant (from Virginia) described this when he admitted, “Many
guys didn't like it. I was one of them. They didn't like the idea of going to the
same mess hall with them. There was a lot of talk about what would happen.
Nothing actually happened. In about two weeks it wore in. I slept with one right
60. Ashmore, Hearts & Minds, 176.
61. Ibid., 178.
62. See, for instance, Table B6, 155. Leo Bogart, ed. Project Clear: Social Research and
the Desegregation of the United States Army (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
1991).
63. Foreman, “The Implications of Project Clear,” 270.
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beside me. I resented it at first. It's all in your mind. Once you get it out, you're
okay. If you can live with whites, you can live with most colored.”64
The authors of Project Clear found that “even among the extreme objectors to
integration there are many who would accept it, if it actually came, without any show of
hostility.”65 This was so even when 60-70 percent of the southern soldiers reported that
they “strongly objected” to integration, but a full 40 percent also said they would “treat
the negroes just like any other soldier or be especially nice to them” if they were forced
to accept black troops in their platoon or squad.66 Civilians might have predicted a
scandal, destruction of unit morale, and inevitable violence. But thanks to the Project
Clear report the Army knew the likelihood of a full-scale mutiny was low, even among
Southern National Guard units.
Although the integration of a military unit was different in many respects from an
all-white unit serving during the performance of integration of duties at a southern
school, the military structure was still in place. White soldiers responded to firm
leadership and clear orders regardless of the setting. To disobey, rather in unit integration
or a school integration setting, meant the same sanctions and punishments. Soldiers that
failed to perform as required could be met with any number of judicial punishments, and
certainly would face social pressure to preserve primary group bonds in the unit. When
facing an external threat – whether it be an attack by North Koreans or ardent
segregationists – the soldiers could only look to each other for safety and mutual
approval.
64. Foreman, “The Implications of Project Clear,” 266.
65. Bogart, Project Clear, 155.
66. Ibid.
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Still, the command structure of the Arkansas National Guard understood exactly
the stakes involved if soldiers acted upon segregationist feelings. A “Troop Information
Program” paper, issued during the initial phase of the federalization, informed the
Guardsmen: “The future of the National Guard in Arkansas and possibly of the Guard
nationwide will be materially affected by our conduct in accomplishing this mission.”67
Clearly the Guard leadership sought to invoke organizational pride and loyalty to
suppress the actions of those who might have acted on their own segregationist feelings,
just the sort of “strong institutionalized command structure” that Project Clear
researchers argued made Army integration possible.68
The Guard brass took other measures to avoid using “hothead” anti-integrationist
soldiers in the mission at the school, and in accordance. The Domestic Disturbances
manual warned commanders about “sympathy of troops” and counseled officers to
distinguish between “genuine lack of sympathy” and “common malingering.”69 The
Guard ruled that soldiers from Little Rock could not be utilized as part of the force
assigned to Central High. Instead, that force was composed of units from other areas of
the state. An article written in 1958 for the nationally distributed, Washington D.C.-based
magazine The National Guardsman explained why: “Officers of the Arkansas staff spoke
strongly against using Guardsmen in their own home town for a cause which is
unpopular. ‘It’s like a policeman,’ one leading Guard figure explained. ‘If he lives next
67. Arkansas Command Report, Annex C to Operations Order Number 1, September 28,
1957.
68. Foreman, “The Implications of Project Clear,” 270.
69. FM19-15, 37; Nine of the federalized Guardsmen were high school students at Little
Rock Central High, but apparently were not assigned to duty at the school. See: Special
Distribution No. 28, October 1, 1957, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, 1957-1958.
229

door to you and is your friend, he doesn’t want to arrest you.’”70 President Eisenhower
had sensed exactly this problem during the early planning phase of the operation; he was
wary of pitting “brother against brother” on the streets of Little Rock.71
Thus, with the National Guard in place at Camp Robinson and responding to the
call in good order and without apparent morale problems, the Army brass felt confident
in sending the local boys to Central High with the view of eventually turning the duty
over to them. The first mission assigned in this plan was to provide a motorized escort in
two jeeps for the Army station wagon which transported The Nine to school.
Arkansas National Guard Second Lieutenant William Cook, a twenty-one-yearold from Searcy, Arkansas, was the motor pool officer for the service company of the
Third Battalion of the 153rd Infantry Regiment. Shortly after his arrival the commander
of the 153rd, Col. Julian Beakley, called Cook to see him. The commander offered him
the job of leading the transport detail and told him, “It’s up to you to do it, Cook, or not
do it – I’m not going to order you to do it.”72 Cook said that he felt at the time that
“Everybody was considerate of not trying to force you to do something that you didn’t
really believe in.”73
In his civilian life, Cook was more a product of the Sun Belt ethos rather than the
Old South – his hometown of Searcy was becoming an industrial hub in the region and
soon would benefit from the federal construction of large lake and dam a half hour north
70. W.D. McGlasson, “The Forgotten Story of Little Rock,” The National Guardsman,
August 1958, 24, 23.
71. Robin Higham, Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances
(Wichita, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1969), 40.
72. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, October 5, 2007.
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of the city. Further, his employer, the Yarnell’s Ice Cream Company, fully supported
him, because “it was the patriotic thing to do.”74 Young, unmarried, and serving without
any pressure from his job, Cook saw the meeting with Beakley as good for his officer
career in the Guard; it was not often that such a young officer had the chance of leading
such an important mission, and good performance meant a good chance at promotion. He
leapt at the chance. Col. Beakley agreed that he could select his own men for the job.
Cook selected men “he could trust” and gave them the opportunity to turn down the job,
just as he had been given the chance to turn it down by Col. Beakley. “I wanted them to
have the opportunity, like I did, to refuse to do it. If they had that [original emphasis]
strong of feelings about segregation, they didn’t have any business working [on the
detail].”75
According to Cook, the men showed some hesitancy, and questioned him about
the job. “Lieutenant, are you going to do it?” said one soldier.76 Couching the proposed
mission as one of protecting the overall community, Cook told them, “I am going to do it
– if somebody doesn’t do it, some children are going to suffer for it . . . if it were my
children I would want some people out there to look after and see after them with good
judgment and not put them in harm’s way unnecessarily.”77 His men said, “Okay, if you

74. Albert Yarnell, interview by author, taped interview, October 15, 2008.
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76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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are going to do it, we’ll do it with you.”78 As is so typical of military service,
camaraderie, too, played a role in the performance of duty.
Roger Vaughan, of Searcy, Arkansas, was one of the men assigned to that detail.
He did not recall being offered the job by Cook, but said he had no objection to the
mission when it was explained to him. A twenty-year-old Private at the time, Vaughan
thought the Guardsmen were given the task of transporting the students to and from
school – instead of the out-of-state paratroopers – because the military hoped the locals in
Little Rock would be less likely to attack them. According to Vaughan, “They didn’t
think they would hurt us . . . less likely to ambush us as they would [the 101st].”79 The
distinctive Screaming Eagle shoulder patch was a dead giveaway that a soldier was an
airborne trooper, while the Arkansas Guardsmen wore the patch of the Delta Division, a
white triangle trimmed in red with a blue D in the center. “Of course, we used alternate
routes,” Vaughan said, “in case of a sniper or something.”80 The Army taught the men
various tactics in case of trouble. “We practiced ... in case something happened. They
taught us how to avoid an ambush.”81
Whether this was actually part of the plan or not is unknown. Army documents
do not mention it, but if it was, it was a misguided one. As one writer to the editor of the
Arkansas Democrat stated, “I can’t see any difference between paratroopers and
federalized national guard [sic] at Central High School. The guards are there for the same
78. Cook, interview.
79. Vaughan, interview.
80. Cook, interview.
81. Jay Grelen, “Sweet Tea: 1957 Duty Unsung, Not Forgotten,” Arkansas DemocratGazette, July 12, 2007, 11.
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purpose the troopers were, that’s forced integration.”82 One woman wrote, “as a mother
whose son gave his life in WWII . . . I must speak out against the use of America’s own
soldiers to force the will of a group of political figures.”83 Segregationists were just as
unforgiving in their opposition to National Guardsman as they were local politicians and
other leaders who opposed them. Guard officer Lt. Dale Hanks explained:
As long as the National Guard kept the Nine out of Central High School, we were
heroes to those opposed to “race mixing.” However, the day we arrived in Little
Rock as an instrument of school integration, our exalted status quickly
evaporated. Although Arkansans resented the presence of federal troops in Little
Rock, most people seemed willing to cut them a little slack. Not so with National
Guard soldiers. We were seen as “pure-dee scum” who had betrayed our own
friends and neighbors by taking black kids into a white school at gunpoint.84
In two jeeps the Guardsmen escorted an army station wagon in which the black
students rode to and from school in the early stages of the desegregation process. Four
men rode in each jeep with unloaded rifles; they did carry ammunition and bayonets,
unlike most of the troops assigned to Central High, but never had need for either. Their
orders were to “provide maximum protection” to the black students and to “take into
custody any person attempting to interfere with the safe transportation” of same.85
Vaughan recalled that the soldiers, riding in an open jeep, were easy targets for
harassment by segregationists in the city. Catcalls and jeering were commonplace. On
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one occasion a bucket of water was thrown on his jeep by a passing car. Another time he
was struck by objects fired from a slingshot as a school bus passed. At the instant he was
hit, he says jokingly, he thought he had been shot.86
He was told not to tell anyone that he was part of the escort detail, including
fellow Guardsmen back at Camp Robinson. He said “The reason for it was they didn’t
want any retaliation against us for getting [the black students] and taking them to
school.”87 The Army feared that fellow Guardsmen or civilians back home, during
weekend leave, for instance, would so forcefully resent the action of Cook and his detail
that it could endanger the men above and beyond the already-significant resistance being
exerted by the most vocal segregationists. William Cook, as the officer in charge of the
transport detail, said “no doubt about it, we were in a very volatile situation, and a very
dangerous situation for the [black] students.”88
But had the Guardsmen been allowed to advertise their role, it might well have
brought condemnation from those around them, even from men in their own unit. The
men kept mum about their role and protected themselves from ridicule from their fellow
soldiers, family, and neighbors. If asked what they were doing – while at Camp
Robinson, at home on the weekend, while at church or out with friends – the young
Guardsmen could say state “I cannot say.” And in the militarized society of the 1950s,
much less the more formal and class conscious South of that time, dutiful citizens did not
pry in matters of military importance.

86. Vaughan, interview.
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After the three vehicles arrived at the school, the Guardsmen were to escort the
students inside the building. Here local Arkansas “boys,” mostly ages seventeen to
twenty and carrying unloaded rifles, faced a crowd of fifty or more surly Central High
School students who called them “motherfucking nigger lovers” and on occasion threw
rocks at them. Vaughan said, “I was really worried . . . that I might have to hurt some
high school kid.”89 He was told by Army commanders to “always keep your eyes
peeled,” and that if a rock was thrown at one of the black students, “to stick my head in
front it.”90
In fact, throughout the operation, “Guardsmen were reminded constantly that not
only the eyes of Arkansas but of the whole world were on them.”91 According to
Vaughan, the Little Rock Nine’s “safety was it.”92 On one occasion, as the group of
students and their Guard escort approached the school, one of the Little Rock Nine
dropped a schoolbook. Guardsmen Herman Van Patten reached down, grabbed the book,
and returned it to the student. Officers corrected him and the other men later; even the
split second in which a soldier was picking up a book could be the moment during which
an attack was launched. The black students were to pick up their own books; the soldiers
were to protect them. “Everybody was serious about [the job],” Vaughan said, “we would
do whatever we had to do to keep them safe.”93
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As the Guardsmen took over the job of transportation escort, the Army also turned
over further duties at the school to the Guard. The very first night after the arrival of the
101st, the Guard provided nighttime security at the school, acting as door guards and
roving patrols around the school.94 This duty, like the transport detail, was turned over to
Beakley’s 153rd, the third battalion, and then passed down to Capt. Don Hedden’s
Batesville unit of Company L.
The morning of September 25, 1957, as the 101st ringed the school and braced for
the coming battle with Little Rock hardliners, Company L trucked into Wrigley Stadium
behind Central High school. Bernard Sexton recalled rolling across the Broadway Bridge
into Little Rock that morning. “It was an eerie feeling to me. The thing that really struck
me was – the city was quiet.”95 On later days as the Guardsmen rode in a convoy to and
from the school, things were quite different: white people threw rocks, called names or
insults, and even shot at them with BB guns.96
One of Company L’s young privates, Norman Girtman, recalled a ride through the
neighborhood around the school that morning. A poignant image stuck with him for
decades. He, like the Nine, recalled seeing the black citizens of Little Rock turn out that
morning to watch the black children being taken to school under protection of the 101st
paratroopers. Girtman, looking out of the back of the canvas-covered cargo trucks,
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watched as “little black children saluted” as the Guard convoy rumbled past them.97 “As
far as the eye could see, they were lined up,” he said. “They were so proud.”98
When Company L arrived at the school, the 101st was already working the
perimeter and a crowd was forming. “I remember when we first arrived, it looked a little
scary,” said Budd Kerr, who was a twenty-five-year-old sergeant at the time. He
described the aggressive 101st soldiers as “sitting on ready.”99 The Guard unit assembled
in the football stadium in preparation for its mission their interaction with the Screaming
Eagles was minimal and very formal.100 The situation was very tense because of the
threat of violence.
Guard officers were told that they were to provide overall security at the school
when ordered to do so. There were “threats to burn or bomb the school,” and Capt. Don
Hedden said “those threats were taken seriously because of FBI reports.” 101 He added
that throughout the crisis “we were well-briefed on the threats to the students.”102 Still,
even with knowing the dangers, many of the soldiers were resigned to perform the task.
“It was our duty,” Girtman said.103
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Marcus Flinn, a 30-year-old sergeant at the time, remembered facing angry
parents and other spectators who cursed and insulted him. “We all hated Faubus for it.
After we got through hating Faubus, we hated Eisenhower for interfering.”104 Reflecting
the sentiment of many Guardsmen, Flinn said, “We just figured it was something that
would pass, but the longer it went on, the more we realized [there] would be more and
more [integration].”105 He said of the operation, “We just went down there and tried to
make the best of it.” For young men given a tough and unpopular duty, Flinn
demonstrated a characteristic nonchalance common to many soldiers: “You just have to
roll with the punches and go on; that’s what most of us did.”106
The National Guard unit’s first task was to assume guard duty at the school
overnight, which they assumed at 10:00 PM the night of September 25 with a force of
some 215 men and officers.107 This assignment not only tested the Guard for possible
assumption of all duties at the school, but it also allowed the Screaming Eagles to get
some much needed rest. Bernard Sexton was one of those outside the school that night
and he said they formed a “Palace Guard” which served inside the school.108 Once they
arrived, Budd Kerr was in charge of communications at the command post in the
principal’s office. There he relayed information to all the platoon sergeants within the
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company. “Later on [during the day] we were housed in the basement of the school,”
Kerr said.109
This first duty of the Guard went well enough that Walker reported to the Army
brass on Sunday, September 29, that he was ready to “rapidly restore the situation to
normal in accordance with his program” of “progressive reduction.”110 Walker reduced
the forces over the next several days, dropping the cordon completely, removing the door
guards, and even dropping the interior hall guard force to only fifteen men.111 These
quick reductions, which included removing the 101st bivouac from the school to the U.S.
Army Reserve center on the campus of the University of Little Rock, did not create any
immediate reaction.112
The lack of an immediate response to these reductions gave the Army the
impression that resistance had been broken in the city. The reality was quite the contrary.
Outside the school the segregationists had decided to no longer face the troops, but they
redoubled their legal efforts, and their campaign of propaganda. They began the planning
and implementation of a campaign of hate and harassment all across the city and the
state, from threatening mail and phone calls directed at Blossom and the school board, to
a boycott of the Arkansas Gazette and businesses which advertised in it.
They also launched a new avenue of attack – they sent their children into the
school to do their fighting for them. They were trying to drive the black students out of
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the school and in the words of Harry Ashmore, “turned to a guerilla campaign intended to
force their withdrawal.”113 Army estimates of the student body on September 26 stated
that, “250-300 absent are anti-segregationist” and “300 are absent due to parent concerns
for welfare” of a total student population of approximately 1900.114 If anything, this
memo indicated that the Army well understood the danger of the drawdown of troops, but
simply underestimated the trouble that the resistant students could cause to their mission.
The rapid drawdown during the first few days was possible because the segregationist
students were absent, but the environment changed as soon as they returned.
For the Army, however, the most pressing issue which materialized was not bomb
threats and concerns about a shooting or other direct attack on the school, but a
“campaign of verbal threats, name-calling, and physical harassment that ranged from
shoving and tripping to spilling ink on students’ clothes and putting broken glass on the
floor in the gym’s shower room.” 115 This proved to be a much greater threat to the
mission than the riots outside.
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CHAPTER 10
THE SETBACK
The 101st had been at Central High for only four school days when the
paratroopers were pulled out and the federalized Arkansas National Guard sent back in to
Central High, this time to support integration rather than foil it. Eisenhower and the brass
at the Pentagon were pushing for the federal presence to be reduced and removed as soon
as possible.1 The same conclusion was reached at Central High. The process began with
the successful reduction of forces at Central High beginning Friday, September 27. By
the start of the second week at Fort Central, everyone, it seemed, was convinced that after
only a few peaceful days under the watchful eye of the Screaming Eagles, the school had
settled down and could get back to normal. After the Guard’s reliable performance of
their assigned duties at the school during the evenings and over the weekend, the Army
moved forward with plans to hand over the daylight duty to the Guard on Tuesday,
October 1.2 The Guardsmen largely proved willing and able to perform the mission,
though their conduct in the early stages of the operation drew considerable criticism.
If the military leadership involved in shepherding integration at Little Rock failed,
it was certainly in providing protection to the Nine against segregationist interference
inside the school. The military and school authorities seemed principally concerned with
problems that might originate outside the walls of Central High and they gave very little
thought, apparently, to fostering integration inside the school. The formidable ring of
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Army troops standing guard outside meant that the only viable way for Little Rock
hardliners to reach the black children and disturb the integration process was to prompt
white school children to lead the attack.
Army personnel in the school were operating under the orders drafted at Gen.
Walker’s headquarters on September 28, at a time when Gen. Wheeler was still in Little
Rock. Thus the orders certainly had the force, if not the blessing, of the Army Chief of
Staff.3 They stated: “primary responsibility for handling students who create disturbances
rests with the school authorities” and that military personnel will not “interfere with the
exercise of disciplinary control by the school authorities.”4 Further, if an incident
occurred out of the view of a school official, the soldier was to report the incident to the
nearest teacher and that “ordinarily, no further action need be taken by the soldier.”5 The
soldiers were advised to use “tact and common sense in dealing with students.”6 In
addition, they were told to avoid “any physical contact involving the civilian populace in
general and school children in particular.”7 The orders made it clear that the priority
mission was to “maintain law and order” and “protect and conserve public property of
whatever nature.” Secondly, it was “to protect law-abiding citizens in their persons and
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6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
242

property.”8 As the Arkansas Military District command report put it, “school discipline
problems were to be handled by school officials.”9
These orders given to the soldiers at Central High School were a sort of guiding
principle throughout the operation. Reports of abuse by the Nine often fell on deaf ears
because of the stern nature of these orders – as well as Walker’s personal blessing of
them – given to the Guardsmen at the beginning of their federalization. The young and
inexperienced soldiers naturally erred on the side of caution in conflicts between the
students, the high school administration, and the Army.
As far as the Army was concerned, student “misbehavior” in the school was a low
priority and best dealt with by school personnel. On September 28, Walker inquired
about the response his soldiers should take toward disturbances in the school and what
“disciplinary action” may be taken against students who “take part in demonstrations
against Negro Pupils” or in “assaults” against them. On September 30, Army lawyers
informed Walker that “assault is a criminal offense” and that “criminal charges” were to
be “tried [sic] in civil courts.”10 This issue continued to concern Walker, who worried
about possible physical altercations between his troops and segregationist students at the
school. Walker formally requested orders from Washington on January 29, 1958,
suggesting “that The Judge Advocate General go to the Attorney General for a ruling”
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about how to deal with fights in the school.11 He never received a definitive response, and
so the possibility of aggressively using troops inside the school was apparently never
intended or endorsed.
The Army expected black students and their families to file affidavits for assault
with the Little Rock Police Department. The Army lawyers reported to Walker that “the
assaulted person may properly sign a complaint with the civil authorities who may then
issue warrants of arrest.”12 Failing that, the lawyers informed Walker, the victim could
file a civil suit for damages.13 The more likely situation was that some sort action would
“be taken by local school officials.”14 The Lawyers informed Walker that in an interview
with Superintendent Blossom he had told Army lawyers that “school officials would not
hesitate to utilize their authority . . . in any proper case.”15
This memorandum laid out the ground over which the Army battled for the next
several months. Because Army soldiers had no legal authority upon which they could act,
their role in quelling “misbehavior” inside the school was largely superfluous. The
soldiers acted mainly as observers, and in the case of the more vicious attacks, as simply
a more reliable intercessor than some of the segregationist-leaning teachers. As the
military saw it, they were “neutral troops.” Lt. William Cook, an officer who directed
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security inside the school, said, “generally [the guards] were there not to take sides. They
were neutral troops . . . so if a fracas started they were there to stop the physical
violence.”16 This ambiguity resulted from the president’s vision to use military forces
“not to enforce integration, but prevent opposition” to the court orders.17
The Army mission was more concerned with bombs, snipers, arson, and other
sorts of violence. At least two plainclothes intelligence officers observed the school
during the operation.18 Their commanders tasked them with acquiring Essential Elements
of Information (EEOI) and these tasks provide an insight into what the Army anticipated
was most threatening to its mission. They answered questions such as: Will there be any
organized resistance to federal authority? Will law enforcement agencies act to insure
implementation of Federal Court Order? What is the “strength and composition of the
crowds? Will mobs attack the school? Will there be acts of sabotage? What editorial
position will the news media take?19 As these questions reveal, the military command
feared widespread revolt and rebellion among Little Rock citizenry, not unruly school
children.
If “student misbehavior” rose to the level of criminal action, the Army was still
hamstrung. Per Army policy worked out with the school, Walker’s men could only arrest
a student if the principal agreed. According to Vice Principal Elizabeth Huckaby, “We

16. William Cook, interview with Shawn Fisher, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
October 5, 2007.
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administrators, anxious to have control of our students returned to the faculty, had asked
that the federalized National Guard troops, who were to have full responsibility for
security . . . stay as much in the background as possible.”20 Later under their new orders
given on October 3, soldiers were told that “should the principal decide that the matter
cannot be handled administratively, the student(s) will be escorted by the apprehending
soldier to the collection point established at the Command Post at Central High.”21
Procedures to bypass the principal and arrest students for attacks against the black
students simply did not exist. But each day, more resistant students were returning to
school. The reduced military presence gave them a perfect opportunity to begin their
campaign of torture against the Nine. Incredibly, despite all the effort at information
gathering and monitoring by the federal government in Little Rock, and by the school
district itself, no one realized what was developing inside the school until it was too late.
The next few days brought accusations that the National Guard had done nothing, or at
best very little, to provide protection for the black school children.
The Nine could hardly have known that it was U.S. Army strategy to put the
Guardsmen “in the background.” Nor were they informed that the Army was planning to
exit the mission as quickly as possible by dramatically reducing its presence at the
school. However, in some cases the black students knew their attackers and the reasons
for the resistance. Jefferson Thomas, who was on the track team at Dunbar, had
frequently visited Central High before integration occurred, playing sports after school
20. Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, Little Rock, 1957-58 (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 51.
21. Memorandum: Handling Disturbances Inside Central High School, Arkansas Military
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“with white kids from the neighborhood.”22 Thomas said he “went up to Central High
School after school and we played basketball and touch football together. I knew some of
the kids.”23 After he entered the school he found “they were not at all happy to see me.”
One of them told him, ‘Well I don’t mind playing basketball or football with you or
anything. You guys are good at sports. Everybody knows that, but you’re just not smart
enough to sit next to me in the classroom.’”24 These racial views guided much of the
resistance throughout the year.
On Tuesday, October 1, the Arkansas National Guard assumed control inside and
outside Central High during daylight hours for the first time. Walker ordered the
guardsmen to take up positions in out of the way spots: “in the back office, some in the
teacher’s conference room off the main hall, and some reserves in the old shops in the
basement.”25 In this move Walker had substantially changed internal security at the
school. He removed the hall guards completely, which had numbered fifteen on the
previous day, and instead put a single nine-man squad (one officer and eight men) in the
principal’s office, “on call for duty wherever needed.”26 These troop cuts left fewer than a
dozen men to manage a student body of nearly 2,000 inside a four-story, 150,000 square
foot building which covered two city blocks. A handful of soldiers had to face what the
Army suspected was perhaps as many 300 of the most resistant students as they returned
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to school. The reduction in manpower, predicated on rushing Central High “back to
normal” as quickly as possible, helps explain the timing of the segregationist attacks.
Throughout that Tuesday, the nine black students were repeatedly assaulted and
threatened and subjected to a barrage of “name-calling, thrown objects, trippings,
shovings, kickings.”27 The tough and determined Elizabeth Eckford was barely prevented
from going home that day by Mrs. Huckaby. The black children were subjected to
constant badgering, even brandishing of knives, and the atmosphere created a situation
which was, according to Mrs. Huckaby, “the most disagreeable in school since the arrival
of federal troops.”28 Unfortunately, this day was only a hint of the things to come.
According to Terrence Roberts, resistant white students at Central carried on a deluge of
attacks throughout the year. They “hit, kicked, pushed, shoved, slapped, tripped,
scratched, spat on, and verbally abused us constantly.”29
Gen. Walker visited the school personally that day and reported cheerily to
Washington around noon on the “success” of the handoff operation thus far, writing that
“everything is quiet and as in good condition as yesterday. The National Guard operation
of the daylight security, patrol, etc. is proving satisfactory with no reported incidents.”30
Walker oversaw the reduction of the interior guard. He visited Central High and then
reported to Washington that six soldiers were “on standby in a room,” as well as two men

27. Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New
York: Simon and Schuster, Jan 9, 2007), 186.
28. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 105.
29. Terrence Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock (Little Rock, AR: Butler Center Books,
2009), 110.
30. Memorandum for Record, October 1, 1957, Box One, Journal One, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
248

“moving in and out of the school entrance.”31 Walker’s pleasant report belied the real
problems that occurred in the school that day, though it is unclear whether he was fully
aware of them at the time of his midday visit.
Walker’s favorable inspection and approval of the security arrangements
reinforced to the Guardsmen that they were conducting their duties as instructed by the
commanding general of the federal forces in Little Rock. His report to higher
headquarters made clear that he was well aware of the Guard’s dispositions and that he
was pleased with their performance of their duties. The official Army history, based as it
was on Walker’s report, categorized the attacks in terse military fashion as “minor
harassing actions,” and then trivialized them as school-kid activities, that of “throwing of
spitballs and pencils.”32
On the morning of October 2, several problems developed as a result of the rapid
drawdown of troops at the school. First, the “palace guard” was not quite into position
inside the school when the black students arrived. New Guardsmen were taking up
positions and according to Army records were “not familiar with the lay-out of the inside
of the school” and thus had “not completely posted its interior guard when school
opened.”33 Elizabeth Huckaby reported that “Army officers” were in the principal’s
office or were being shown where to post their soldiers by the principals just as the Nine
arrived at school.34
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The escort from the Army station wagon to the front doors of the school that day
was not a platoon of elite paratroopers bristling with bayonets, but a lone Guard officer –
again, the result of the Army effort at a reduction in force. Walker proudly reported that
the previous morning, one officer had accompanied the nine children into the school “so
unobtrusively that observers believed that the students had not been escorted into the
school.”35
In fact, as this lone officer escorted the black children, he met a crowd of students
on the front steps which Huckaby described as provoking within her a “the taste of
fear.”36 Nevertheless, she resigned herself to confront “a jeering group of boys” that had
blocked the front doors so thickly that she could not push through them from the inside.37
As she exited the building from a lower level, the boys spotted the black children, saying
“Get those coons!”38 Huckaby tried to stop them, but the boys descended the steps when
the Guard officer directed the black children into a side door of the school. The boys then
followed them and chased them inside the school.
Incredibly, Huckaby simply went back inside the massive school building without
checking on the black students, saying that upon “reentering the building, I heard no
sound of disorder.”39 As Huckaby returned to her office she reported that “the conference
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with the officers was over” and that she had “told [Principal] Jess [Matthews] what had
happened.”40
The nine black children, unprotected by Army troops or Central High
administrators, were chased through the building and assaulted all the way up to the
offices, where Mrs. Huckaby reported a struggle, with some white boys kicking Terrence
Roberts and Jefferson Thomas.41 Daisy Bates described the scene:
Two boys met them midway on the stairs, knocked the books from their hands,
and kept moving. As Jeff and Terrance stooped to pick up their scattered books,
two other boys came up from behind and kicked them from the rear. Meanwhile,
other boys started to play football, kicking their books around the floor. Mrs.
Huckaby (girls’ principal) heard the commotion and came outside to investigate.
Seeing the attackers, she grabbed the first two offenders within her reach. The
federalized national guard, only six feet away, had witnessed the attack but stood
smiling, making no effort to stop it or otherwise protect the Negro students.42
After the scuffle, Huckaby hauled the white “hoods” to her office. “I was
wondering where the men from the National Guard were when I saw a group of them
looking on from the door of the conference room next to my office,” she recalled. “None
of them had made a move toward the scramble I had interrupted.”43 But the
administration had requested for the guardsmen to stay back; the conference room was
precisely where Walker had reported the Guard stationed the day before.
During a later meeting with National Guard brass, Huckaby “spoke up to assume
some of the blame and the responsibility, admitting that we had been too confident of our
40. Huckaby, Crisis in Little Rock, 54.
41. Ibid.
42. Daisy Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, (Fayetteville, AR: University of
Arkansas Press, 1987), 125.
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ability to control our own students and had even suggested the less obvious role for the
guard.”44 Blossom characterized the whole incident as “a few yelling boys [running]
across the campus,” but despite a “blockade” that “there were no incidents.”45 However,
the damage to the Guard had already been done.
The white school authorities’ accounts obscure what had really occurred. A large
group of white students had momentarily seized control of the school, in part because of
an Army effort to rapidly draw down its presence too quickly and in part because the
school administration was overconfident of its ability to maintain control of the school.
That moment, when Huckaby faced the mob of white segregationist students, was the
moment from which the school never recovered throughout the rest of the school year.
The most resistant white students tasted victory in the moments afterward, proving they
could run amok inside the buff colored brick walls of Little Rock Central High.
Press reports soon broadcast that “Pupils Tormented at Central High.” Daisy
Bates, concerned for her charges, stated, “I would prefer the federal troops replace the
Arkansas National Guard at once.”46 This negative publicity was disastrous. It
endangered the mission, damaged the strategy of removing the Regular Army troops, and
embarrassed the administration. It also called into question the loyalty and
professionalism of the Guardsmen.
The Judge Advocate’s office, at the frequent and forceful request of the Secretary
of the Army, launched an investigation into whether the Guardsmen had ignored orders
44. Huckaby, Crisis in Little Rock, 55.
45. Virgil Blossom, It HAS Happened Here, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959),
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by refusing to help the black students. When Walker tried to defend the Guardsmen,
saying “the soldier in question was awaiting a call by a teacher if she needed help,”
Brucker rejected that reasoning, saying that the Guardsman’s explanation was “just an
excuse for inaction.”47 Brucker had been a corporal in the Michigan National Guard when
his unit was deployed along the Mexican border in 1916, and he had been a young Guard
officer in all major American combat operations in France during WWI.48 Two
investigations were conducted by Army officers in Little Rock before Secretary Brucker
finally accepted what Walker, Wheeler, and the Army had determined – that the Guard
had done what it was ordered to do.
As reported in Operation Arkansas, the Guard officer in charge of the interior
detail at Central on October 2, Lieutenant Malcom E. Moore, believed he was following
orders: “Later in the day when it became apparent that our previous orders of staying in
the background and handling the students with ‘kid gloves’ had been completely
rescinded I notified my people that they were to take immediate action at the slightest
disturbance.”49 The Judge Advocate’s office of the Arkansas Military District, which
conducted the final investigation into the incident, recommended that “no action be taken
against military personnel.”50
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Nevertheless, the White House learned through Army channels that while the
Guardsmen had not been derelict in their duty, the paratroopers of the Regular Army
considered them “immature, ill-trained” and felt that their “sympathies [were] not there”
in regards to the integration mission.51 Still, the White House feared that the rush to put
the Guard inside the school had caused them to lose “a chance for earlier resolution of
[the] problem,” by which it meant “returning this [responsibility] to local authority.”52
In response to the harassment at Central, Lt. Colonel Ernest McDaniel,
commander of Arkansas National Guard’s 3rd battalion, 153rd, immediately reinstated
the personal guard for the black students – which Walker had canceled the previous day –
and assigned two guards to each student. He told his men, “You are to protect them, if it
means walking shoulder to shoulder with them the rest of the day.”53 This action was too
late to save McDaniel, however; he was relieved of command as punishment for the
disorder inside the school.54 This action, apparently, was the minimum price General
Taylor and Secretary Brucker would accept for the foul-up on October 2.
The Army brass in Little Rock had taken a drubbing for the fiasco on October 2.
As the reality of resistance from within the school become clear, the Army issued new
orders, effective October 3.55 These orders made it clear that the rules had changed. The
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new orders to the soldiers directed that a focus be made on “providing necessary
protection and assistance to the process of integration at Central High School and
preventing any interference with this process,” which is substantially different than the
previous orders focus on “law and order” and “protection of property.”56 With these
orders the Army made clear its acceptance of more direct role in supporting integration
inside the school.
While the Army exonerated Guardsmen from any wrongdoing, the fallout from
the incident was substantial. First, it resulted in the immediate return of the paratroopers
to hall duty inside the school in much larger numbers and for much longer than Walker
and the Army leadership had initially hoped. The new approach to placing Guard troops
in the school was to be more gradual. Rather than start the Guard back in the school all at
once, the 101st adopted a plan of shared responsibility, slowly reducing the number of
paratroopers and replacing them with Guardsmen until full responsibility for security at
the school was finally turned over to the Guard in late November.
The plan, which began on October 10, was for “one officer and five enlisted
men” to be “oriented and trained on the various duties” by the paratroopers. On following
days, in “increments of five,” Guardsmen were introduced into the school “until a
sufficient number is on hand to perform the entire mission inside the school.”57 The roles
for the Guardsmen were the same as paratroopers, that of door guards, hallway patrols,
and student escorts. However, 101st officers were in charge of the entire Guard-Airborne
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force inside the school, while Guard commanders were in charge of security outside the
school.58
The October 2 debacle also prompted substantial scrutiny of Guard activities in
and around the school, which resulted in a second investigation. While the first Judge
Advocate investigation gave the Guardsmen a pass, so to speak, the second investigation
did not. The details of the incident that caused the investigation are not known, save for a
single paragraph in the Arkansas National Guard Command Report. It reads, in part: “Lt.
Young, while acting as escort officer for the Negro children, made statements which were
detrimental to the mission.”59 Young’s replacement was Second Lt. William Cook, who
recalled that the officer he replaced had, a “difference of opinion with Mrs. Bates.”60
Whatever the case, Young was punished with an Article 15 under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice of 1950. The regimental commander imposed this punishment, which
meant it had the harshest penalties allowable for such a punishment. These included one
or more of the following:
… correctional custody for not more than 30 consecutive days; forfeiture of not
more than one-half of one month’s pay per month for two months; reduction in
pay grade; extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 45
consecutive days; restrictions to certain specified limits, with or without
suspension from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days; detention of not
more than one-half of one month’s pay per month for three months.61

58. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 143.
59. Operation Arkansas Command Report, Arkansas National Guard, Annex C, 1957.
60. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas, October 5,
2007.
61. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Subchapter III, “Non-Judicial Punishment”
256

The report on the incident does not mention Young’s punishment nor does it
mention specifics about his remarks. It is telling, however, that this case was handled at
the regimental level, instead of the company level. Under normal circumstances, such
non-judicial punishments are handled by immediate supervisors, but Guard leadership
took an interest in Young’s Article 15. The punishment was imposed from several levels
above. It is unclear if this was an attempt to make an example out of Young by referring
the case to an officer of high enough rank to mete out the more serious punishments
under the Article 15, or if it was an attempt to whitewash the incident by removing the
case to the purview of the high-level brass.
For their part, the nine black children were both distrustful of the Guardsmen and
confused about the role of the soldiers at Central. The initial use of personal “guards”
gave the impression the soldiers were assigned to protect the black children against the
daily tortures and vile behavior of the segregationist “trouble makers” inside the school.
Roberts recalled that “when groups of students would gather in the more isolated parts of
the school or when groups would hide behind bushes just outside the exit doors, our
guards would warn us.”62 Roberts said he was able to cope with the abuse and constant
threats “because [he] believed that if the things got really bad, the soldiers would just use
their weapons and protect us with firepower.”63 Only many years later did he learn that
the weapons were unloaded.64 However, the Army’s use of psychological intimidation
was its most potent weapon; when it failed, it was really just a paper tiger. If the soldiers
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“looked on like spectators at a sport event – not like men sent to guard our safety,” as
Melba Patillo charged, it was due to their orders.65
Because of the Guard’s composition and history – its all-white membership, its
previous role under Faubus – the inaction on the part of the Guard was perceived by some
of the black children as a dereliction of duty, rather than official action. For instance,
Daisy Bates reported of the incident that day that “when they asked a guardsman [sic]
about reporting the incidents he just moved away.” Later, she stated that the children “got
no protection.”66
Melba Patillo Beals, revealing deep-seated fears of the white militia within the
black community and stated, “I couldn’t get used to the fact that our safety now depended
on the nonchalant, tobacco-chewing adolescents who were most likely wearing white
sheets and burning crosses on the lawns of our neighbors after sundown.”67 Elizabeth
Eckford said, “I never felt I was protected by the Arkansas National Guard.”68 In fact,
according to Eckford, “When they first turned the guard duty over to the National Guard,
the students laughed at them.”69 Eckford said, “They were young and they hadn’t been
trained very well” and that “I could see the difference between professional soldiers and
those who, at that time, did not have very much training. You could see the pride in the
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101st with their starched uniforms and shiny boots.”70 The black students sometimes
referred to the men as “Arkansas National Slobs.”71 Beals was not entirely critical of the
Guardsmen, however. Once, when she was assisted by one of the Guardsmen after an
attack by a segregationist student she wrote that “not all Arkansas National Guardsmen
were of the same character.”72
The Guard bristled at criticism of their professionalism, however. While General
Clinger was retained in federal service, in late October the acting Adjutant General of the
Arkansas National Guard, Lieutenant Colonel William C. Page told the press:
I’m very proud of our Guardsmen. Although they were doing something they
didn’t want to do, they went ahead and carried out orders. They received bad
publicity because they are not as well-equipped as the paratroopers. For instance,
many of them could not get as many changes of uniforms as they would like. It’s
not fair to compare them with professional soldiers.73
The guardsmen were mostly inexperienced, but it is also important to remember
that many of them, particularly the sergeants and officers, were not inexperienced; many
were veterans of WWII and the Korean War. The paratroopers also had a number of raw
recruits with little more experience than their youthful colleagues in the Guard. Chuck
Christman, a nineteen-year-old paratrooper and BAR gunner at the time of his
deployment to Little Rock, said “we were kids guarding kids.”74
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Moreover, the Nine’s perceptions of the Guard seemed to reveal their own
personalities and dispositions. Terrence Roberts, for instance, reflecting on the presence
of the troops said, “I felt safe with the Guardsmen.” The Guard soldiers, he said, “were
just as frightened as we were – you could see it in their eyes.” This was comforting to
him, and he said “I thought, ‘Okay, we’re in this thing together.’” Roberts added that, “I
never felt they were slacking off . . . they were a dedicated group.”75
Roberts stated that he was certain “there was some reluctance on their part to fully
defend us simply because they were Southern white people, some of who harbored the
same negative ideas about black people as some of their civilian counterparts.” He added,
however, that “the [Guardsmen] went about their task of protecting us with as much
military discipline as they could muster.”76 For his part, Roberts said he looked to himself
for safety, saying “I prided myself on my ability to think quickly and to anticipate the
development of dangerous situations.”77 He saw the soldiers as the Army saw them – as a
last line of defense, not the first.
Carlotta Walls had a similar approach to the soldiers. She realized the soldiers
were limited in their authority and ability to protect her from the leather-clad tormentors
within the school, which she characterized as “quick and sneaky” and not at all
“threatened by the military presence,” adding that “their antics could easily escape
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notice” inside the crowded and unruly halls of the school.78 Walls also noted that the
soldiers could only direct her assailants to the office, and that they did not count as
witnesses in matters of dispute.79 She resolved that “if the soldiers couldn’t protect me,
I’d have to do it myself.”80 One of Carlotta’s tactics was to walk very fast – Mrs.
Huckaby said the soldiers referred to her as “the Ridge Runner.” 81 Her friends chided her
for wearing out the soldiers by walking so quickly. Like Roberts, Walls realized that she
needed to develop her own defensive methods and not look to the soldiers as a primary
means of safety. Thus, when the 101st left after Thanksgiving, Walls, having never relied
on the soldiers much in the first place, felt “everything continued operating much the
same.”82
Both military units fell under the same set of rules. Melba Patillo recounts that
Danny, a paratrooper she became acquainted with, failed to intervene when she was
pushed down and kicked by several boys. When she pleaded with him to help her, he
responded, “I’m not allowed to get into verbal or physical battles with these students.”83
Despite the impressive display of military power – rifles with fixed bayonets, helicopters,
machine-gun equipped jeeps, the polished boots, the expansive tent city that appeared
overnight on the athletic field of the school – these were little more than a means of
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psychological intimidation. The paratroopers were under the same strict guidelines as the
Guardsmen.
Still, there was a pronounced contrast between the paratroopers and the Guard:
professionalism. Lieutenant Marty Sammons recalled that when he first arrived, the
paratroopers observed that the Guard was more lax in militarily comportment.
Guardsmen were “calling people by their first name” and “marching out of step,” but
they improved over time.84 Sammons could not recall any rumors among the paratroopers
of the Guardsmen refusing to act out of segregationist feelings, or suspicions among the
troopers that the Guardsmen were slacking off – only that the Guardsmen were not as
professional in military comportment and carriage.85 The Nine, observing the difference
in bearing and in the numbers of troops might have assumed that the Guards inaction on
October 2 and afterward was because of their segregationist beliefs – a conclusion with
which the Army brass and investigators never concurred, even in the face of frequent and
forceful insistence on punishing the “inaction” of the Guardsmen by the Secretary of the
Army himself.
Governor Faubus’s blustering in mid-October encouraged that thinking, however.
He said that “if I gave an order to the Guard to enforce integration in certain schools,
hundreds of them would resign rather than be party to forced integration in this state.”86
This was a preposterous statement given that Guardsmen were already on duty at Central
High for the very purpose of enforcing integration. However, such comments reinforced
84. Marty Sammons, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas,
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262

perceptions of the Guardsmen as on the verge of mutiny. Like Faubus’s previous claims
that Little Rock hardware stores were selling out of knives in the days before the schools
were to integrate, or that FBI agents were holding high school students against their will,
this was a sensationalized statement. Still, Roy Reed reports a similar sentiment from a
man claiming to have been an Arkansas Guardsman, who wrote Faubus that “The
Arkansas National Guard people would have gone to war, to a man, behind you, had you
rebelled against Eisenhower’s [sic] order to you.”87 While these claims seem dubious, it
is important to remember that among a population of 10,000 Guardsmen, a sizable
number would no doubt have counted themselves firmly among the most ardent
segregationists. The existence of any hardcore segregationists in the Guard could have
given the impression of widespread segregationist activity in the whole organization.
Faubus’s comment, moreover, could only have disheartened the nine students
who would eventually become dependent upon the Guard for their safety. They had
already seen Faubus order the Arkansas National Guard to keep them out of school at the
beginning of the crisis. The also observed the segregated nature of the Guard and
Faubus’s comments added to that distrust. Yet these Southern white men provided the
protection to these nine civil rights activists. It was an improbable situation, and
frightening to the black students, reinforced as it undoubtedly would have been by the
black adults supporting them. The grandmother of Melba Beals said that asking
Guardsmen to watch over the integration process at the school was like having “the wolf
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guarding the hen house,” and added that “you certainly won't be able to count on those
boys for help.”88
After the debacle on October 2, The Army entertained similar notions. General
Walker’s headquarters sent a letter to General Clinger on October 3, re-stating the
soldiers’ orders from the President and the parameters of the mission. He asked Clinger
to respond in writing “reply by endorsement hereon indicating that you understand the
above mission and that you and the troops at your disposal are capable of carrying it
out.”89 The two men were both in Little Rock and had occasion to meet frequently; this
letter was clearly a formal, written documentation of the Guard problems at Central High.
Once received, Clinger deliberated with his officers and responded: “It is my belief that I
and my command understand the mission as stated and that Arkansas National Guard
troops in numbers as presently assigned to me are capable of carrying out the
assignment.”90 In addition, Clinger made it clear through back channels that his men
would “crack a couple of heads” in order to “establish respect” for the National Guard.91
That same day, when asked by the press about the Guard’s performance thus far
Clinger said simply, “what does any general say to his troops when he is proud of
them?”92 Walker, for his part, was satisfied by Clinger’s letter and sent his own letter on
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the subject to Gen. Eddleman, writing “As the commander of the National Guard, and
from what I know, I believe General Clinger’s statement.”93
The military leadership also intended to address the disparity of training between
the Guardsmen and paratroopers. In orders issued on September 28, the federalized
Arkansas National Guard was directed to train throughout the month of October in basic
combat training and “domestic disturbances.”94 On October 10, staff officers began
weekly inspections of unit training to ensure proper conduct. But it was too little, too late.
The sum total “domestic disturbance” training through the month of October amounted to
about eight hours.95
There is evidence that the October 2 attacks by resistant students on the Nine
widened the rift between the Guard and their protectees. A meeting on the night of
October 3 included a discussion between Superintendent Virgil Blossom and Mrs. Bates
on the topic of the “discriminatory preferences of guards” among some of the children.96
This was certainly in response to the complaint from Minninjean Brown to Mrs.
Huckaby, who noted that Brown “feels that more guards -- or different guards -- are
needed.”97 The Guardsmen deeply resented these criticisms of their professionalism by
people they considered to be their inferiors. If the men of the Arkansas National Guard
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were willing to perform the mission, they also were not going to accept criticism from
people they considered their social subordinates.
An Arkansas National Guard intelligence report revealed that the Guard
considered three unnamed black students responsible for problems at the school “as a
direct result of their own antagonistic attitudes.”98 By October 3 the situation between the
black children and the National Guard had deteriorated to the point that recriminations by
the Guard against the Nine had reached Washington. According to one report a “National
Guard officer with the vehicle escort stated that the negro children are very sarcastic and
catty to the National Guard escort, particularly Minnie Brown is out-spokenly [sic]
impudent and overbearing.” The Guardsman noted that “no comments were made when
the 1st Battle Group was escorting the students.”99 Thus while the children, Mrs. Bates,
and even the NAACP reached Washington with concerns about the lack of protection at
the school, the Guard responded with counter-claims that they were being unfairly
criticized. The Guard was willing to perform its official duties, but did not silently suffer
criticism from the students for which the Guardsmen personally had little sympathy.
That was the official line, anyway. Unofficially, the Guard developed a response,
much as the paratroopers had protested mistreatment by Little Rock citizens with their
covert “MFNL medal” on their uniform, which expressed their disapproval of their
treatment by the black children. It surfaced as a military cadence, or marching song,
which featured Minnijean Brown. According to Ed Hammontree, a Guardsman from
Bentonville, Arkansas, the song went as follows:
98. Arkansas National Guard Command Report, Annex B.
99. Sport Report #82, October 3, 1957, Box One, Journal One, Operations Arkansas,
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If I die on the combat zone
Box me up, and send me home.
If I die on the high school scene
Don't box me up with Minnijean.
Sound off, one, two
Sound off, three, four,
Break it on down now
One, two, three, four,
One, two, THREE, FOUR.100

According to Hammontree, Brown taunted the soldiers, saying, "See I’m going to
the white school, I’m going to the white school.”101 Certainly Minnijean generated the
impression of a pugnacious and undiminished personality among the whites at the school.
A female senior at Central High said some years later of Brown, “I can just remember her
attitude. It was a haughty, snotty, look-down-your-nose-at-me attitude that she had.”102
School administrators noted that Brown was a “showoff and braggart,” and historians
have described Brown as “combative.”103 Virgil Blossom reported that Brown “drawled”
imperiously to the soldiers, “Come on, Guard. Now I’m going to another class,” or
commented to them “I could do a better job than that!”104 These sorts of comments seem
to be in line with Hammontree’s observations, and certainly served to induce the deepest
racial sentiments within the Guardsmen at Central High.
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Elizabeth Huckaby, on the other hand, described Brown’s personality as
“affectionate, impetuous, undisciplined.”105 In other words, Brown had a personality
commonly found among many teenage girls. As one historian put it, what others saw as
“insolent insubordination” was, in the words of Minnijean herself, a strategy to “keep
your moral up.”106 Brown’s “attitude” was simply a front, an act by a child in desperate
need of acceptance – and at Central none was to be found, not even among the white
soldiers assigned to protect her. Sadly, her “unguarded” and “vivacious” personality, as
well as her “unwillingness to identify herself as a social subordinate,” made her the target
of feelings of resentment and criticism among the Guard and the school officials.107
Brown’s bravado, rather than insulating her from mistreatment, made her a more
visible target for the segregationist students and an object of resentment by the National
Guard soldiers assigned to Central High. True to their social background, the Guardsmen
may have been willing to follow orders they regarded as lawful, but they were unwilling
to be tolerate any criticism or complaints from the “troublemaking” black children.
Terrence Roberts, reflecting on this sort of description said he felt “the nine of us, in the
eyes of many white people in Little Rock, were ‘bad niggers.’”108 Some of the troops
seemed to agree. Some even went so far as to contact U.S. Attorney Osro Cobb in regards
to the behavior of the black children; Cobb made known their complaints to Mr. L.C.
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Bates.109 No matter how dedicated the men were in their willingness to perform their
mission, their prejudices could not be fully muted.
Even if Mrs. Huckaby, Mrs. Bates, or The Nine expected the Army troops to act
quickly and aggressively inside the school, their orders were exactly the opposite – to
demure, to go slow, to allow teachers or administrators to handle the situation. This of
course cast the young Guardsmen into a terrible situation, that of determining action in a
very subjective environment. How could one avoid “physical contact” while protecting
someone? If the soldiers should not “ordinarily” interfere, what constituted an
extraordinary situation in which interference would be authorized? The soldiers were
untrained for such an environment. Lower ranking enlisted men in the military are
generally given direct, clear, verbal orders. The orders are drawn as clearly as possible to
avoid any misunderstanding by privates and sergeants. The whole weight of military
action is designed “to perfect an instrument of obedience.”110 The problem at Little Rock
Central High was less disobedience of orders by Guardsmen because of their
segregationist feelings than it was unclear and incomplete Army plans for the operation,
which put the burden on inexperienced solders.
Central High was a loud, crowded, confusing, and fast-moving situation. With the
reduction of forces, soldiers often found themselves walking alone or in pairs in hallways
which were nearly vacant during class time but tightly packed during the intervals.
Incidents happened quickly and without warning. A single unarmed soldier had little
means to interfere and little leeway to do so. For an aggressive and highly trained
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110. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kansas, 1995), 58.
269

paratrooper accustomed to thinking of himself surrounded in enemy territory, a hall full
of swaggering teenage toughs was not a particular challenge. For Guardsmen without
such training, the situation was different, as they were perceived by the locals as less
impressive, and by the black students as somewhat suspect.
The Guard made it clear to Walker and the Army command that it regarded its
position as increasingly difficult inside the school. In one candid assessment of the
conflict between the Guard and school officials, the report said that “it was also felt that
the school authorities were attempting to use the [Guard] in the performance of duties
normally a responsibility of the school officials. There seems to be some
misunderstanding on the part of school officials concerning the limits of the assigned
mission. This might be clarified by a conference of the authorities.”111
General Walker increasingly found himself in a terrible bind. He was trying to
sort out these competing claims, fending off the Secretary of the Army from crucifying
the Guardsmen, and trying to keep the mission moving toward a lower profile and
smaller footprint on the ground in Little Rock in keeping with the President’s wishes. He
found himself “in a near untenable position.”112 Working out the relationship of the
school administration to the Guard, the Army, the nine black children, and vice versa,
required a deft hand. Little did Walker or the Guardsmen know that their duty at the
school was only to going to become more desperate in the coming months.
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CHAPTER 10
LIVING HELL

On Thursday, October 3, the Army’s trust in the Guard was restored. On that day,
the most resistant students staged a protest at the school. This protest not only tested the
commitment of Guardsmen but also confirmed the validity of Army plans to exit Little
Rock quickly and turn the mission over to the Guard. As a result, the National Guard took
over the integration mission and the airborne troops departed.
As the Army stiffened its security, it frustrated attempts to drive the black
children out of the school. The Guard became increasingly visible as part of this force.
Segregationist feelings toward the local soldiers intensified. White toughs made this clear
to Beals when she was attacked after a school pep assembly: “Ya’ll are gonna go
screaming out of here, taking those nigger loving soldiers with you.”1 These white
leather-clad boys were intent on making Central High, a “living hell” for the black
children.2 At a meeting arranged by a reporter between the black students and a small
group of segregationist students, the latter expressed “outrage” at having the soldiers
inside their school.3 Police Chief Potts informed the Army that the situation was such that
“the white students, themselves, will keep the Negro students away from the school” if
the Army troops were withdrawn.4 Superintendent Virgil Blossom reported that some
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students refused to say the Pledge of Allegiance “as long as federal soldiers ‘occupied’
the school building.”5
Once celebrated by segregationist for keeping the black students out during the
Faubus operation, the Guard was now disowned by the segregationists. One Guard officer
said that “as long as the National Guard kept the Nine out of Central High School, we
were heroes to those opposed to ‘race mixing.’ However, the day we arrived in Little
Rock as an instrument of school integration, our exalted status quickly evaporated.”6 As
one writer to the editor of the Arkansas Democrat stated, “I can’t see any difference
between paratroopers and federalized national guard [sic] at Central High School. The
guards [sic] are there for the same purpose the troopers were, that’s forced integration.”7
One woman wrote, “as a mother whose son gave his life in WWII . . . I must speak out
against the use of America’s own soldiers to force the will of a group of political
figures.”8
Central High Principal Jess Matthews told the Army that in the minds of the
public, “so long as the National Guard troops are there, the federal troops are there.”9 One
Guard officer said they were seen “as ‘pure-dee scum’ who had betrayed our own friends
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and neighbors by taking black kids into a white school at gunpoint.”10 He recalled that
while taking his men to the barbershop they were accosted by “two little old ladies” who
cursed the men, saying “‘You dirty, rotten, lowdown, goddam, traitors;’ ‘You turncoat
bastards’.”11 Guardsman Eulan Simpson walked the perimeter outside of the school for
over a week. Passersby yelled obscenities at the men on patrol around the school. After a
rain, “cars would deliberately drive up against the curb to splash water on you.” He adds,
“you knew there was a lot of [hard] feelings on both sides.”12
The escort duty on the morning of Thursday, October 3 fell to Guardsmen Lt.
Dale Hanks. With paratroopers re-assigned to interior duty at the school, the Guard
maintained its exterior duties. Hanks escorted the nine black students from the “dismount
point,” where the students exited the Army station wagon that brought them to school, up
to the front doors of Central. That day he described “a pack of angry, white male students
sporting duck-tail haircuts, saddle oxfords, white socks and trademark jeans [who] were
digging in on the front steps of the school. Like us, they had put their big guys up
front.”13 Vice Principal Elizabeth Huckaby had faced this same group that the day before;
they had given her “the taste of fear.”14 Hanks was worried about his men, recalling “I
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just couldn't shake my concern about their mental and emotional readiness to take those
nine black kids into the white-by-God school.”15
As the nine black children exited the vehicle, Hanks tucked them inside the V
formation of the Guardsmen and they advanced toward the front doors of the school –
there was to be no veering to a side door this morning. As the group stepped toward the
mob blocking the front door, Hanks stated “we came face to face with the youthful mob
[and] there was no doubt that if the hatred in their eyes could have killed, we would have
been instant casualties.”16 Nevertheless, as they approached the white toughs, “one by
one they grudgingly gave way” as the Guardsmen marched forward, “intended to plow
right through them had they not made room.”17 Once the group reached the front doors of
the school “the 101st troops inside the building opened the doors and assumed charge of
internal security for the black students.”18
This tense confrontation on the steps of Little Rock Central demonstrated a real
moral challenge for the average southern white male. They were required to meet and
overcome the most resistant white males of the school, to violate southern social values at
a time when those values were most being most vociferously argued in the public sphere.
Only a week earlier in that same situation a Little Rock police officer had quit on the
spot, and even the young soldiers’ own officers feared they might do the same that
morning. Even the Secretary of the Army insisted they had caved in to their
segregationist feelings through their inaction on the previous morning. However, their
15. Hanks, “In The Eye Of The Storm,” 28.
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victory in this conflict on the steps of the school proved that the Guard could still perform
its unpopular mission.
The next test for the Guard came barely an hour later during a student walkout
planned for that morning. The rumors been had been circulating for several days, but on
the afternoon of October 2, confiscated notes announcing the walkout turned up in
Walker’s intelligence briefings.19 The school notified students that those who participated
in the walkout would be suspended.20
Around 9:00 AM the most resistant students began to walk out of the school,
calling for others to participate. Blossom noted the numbers at the school that day as
1,651, with 85 participating in the walkout.21 The soldiers did not interfere inside the
school, but did respond to the crowd forming once it exited the school building. Blossom
reported that some of the students “were placed in a difficult position by their parents,
who had instructed them to walk out if a majority of their classmates left.”22
A black student and white student stood at the front door to the school. Despite
the incredible racial pressures inside the school that even those on both sides of the lines
could find something ridiculous about the whole affair. As the crowd of resistant students
was exiting the building, one white boy asked another white boy if he was leaving to
participate in the walkout. He said that he was not, that he was “too chicken.” One of the
black children was nearby and overheard the conversation. One of the white boys asked
19. Intelligence briefing report titled “Not for Distribution,” October 3, 1957, Box One,
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him are “You goin' out?” The black youngster flashed a grin and said “Not me, I'm
chicken, too,” at which point “all three grinned.”23 It was but a single moment of levity
between black and white classmates in a year of terrible suffering for the nine black
students, but it showed that perhaps under less pressure from segregationists, integration
could have occurred at Little Rock Central High, as it had in other places in Arkansas.
The walkout involved fewer than 100 students and thus failed to galvanize the
student body or shut down the school. Students exited the building yelling, “Come on
out, you chickens!” and “Dirty Chickens!”24 They demonstrated their regional identity by
wearing Confederate forage caps or waving the Confederate flag or pinning it to their
clothing.25 The Guardsmen, undoubtedly embarrassed by their reported lack of action the
previous day and castigated by their superiors, moved quickly to disperse the crowd that
was gathering across the street and burning a straw-stuffed effigy in protest.26 A reporter
described the Guard action: “sixty National Guardsmen quickly formed solid ranks. With
rifles aslant across their chests they moved silently and inexorably on the demonstrators.
For a moment, the students seemed inclined to resist. Then they grudgingly gave way.”27
First Lieutenant Jack C. Lovett was a WWII Navy veteran and a company
commander of the 39th Military Police Company of the Arkansas National Guard in
1957. On the morning of October 3, Lovett was supervising his troops, who were
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manning traffic checkpoints around the school. When the protesting students produced an
effigy of a black student and began to attack it – knifing it, kicking it, and eventually
setting it aflame – Lovett approached the group and tore it down.28 A group of soldiers
then arrived on the scene, he said, and “rescued” him from the angry students and white
adults in the area who were well-known as troublemakers and racial agitators.29
Most of the students left the area as the Guardsmen formed ranks and pressed
toward them, but some resisted and taunted the men, saying, “Look at the Boy Scouts.”30
Two female students mocked the Guard as they dispersed: “‘why do they keep pushing
us?” one girl asked. “Oh, they’re big and brave,” another girl said, taunting the
soldiers.”31 One female student, Anita Harper, shouted at the Guardsmen, “Why are you
protecting the Negroes and making us whites move on?”32 When she refused to leave a
Guard officer told her she would be arrested. She then dared the soldiers to arrest her, and
when they attempted to do so, slapped a Guardsman and was suspended from school.33
One man refused to leave the scene. Vernon H. Duncan was arrested for
disturbing the peace and for refusing to obey an order of a military officer. He was fined
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$51.50, but four others were found not guilty.34 On appeal the district court acquitted
Duncan of disturbing the peace, but he appealed the disobedience charge up to the
Arkansas State Supreme Court, which rapidly accepted and reviewed the case. The prosegregation forces in the majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled on the case in
March 1958, declaring, “it simply is not against the law in Arkansas to fail to obey an
order of an officer of the United States Army, and it is conceded that Lieutenant Tanner
was acting in the capacity of an officer of the United States Army at the time the order is
alleged to have been given.”35 In the minority dissent, two justices said that Statue 11-508
which made it a misdemeanor to obstruct “any officer or soldier of the National Guard
while on duty” should apply to Guard officers even if they were federalized.36 If
federalized Guard officers had no legal authority and non-federalized Guardsmen did
have authority it highlighted the challenges the military faced in performing such an
operation.
Later that afternoon, as people learned of the failure of the walkout, Lovett was
summoned to the headquarters of the Arkansas National Guard at Camp Robinson. He
met with Gen. Clinger, who informed him that there was a rumor that Lovett’s house in
Fort Smith was going to be attacked by Klansmen and a cross burned on his lawn in
retaliation for his participation in the integration mission, a potentially ominous change of
tactics by segregationists in Little Rock. According to Lovett, a small military plane was
immediately dispatched to carry him home that evening, where he waited with a rifle for
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the next several days, protecting his wife and two sons, ages three and fifteen. The Klan
never appeared and Lovett returned to duty in Little Rock without incident. Lovett could
not say whether the threat was real or simply a vicious rumor, but he characterized the
issue as “the White Citizen’s Council [was] keeping the pot stirred” in Little Rock.37
The Army was pleased with the Guard action on October 3. Gen. Wheeler, in his
capacity as the Army Chief of Staff’s personal observer and representative in Little Rock
communicated with Washington, D.C., that very afternoon, stating that he was
“impressed by how the National Guard troops handled situation [sic] this morning.”38
This report materially settled the question of Guard loyalty, which up to that point had
remained a significant question. Army plans thereafter focused on downsizing the
operation and removing or replacing the airborne troops, but never again raised concerns
about National Guard sympathies and obedience. As one Army account stated, “their
performance was often excellent, particularly in light of the segregationist sympathies of
some of the men and the jeers and insults they received in the process of carrying out
their duties.”39
In the days following the walkout, the black activists’ apprehension about the
Guardsmen also somewhat subsided. Daisy Bates seemed to understand the parameters in
which the military men worked, telling school Superintendent Virgil Blossom, “it’s up to
you – not the Army – to maintain discipline inside the school.”40 However, when she
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charged that “many of the Guardsmen looked the other way when the Negro pupils were
attacked” she might have misread the situation.41 Cut off from the discussions between
the school and the Army, Mrs. Bates’ reached conclusions without full knowledge of the
soldiers’ orders. Nevertheless, on October 3, reporters asked Bates if the “young
guardsmen” were doing their jobs, Bates said “Well, you know, they didn't do anything
Tuesday,” she said. “But there was increased protection inside the school after the
incident and everything was all right.”42
Army reports from the evening of October 3 indicate that Superintendent Blossom
met with Bates and informed her to “keep the Negro students in order and to eliminate
their discriminatory preference of guards.”43 The report indicates that “this statement was
designed to counteract a display of preference for Regular Army [Airborne] escorts by
some of the Negro students.”44 When military force was further reduced on October 15,
and after several days of slow re-integration of the Guard back inside the school as it
replaced the 101st, Bates said, “We're not concerned. I certainly think the troops that
remain will be able to handle anything that might arise. The community is getting back to
normal.”45
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Normal did not mean entirely peaceful, however. At 8:00 PM on Friday, October
4 the Central High Tigers played the Hot Spring football team at the Central High
stadium as some 8,000 spectators watched. Little Rock police provided security for that
event without incident. A large number of paratroopers, “a few minutes before kickoff,”
marched into the stadium – and took their seats in the stands. The Screaming Eagles then
“began cheering for the Black and Old Gold.” By the end of the game “Central's students
[had] jumped to their feet and traded fist pumps with the 101st. Their winning streak
climbed to 24. The wall between them and their occupiers began to crumble.”46 Gene
Hall, Tigers assistant coach, said “They were our biggest fans . . . they were cheering for
Fort Central.”47 The Tigers won the game, and the paratroopers began to win the hearts of
the Central High students.
In fact, the school newspaper, The Tiger, that week had run an article about the
paratroopers. Student reporter Henry Griffith reported “Captain Jack Edmund Barker is in
charge of public relations . . . a friendly, soft spoken, family man from South Carolina . . .
he explained the story of his Screaming Eagles,” and gave the school reporter “a better
understanding of their position.”48 When Griffith mentioned that he had noticed fewer
troops at the school, “Capt. Barker's face broke into a smile and he said, ‘So you noticed
that that's what we're trying to do. We want to restore order here with the minimum
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amount of force and then to withdraw as quickly as possible.’”49 Barker told the student
“We don't want to be obnoxious to the people. These boys (the younger soldiers) want to
be – are even eager to be friendly with the students.”50 Careful to portray the military
authorities as sympathetically as possible to the high school students, Barker told Griffith,
“We don't want to be foreboding. That's why we're trying to slip into the background as
much as possible."51 The discussion lasted for two hours, after which Griffith wrote that
the soldiers were “somebody's husband, somebody's son, somebody's boyfriend, and they
want to be friendly with the students of Central High; but they were sent here to do a job
with a minimum amount of force and as quickly as possible.”
Relations were not so cordial at a school dance that followed the game. Around
11:00 PM two paratroopers from E Company patrolled a path that led them directly in
front of the campus gym where the dance was taking place. A 19-year-old former Central
High student Robert King, who had been drinking, blocked the soldier’s way. King and
about ten others surrounded the two troopers and began using abusive language, calling
the soldiers “nigger lovers” and telling them to “get out of town.”52 The soldiers were
menaced by the crowd and then “a scuffle took place.”53 One of the troopers struck King
with a rifle butt, knocking him to the ground.54 When King stood and continued to argue
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with the troopers, and still refused to move out of the way, one of the paratroopers
stepped back, fixed a bayonet to his rifle, and then “ordered King to accompany him to
the Sergeant of the Guard.”55 A Central High teacher then stepped in and took King
away; the soldiers mistakenly thought King was a current student and released him to the
teacher, as “local orders require[d] that students of Central High School involved in an
incident be turned over to the school authorities.”56
That evening another altercation broke out, this time between paratroopers and
Little Rock police officers at the Arkansas Livestock Exhibition. A large group of
airborne officers and enlisted men – including some black paratroopers in the group –
attended the fair and livestock show. One group of six to eight paratroopers gathered to
watch a sideshow, and according to witness statements they jeered the performers.57
When asked by a Little Rock police detective to leave or quiet down, a fight broke out
between the police officers and the soldiers. A police officer battled with one trooper and
“struck [him] in the head with a nightstick.”58 The police arrested two paratroopers for
resisting arrest and public drunkenness.59 The troopers were not charged in civilian
courts, but turned over to the military police. One was tried in a Special Court-Martial on
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October 9, fined fifty dollars, and reduced in rank one grade. He also agreed to reimburse
the police officer’s damaged uniform out of his own pay.60
October 4 also marked a major hallmark in the Little Rock operation for another
important reason: the launching of the Soviet PS-1, Sputnik, the “fellow traveler” that
shocked the nation and the world. Although Ike was publically nonplussed about what he
called “a small ball,” at an emergency meeting of the National Security Council on
October 10 the president learned from CIA Director Allen Dulles that the launch was the
first in a trilogy of bad news, “the other two being the announcement of the successful
testing of an ICBM and the recent test of large scale hydrogen bomb.”61 A month later,
on November 3 the Soviets launched Sputnik II, a much larger satellite, just three days
before the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik anniversary.62 As one defense reporter
put it, “it's impossible to exaggerate the alarm felt in the Pentagon” regarding Sputnik.”63
In mid-October, Secretary of State John Dulles warned that the U.S should be
ready for an attack on Turkey, but that “the United States would not leave the Soviet
Union a privileged sanctuary.”64 He predicted that in five to ten years missiles might
prove to be the “decisive weapon” for now the U.S. currently had a lead in heavy
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bombers.65 By this time the U.S. had nearly 1,300 B-47 jet bombers organized into
twenty-three bomber wings, many of which were forward-deployed in the UK, and
dependent on inflight refueling.66 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded on
November 6 that “our people” would use “any means of destruction if our country is
subjected to attack by imperialist states,” a threat, certainly, but one that implied that the
recent demonstration of Soviet missile technology might prove decisive after all.67 As
Khrushchev put it, “they might as well put bombers and fighters in a museum.”68
The administration’s political and public relations disaster at Little Rock had
yielded to an even more internationally explosive event. Making the most of their
technological coup, Russian propaganda noted the exact moment when Sputnik passed
over Little Rock.69 Melba Beals, for one, appreciated the distraction Sputnik offered,
noting that “over the weekend of October 5th, a great thing happened that took the Little
Rock school integration from the front pages of the national news.”70
Faubus critics sought to tie Sputnik and Little Rock together, while critics of Ike
wanted to paint him as a do-nothing in the Sputnik crisis. Maryland’s Governor Theodore
McKeldin compared Faubus’s political career to Sputnik’s short-lived orbital life, saying
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“little men who seek political promotion,” but will, like the satellite’s deteriorating orbit,
“be wasted and worn in the highly abrasive atmosphere of public opinion.”71 Later he
referred to Faubus as the “sputtering Sputnik from the Ozarks.”72 Michigan’s Governor
Mennen Williams penned poetry about Sputnik, saying that “we hope our golfer knows
enough to get us on the ball,” a reference to the perception among Eisenhower’s critics
that he had failed to keep America competitive with the Soviets.73
However, the most direct impact of the Sputnik launch on the Little Rock
operation was Gen. Wheeler’s immediate recall to Washington over the weekend of
October 5. Wheeler spoke directly with Secretary Brucker and Gen. Taylor about the
Little Rock operation. Wheeler informed Brucker that after the Guard’s firm action the
previous week, “the main part was probably broken and the tough element under
control,” although he could not rule out “outside interference.”74 Brucker reiterated to
Wheeler that the safety of the “Negro students was a matter of primary concern,” while
Taylor insisted that his paratroopers remain in the basement of the school in case they
were needed.75 Wheeler’s high-level meetings indicated that the airborne troops were
going to be pulled off the mission as soon as practicable.
Over the next several weeks Sputnik and Little Rock converged in Gen. Taylor’s
favor during the ongoing conflict with the Joint Chiefs and the New Look strategy.
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Taylor reported that because of the international emergency caused by Sputnik, the Joint
Chiefs were invited on November 11 to prepare “a list of high-priority items” budget
items not provided by “the basic 1959 budget.” On November 17 the Joint Chiefs
recommended $362 million for the Army, “the first and only time that I ever received
support from my colleagues to increase the strength of the Army.”76 This implied a
significant relationship to Little Rock as well because of the military services the Army
was tasked with “primacy in civil disturbance operations.”77 Given Taylor’s September
26 “alert” order to establish 1,000- to 1,200-man task forces for “situations similar to that
now in Little Rock,” he certainly intended the Army to organize, train, and plan for
further domestic disturbance operations. Taylor’s order alerted two of his fledgling
STRAC units: the 82nd Airborne at Ft. Bragg, and the 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley,
Kansas.78 It did not “alert” the remaining STRAC unit, the 4th Infantry Division at Ft.
Lewis, Washington, but rather the 1st Armored in Fort Polk, Louisiana – presumably
because the latter was already in the South and located closer to resistant population
centers into which might deploy. Though Secretary Brucker immediately rescinded the
‘alert’ in the face of southern Democratic senators such Russell and Stinson who
protested that the Army was prepared to “occupy the entire south,” the initial orders
clearly demonstrated the Army expectation that it could be called upon again. Thus,
additional budgetary allotments in the fall of 1957 strengthened the Army for both its
Cold War, and its civil disturbance missions.
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In Little Rock things “settled down to a routine basis” over the next several
days.79 Paratroopers worked inside the school and Guardsmen outside. With the walkout
a failure, and the paratroopers’ football game appearance received favorably by the
student body, a period of calm settled in at the school. The daily reports sent to the White
House over the next couple of weeks routinely listed the situation at Central High as
“quiet” with “no incidents.”80 As the Army saw it, “the only real reduction in the visible
effort lay in the gradual diminution of the number of escorts of Negro students from the
military station wagon to the school entrance.”81 With the situation calming at the
school, and the Guard evidently able to take over the job, the crisis had passed for the
moment.
The more pressing situation from the Army standpoint was not the safety of the
black students – that issue seemed to be resolved to the Army’s satisfaction – but training
for the 101st. In the heated aftermath of Sputnik, the Army began looking at the mission
as one which “interfered with the 101st Airborne Division’s training program intended to
prepare the division for a much more vital role in national defense.”82 The Army
characterized the duty as “onerous” and “a burden,” a mission which could be better
handled by military police, which “could benefit a good deal more” from the duty at the
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school than STRAC paratroopers being groomed as the nation’s new, quick-reaction
force.83
As Coakley put it, “the big problem was to cut the cost of the operation, both in
terms of money and interference with normal troop training.”84 At minimum, if the 101st
was to remain at the school, the men had to get their monthly parachute jump so that they
could be still qualify for jump pay. Without the $50-100 a month in extra pay, the
soldiers’ morale would substantially diminish, along their readiness for their intended
mission. The men needed to train at Fort Campbell or “some area found nearby where
they could conduct jump training.”85 Walker’s work was simply contingency planning.
Nothing could be done until the brass in Washington decided how to proceed in the long
term.
The long-term plan for the mission came directly from Eisenhower. A strategy
meeting took place at the White House on the afternoon of October 14, with all the key
players in Washington present: Secretary Brucker, Attorney General Brownell, and
Deputy Attorney General Rogers, plus Taylor, Wheeler, and Ike’s military liaison officer,
Gen. Andrew Goodpaster.86
Secretary Brucker informed Ike that the National Guard could be reduced to a
force of about 1,800, instantly demobilizing some 8,000 of the remaining Guardsmen,
including all of the Air National Guard force. He suggested that half of the 101st be
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removed and replaced with military police, but Ike balked at sending in a new unit into
Little Rock as it would “imply permanence in the situation.”87
The president made clear that he would accept cutting the large remaining force
of Guardsmen, which he preferred to be set at 1,000, but he wanted “Walker constantly
pressing the local police to take over.”88 More importantly he wanted the “Regular Army
out of [the Little Rock] operation as quickly as possible.”89 Taylor contended that it
might be unwise to move too quickly.
As Taylor saw it, once the drawdown of Guardsmen began, the Guard alert force
would take on a new characteristic – it would become a composite unit, “formed of
individuals from many units” throughout the state.90 Taylor’s warning implied that while
the present Guard organization and its constituent units had responded as well as could be
expected, the jury was still out on a blanket endorsement of all individuals in the Guard.
Composite units were notorious in military circles for a lack of unit cohesiveness, since
they had not trained together as a unit and thus did not consist of leaders and soldiers who
shared a common bond, as did the Guard infantry companies currently on the scene at
Little Rock. The composite units were simply a body of men unknown to each other,
lacking the most basic “primary group” social pressures that made combat units possible.
Taylor suggested that if the Airborne Battle Group left Little Rock the Army might find
its mission in the hands of entirely undisciplined and untrained soldiers.
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Keeping the paratroopers in Little Rock a bit longer provided further training of
the Guardsmen. Since October 10 they had slowly been replacing paratroopers with
Guardsmen in groups of “one officer and five enlisted men.”91 They were “oriented and
trained on the various duties” by the paratroopers.92 Keeping the Regulars on for a few
more days would also allow the Army to assess the impact a composite Guard force
might have on the mission. Ike agreed to this reasoning, but reiterated that he wanted
Regulars to be pulled out to Camp Robinson. The Army brass convinced Ike that halving
the size of the paratrooper unit would be a good first step, along with cutting the Guard
down to less than 2,000.93
On the afternoon of October 14, Gen. Pachler called Walker to tell him
“something very important.”94 Pachler warned that a press release was coming to explain
that the military forces at Little Rock were going to be reduced, pursuant to the meeting
at the White House.95 Walker was ecstatic. He asked “will it mean we will go to work?”
Pachler responded in the affirmative: “you will go to work making a plan.”96 Walker
stated that the Regular army troop reduction plan could be worked out in an hour, but that
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the Guard plan would take some time.97 Walker informed Pachler that “there was going
to be a lot of reaction down here.”98
Walker was right. He reported in a memorandum that next day that within thirty
minutes of the press release Blossom was in his office bombarding him with questions:
“Is the Guard being de-federalized? Does this mean one half of the 1st Airborne Battle
Group will be pulled out of Little Rock? Is this notice of withdrawal of support of the
Little Rock School District?”99 Walker had to explain to Blossom that the plans were in a
preliminary stage only, and that he would be informed in due time. Of course the local
and national press exploded with speculations about the change.
Planning and implementing of the drawdown of forces in Little Rock consumed
the attention of the Army for the next several weeks. The Regulars were “phased down
expeditiously to a strength of approximately 500,” departing on October 16 in several
small waves by aircraft and ground transportation to Fort Campbell until about half the
force remained.100 Elements of the 327th Airborne Battle Group remained in Little Rock
until the final withdrawal of all airborne troops on 27 November.101 On November 30,
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Col. Kuhn, the commander of the 327th, was reassigned as a military advisor to Shah in
Iran, fighting against pro-Soviet revolutionaries.102
The Guard proved much more difficult to reduce, as it involved so many more
personnel and so many different units. It was finally decided to maintain a “hard core” of
approximately 1,000 Guardsmen from the existing Alert Force “who lacked the sort of
hardship claims that could free them from duty.”103 They would be backed by support
troops and a replacement pool of men who “would remain on duty at home stations.”104
From October 16-23, the reduction of the Guard “as quickly as possible” was “the
primary concern of all staff officers connected with Operation Arkansas.”105 The issue
was so important that the Army waived regulation after regulation, which “provoked
considerable criticism from National Guard authorities.” In much the same way that the
National Guard call-up had been a “crash program” so was its demobilization.
One complexity of the rapid call-up and demobilization procedures was that all
the men had to be X-rayed and given blood and urine tests upon federal activation.
However, by October 15, when the drawdown was to begin, only 2,500 of the Guardsmen
had completed the medical in-processing requirements; the estimate at that time was that
three more full weeks were needed to bring all the Guardsmen into “on-duty status” as
part of the federalization.106 This news did not please Washington. Under normal
circumstances, the soldiers would undergo a full complement of tests and services (dental
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inspections and shots, for instance) upon coming into federal service and once again
when going out of federal service. This process would have taken much longer than the
Army was willing to tolerate.
In an effort to streamline the paperwork and processing requirement, Wheeler
suggested all “non-essential processing steps” be eliminated.107 If a soldier had
undergone an in-processing physical then an out-processing physical was not required. In
essence, in-processing and out-processing occurred simultaneously using a highly
modified administrative procedure. The Arkansas National Guard considered this a
highly irregular situation and expressed doubt that such a procedure had been tested and
that if it had been “the validity of such a test must certainly be questioned.”108 A
testament to the incredible pressure being exerted to de-federalize the Guard as quickly as
possible can be found in a telephone conversation between Wheeler and Pachler on
October 17. Wheeler said, “The panic button is really pushed down here,” adding that
“the paperwork is terrific” and “Walker and staff are being driven crazy.”109 From
Washington, Pachler concurred: “If I get into another day like yesterday, someone else
can handle Arkansas.”110 Nevertheless, the abbreviated out-processing, once established,
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moved quickly. By October 23 the Arkansas National Guard on federal duty was down to
1,800 men.111
Gen. Wheeler returned to Washington permanently on October 23. The Army
hierarchy needed him in other more important capacities, and the Eisenhower
administration considered the danger as largely passed in Little Rock. They trusted
Walker and the Arkansas National Guard to handle any threats to the mission. Wheeler
reported his plan for reducing forces going forward would be to “diminish progressively
over-all military operations concurrently decreasing operations of the 1st Airborne Battle
Group . . . and increasing those of the 153rd Infantry Regiment. At an appropriate time,
withdraw the bulk of the 1st Airborne Battle Group . . . from Little Rock and reduce the
number of National Guard troops on duty.”112 At all times, Wheeler noted, the Army
must look after the “safety of the Negro students” as a matter of “paramount
importance.”113
The next day Walker began Wheeler’s plan, essentially restoring the drastic cuts
that he had tried back on October 1 and was forced to reverse on October 2. Walker cut
the escort from the military station wagon to the school doors, cut the hallway guards
from thirty to sixteen and reduced the door guards to only a couple of men at the front
doors. Only a few two-man walking patrols moved around outside. Most important, six of
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the nine black students agreed to the elimination of their personal guards.114 The next day
the black students began coming to school in their own vehicles, with only a single
National Guard jeep patrol conducting surveillance along their likely route.115
While the Army wished to continue reducing its footprint, several events in Little
Rock suggested it should take extreme caution in doing so. Of the most pressing concerns
were the impending elections in Little Rock on November 6. These would determine
whether arch-segregationists or moderates would take control of the new city council.
This new body would not only determine the city manager, but would also choose the
new police chief, as Marvin Potts was retiring. Until these issues were resolved, Army
reduction planning halted.
In addition, Blossom reported to Walker that while the students had warmed to
the paratroopers, they generally held the Guardsmen in contempt, or with “indifference
and disrespect.”116 Even so, he told the Army that he could handle the students through
normal school disciplinary channels as long as the students were not “stimulated by
parents and adult anti-integration organization.”117 Lt. William Cook, a Guardsmen in the
school at that time, concurred with Blossom’s assessment. The hardcore element was:
just adamantly opposed to it, because their children were going to have to go to
school with the blacks and eventually have black children . . . you know how that
fight goes . . . which is exaggerated . . . and that was our basic problem
throughout the whole nine months was the parents who had students in school.
And [the students] got home from school, and they heard at home ‘you ought to
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kick the shit out of the black son of bitches,’ they were just pushing them to do
things. Just egging them on . . . you knew what was happening, they were going
home at night and the parents were saying ‘Them damn Guard troops, you need to
get them out of there, you need to get them in trouble, you need to do this to them
or that to them.’118
Regarding the security for the black students in the school, Cook stated that “of
course, we were dealing with juveniles . . . you just don’t bash a kid upside the head with
an M1.”119 He says the troops “could only restrain” and “they were not to take sides –
they were neutral troops. So if a fracas started all they were there for was to stop the
violence.”120 Guardsmen Roger Vaughan recalled, “I was really worried . . . that I might
have to hurt some high school kid.”121 Regardless of the limitations, Cook understood
that what the Army needed most was “eyes and ears inside the school building.”122
The paratroopers left the school in late November, turning the complete security
of the Little Rock Nine over to the Guardsmen. There was no celebration among the
segregationist crowd. Attacks upon the Guard continued. A rock was thrown at a
Guardsman on November 27. The report read: “There was a group of white students
standing in the end of the hall where the rock came from but the guard was unable to
determine who actually threw the rock.”123
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In another incident, student Jessie Cole was observed by a Guardsman “following
Minnie Brown down the hallway, making loud derogatory remarks.”124 The Guardsman
directed the student to the office and he refused; two other soldiers were called to the
scene, but he “threw down his books and dared any of the guards to lay a hand on
him.”125 A school administrator took charge of the student, but school authorities did not
punish him for his actions. This conflict could not only discourage the soldiers and
encourage the segregationists.
Criticism of the Guardsmen by the segregationist crowd continued the rest of the
school year. If Guardsmen observed an incident and took a student to the office
segregationists protested the way in which they were handled. “One segregationist
student said the troops were ‘pretty rough’ with the students they take into tow. ‘They
grab them by the arm real tight,’ he said, ‘There’s no reason for doing that.’”126
The resistance to the soldiers went beyond name calling and physical attacks. It
often included sexual innuendo or direct sexual overtures. Some students claimed that the
men “spent most of their time just looking at the girls.”127 As with any military
operation, the majority of the work was performed by young privates, Guardsmen who
were in many cases no older than the students themselves. Young and inexperienced,
they were required to stand a post in the halls between classes, easy targets for this type
of sexually-charged public harassment.
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Beals described how one female student confronted the paratrooper assigned to
protect her: “‘You like protecting nigger bitches?’ She smiled sweetly and fluttered her
eyelashes at him. ‘Wouldn’t you rather be following me around instead of her?’” One
leading female segregationist student, Sammie Dean Parker, claimed that Guard troops
repeatedly asked her for a date, which she of course declined.128 On another occasion a
Guardsman reported seeing Parker lift her skirt up to reveal to her friends a small printed
sign hidden “in her panties on the right side.”129 The Guardsman reported “though she
appeared not to be doing this for my observance she made no effort to conceal the action
from me.”130
According to Lt. William Cook, the female segregationist students even resorted
to grabbing the groin area of the Guardsmen, rubbing their bodies suggestively against
the Guardsmen as they passed in the crowded halls, or making sexual remarks in order to
provoke an incident which would result in the “occupying forces” being removed from
the school.131 National Guard Lt. Malcom E. Moore reported that segregationist female
students “were making faces and saying things . . . they’re so ashamed now they don’t
know what to do.”132 These tactics were in line with Faubus’s own sexualized allegations
about other incidents at the school – allegations of paratroopers peeking in dressing
rooms or ogling girls during PE class – which make clear that a sexual subtext was part
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of the segregationist rhetoric. As Elizabeth Jacoway argues, defending the purity of the
“the alabaster blond” was one aspect of segregationist ideology – even if the threat was
concocted by the segregationists themselves.133
In this environment the pressure on the Guardsmen was tremendous. Cook often
visited with his troops while they were on break in the basement of the school. The troops
could have hot coffee or a meal in a makeshift barracks. Amid the bunks and piles of
military gear Cook would lend a word of encouragement to the beleaguered soldiers.
Cook would approach the soldiers and commend them, giving them a pat on the back and
saying “Hey, Jack you did a good job there and I appreciate what you’re doing there.”134
Under such extreme stresses in the halls of the school, he said countless times he saw the
men break down and “totally cry like a baby.”135 Cook said the tension was incredible
and that his men “were all conscientious” and that like their youthful black protectees,
they sometimes felt the harassment was more than they could bear.136 At other times, they
sought to lash out themselves, but resisted. Cook said he would think to himself that
“God gave me enough strength to keep my mouth shut” when provoked by a
segregationist student, and that he and the other guards would have liked to knock “the
hell out of that ignorant little bastard,” but refrained from doing so.137
Thus, as the paratroopers began to move out, the most resistant students – male
and female – challenged the National Guard at Central High trying to provoke a response
133. Jacoway, Turn Away They Son, 240.
134. Cook, interview.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
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that might provide positive propaganda for the segregationists. They failed. Nor could the
students take command of the school, as they had done on October 2; the Guardsmen had
been suitably trained to conduct the day-to-day operations by the 101st enlisted men and
officers that they replaced.
On November 20, the U.S. Army, after having worked in close cooperation with
the Arkansas National Guard for two months, gave their official evaluation of the
Guardsmen to the Secretary of the Army: “The National Guard . . . is competent to carry
out the local tasks, although not as highly trained as the 101st [paratroopers.]”138 With a
slight hedging of their bets, the Army seemed to be sufficiently pleased with the
professionalism and discipline of the Guardsmen to recommend that the president turn
the mission over to them.
The last paratroopers left Little Rock on November 27. The Guard took over the
mission the next day. Melba Beals wrote in her diary that she would never forget her
101st guard, Danny. However, even she could not be certain of his motivations, so
guarded and shielded was his behavior. She wrote that she would “never know if he only
behaved that kindly because he was a great soldier or a good person or both. It doesn’t
matter. He was wonderful.”139

138. Supplemental Note for Record, November 20, 1957. Records of the Office of the
Staff Secretary, 1957-1958.
139. Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry, 139.
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CHAPTER 12
THE CLOSE OUT

As the last paratroopers departed Little Rock, the Army redoubled its surveillance
efforts and continued a process of constant intelligence gathering, analysis, and mission
planning. The mission remained the same, requiring a constant strategizing of solutions,
frequent expressions of frustration with the status quo, and a near obsessive approach to
risk avoidance.
Guardsmen took on the role as sole protectors of the Little Rock Nine in late
November. Little else changed in the city. Faubus enjoyed his newfound popularity
among the segregationists, while extremists plotted an ongoing harassing campaign
directed at the school, adding frequent bomb threats to its arsenal of hysteric accusations,
subtle threats, and legal maneuvering. Everything else seemed stuck in the center as
“Little Rock’s white citizens peaceably opposed integration, and the new city
government, despite its moderation, reflected the will of those who had elected it.”1 The
Army, and especially the increasingly thinning ranks of the Guardsmen, thus shouldered
the burden of responsibility during the crisis.
The young Guardsmen at Central continued their thankless job throughout the
school year, pressured by the Eisenhower administration to avoid controversy, urged by
the school board to handle more responsibility for school discipline, branded by the
segregationist crowd as traitors and occupiers, and criticized by the NAACP for their
“do-nothing” stance in regards to protecting the Little Rock Nine. The soldiers, much like

1. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 62.
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the politicized black children in the crisis, had little choice but to walk a fine line between
action and inactivity. Lt. William Cook, who was only twenty-two years old at the time
and in charge of the reserve platoon in the basement, said of the duty that he felt as if he
was “out on a limb.”2
General Edwin A. Walker was now left solely in charge. General Wheeler had
returned to Washington and Col. Kuhn had departed with his troopers back to Fort
Campbell. Walker remained as the only high-ranking Army officer in the embattled city,
riding roughshod over a reluctant Guard, a panicked school superintendent, and a city
police which obstinately refused to help. To survive, the increasingly unhinged
commander reverted to a combat mentality and showed signs of fraying under the stress.
An officer serving in his headquarters said that “General Walker was absolutely in
charge, it was practically a martial law environment. . . . [I]t was an ugly situation.”3
Walker kept himself under tight rein as well as those in his command.
As impolitic as it may have been to be seen with the commander of federal troops
at Central High, the editor of the Arkansas Gazette, Harry Ashmore, often ate with the
“tall, handsome bachelor” at the Little Rock Club.4 Although they did not discuss the
pertinent issues of the affair at the school, Walker’s behavior reportedly alarmed the
journalist. He passed to Ashmore “extreme right wing” literature which in and of itself,

2. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas, October 5,
2007.
3. Major George R. Smawley, “Shoeshine Boy To Major General: A Summary And
Analysis Of An Oral History Of Major General Hugh R. Overholt, United States Army (Retired)
(1957-1989),” Military Law Review, Vol. 176, June 2003, 320.
4. Harry S. Ashmore, Hearts & Minds: The Anatomy of Racism from Roosevelt to
Reagan, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 285.
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he said, was “a manifestation of the hardened political arteries common in the military.”5
Ashmore was more alarmed by the General’s stories of a conspiracy against since “his
cadet days back in West Point.” The unnamed “they” had fixed him into the position in
the Arkansas backwater.6 The Communists, Walker reportedly told Ashmore, had placed
him in Little Rock specifically to humiliate him by forcing him to supervise the
integration of the South. Ashmore reported Walker’s behavior to the Pentagon, but he
said the Army “knew all about it” and therefore left press issues to public affairs
officers.7 National Guard officers reported that they had their own suspicions about
Walker’s sanity.8 General Taylor himself reportedly spent a few “sleepless nights”
fretting over Walker’s leadership in Little Rock, but ultimately Walker stayed in charge.9
However, Walker chafed under his public affairs handlers. When an unfavorable
press report questioned “the brutality of his troops” and his management of the operation,
one Judge Advocate Corps officer reported that Walker ordered his men to seize the
newspaper and take it under military control. The lower-ranking officer stepped into
Walker’s office and said “You can’t do that, you won’t do that, and if you do, I’ll report

5. Ashmore, Hearts and Minds, 285.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Wachs, 351.
9. John M. Taylor, Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen (New York: Doubleday
Religious Publishing Group, 1989), 213.
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you.”10 In the end, Walker did not commandeer the newspaper and the Army avoided a
public relations disaster.
The Justice Department did little to alleviate the Army’s Little Rock problem. FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover and Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers advised the
president on October 7 that aggressive prosecutions in Little Rock “would tend to solidify
the Faubus forces” and might produce “a bad public reaction.”11 Despite some fifty-six
arrests over the last few months, local or federal agencies did little to prosecute those who
participated in the disturbances. Firm action by law enforcement would have signaled
that the harassment campaign inside the school would not be tolerated, and could have
lent a fair bit of encouragement to the beleaguered black students and to their
increasingly frustrated Army protectors. Perhaps more important, the “law and order”
argument so often presented by the segregationists would have been firmly discredited by
fifty-six arrests and fifty-six prosecutions. Of course, none of that happened. Sympathetic
courts instead presented those arrested as victims, not perpetrators.
The President and his various civilian and military agencies, all seemed to be
frozen. Their strategy through the remainder of the crisis seemed to be to sit tight and
wait it out, do not draw attention, do not move too much. To withdraw meant failure,
while firm action invited criticism. It also created the opportunity for local courts, or
segregationist-friendly federal courts, to rule negatively on the whole Army operation. To

10. Major George R. Smawley, “Shoeshine Boy To Major General: A Summary and
Analysis of an Oral History of Major General Hugh R. Overholt, United States Army (Retired)
(1957-1989),” Military Law Review 176 (June 2003): 320.
11. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 62.
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move was risk. In military parlance, they entrenched, preparing to wait it out.
Figuratively, the Army in Little Rock threw up ramparts and barbed wire.
Nevertheless, the Army kept pressing for fewer troops and less visibility at the
school, pursuant to Eisenhower’s wish that the Army get out of the crisis as quickly as
possible. Army Secretary Wilbur Brucker instructed the Counterintelligence Corps to
provide timelier reporting and ordered daily briefings from the Army’s Director of
Operations, Gen. Pachler.12 In agreements with the school board and the superintendent,
by January the National Guard was relieved of duty at the school at nights, on weekends,
and on holidays.13 The school instead used paid watchmen and off-duty police for those
duties, with one man in each three-man shift being deputized by the city police.14 From
the Army standpoint the use of deputized watchmen was encouraging news, though
Brucker repeatedly rebuffed attempts by Gen. Walker to secure federal marshals, saying
that they were “untrained for this type of work” and that ongoing “federal protection . . .
would not require the local people to stand up and be counted,” which was undoubtedly
reflective of the Justice Department’s reluctance to get involved in the crisis.15
Walker proceeded with his phased reduction plan over the next several months.
Each step removed more troops from the school. On some days in late April there were
no troops present inside the school. The program was intended to slowly place more
responsibility for discipline on school authorities until finally all troops would be
12. Robert W. Coakley, Operation Arkansas (Histories Division, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1967), 199.
13. Memorandum for Record, January 8, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
14. Ibid.
15. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 195.
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stationed at Camp Robinson and the full responsibility for the safety of the nine black
students would fall on the school and, it was hoped, the local police – with the departure
of Marvin Potts, the force was under the leadership of “Big Gene” Smith. The Secretary
of the Army approved these carefully orchestrated reductions in troops “in principle, [but
requested] notification forty-eight hours in advance of each step.”16
While the troop cuts were made, the safety of the black children still had to be
looked after. The daily attacks and indignities upon the black students suffered continued
unabated -- kicking, shoving, tripping, name calling, and so forth from a small number of
“hard core” students. Army files listed the attackers by name and carefully kept a log of
incidents, providing the date and time, and the result of each attack. The timelines
suggest that the Army, through the National Guard personnel, was carefully collecting a
voluminous amount of data on daily incidents inside the school.17 The final report on the
mission, however, revealed that despite “minor incidents” which occurred “almost daily”
soldiers “confined their activities to general surveillance of the situation and assistance to
school authorities where required, leaving the problem of proper disciplinary action in the
hands of teachers and the School Board.”18
One such document detailed events from January 10 through early February. It
included the discovery of a stick of dynamite (without a fuse or detonator) in one school
locker, five “bomb scares” – including two on one day – as well as three separate attacks
on Minnijean Brown by students David Sontag, James Cole, and Richard Boehler, as well
16. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 63.
17. Items of Significant Impact, January 10 through February 4, 1958, Box One, Journal
Four, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
18. Summary of Major Events and Problems, Operation Arkansas, Box One, Journal
Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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as two fires set in wastebaskets, and an attack in which Earnest Green was punched in the
mouth.19 The timeline ended February 6 with Minnijean Brown’s second suspension, and
subsequent expulsion, for calling Frankie Gregg “white trash” and Lester Judkin’s
retaliation against Brown by dumping soup on her.
This same day Terrence Roberts’ mother appeared at the school, terrified, to
check on his welfare. She had received a horrifying prank call in which the caller said he
had been severely injured at school and that his “bones were protruding from [his]
arms.”20 She observed her son through the windows of the classroom. Satisfied that he
was safe and unharmed, she left the school. Roberts did not learn about this incident until
many years later because his mother nobly concealed it from him, shielding him from her
own suffering during the crisis.21
Minnijean Brown’s expulsion from the Little Rock School district on February 12
– an unfair and unwarranted act that could have been avoided had the school officials
acted forcefully against resistant students earlier in the year – caused the Army good deal
of consternation. Though considered by the Army as “the most volatile and troublesome
of the Negro students,” Minnijean Brown’s expulsion raised the possibility of failed
Army mission, of a lost battle of attrition against resistant white students.22 While the
Army felt little could be done about school policy and its disciplinary decisions, Gen.
Walker was especially concerned for the safety of the black students. When student
19. Items of Significant Impact, January 10 through February 4, 1958, Box One, Journal
Four, Operation Arkansas, NARA; Roberts, 114.
20. Ibid.
21. Terrence Roberts, Lessons from Little Rock (Little Rock, AR: Butler Center Books,
2009), 115.
22. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 244.
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Richard Boehler attacked Minnijean Brown on January 29, Guardsmen reported he had
an “unopened jack-knife in his hand.”23 Walker asked the Pentagon to study the
possibility of getting a court injunction against “certain students or a group of students”
which interfered with integration at the school.24 Army lawyers studied the suggestion,
and even approached their Justice Department contacts in Washington to raise the issue,
but ultimately nothing came of it.
Unable to suppress the anti-integration activities at the school, the Army’s
frustration with the mission grew in Little Rock and in the Pentagon. Gen. Pachler, who
had been giving daily briefings to the Secretary of the Army since late November, related
to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor a strongly worded opinion that “action other
than military should be taken to permit removal of the troops” at Little Rock Central
High.25 According to Pachler, “the Army’s mission is the removal of the obstruction to
the court order but [it] has not been charged with a solution to the problem.”26
Nevertheless, he argued that “the continued use of troops in the situation is approaching
the point where they no longer effectively influence the factors that contribute to an
ultimate solution.”27 Pachler asserted that “the Army is incapable of influencing local

23. Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New
York: Simon and Schuster, Jan 9, 2007), 230.
24. Memorandum for Record: Meeting with Gen. Hickman (TJAG), January 30, 1958, ,
Box One, Journal Four, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
25. Memorandum: Little Rock, February 10, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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authorities to accept their proper responsibilities and to take the proper actions.”28
Guardsmen had noted in their reports in late January that Sammie Dean Parker had called
a Guardsmen “nigger” and that Herbert Blount had referred to one of the soldiers as a
“bell hop.”29 No disciplinary action was taken by the school authorities for these
incidents. The white students exploited the limitations of the Army troops.
In a follow-up memorandum, Pachler reported on a personal trip he took to Little
Rock along with Gen. Hickman from the Judge Advocate General corps in order to get a
feel for the situation. While Gen. Walker was the major channel through which
information flowed to the Pentagon, he was by no means able to completely control the
narrative that reached Washington. Gen. Pachler reported that Superintendent Blossom
“agrees, in principle, that the military should strive to get out,” though Blossom’s
concerns, Pachler said, were more in line with those of an educator concerned about the
education, welfare, and the “status as future citizens” of all the children at Central,
including the resistant white students.30 Blossom had explained his frustration with the
Justice Department in a meeting with Gen. Walker on January 29, saying “that the whole
problem was left with school board and the military, that the Justice Department had not
done its part.”31 Blossom revisited that theme with Pachler, who reported that Blossom’s
“one note of optimism” was that he felt “if 4 or 5 ringleaders are expelled and the parents

28. Ibid.
29. Incidents at Central High School, Oct 57 – Jan 58, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
30. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Re: Report of the trip to Little Rock
Arkansas by Brigadier General Pachler,” February 18, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
31. Memorandum: Meeting between Gen. Walker and Mr. Blossom and Mr. Upton,”
January 29, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
310

that are causing these problems could be prosecuted in the courts the entire picture might
be favorably altered.”32 However, in a meeting with Vice Principal J.O. Powell, Gen.
Hickman asked Powell what he thought would happen if the troops were removed from
the school. Powell believed that “the colored students would be goaded to the point
where they would retaliate” and then be expelled from school, or they would be harassed
until the situation was “intolerable and they would withdraw.”33 From Powell’s point of
view, given the options available, the National Guard’s presence at Central High was
essential.
The Army brass had discovered that the school officials and military officers were
equally frustrated by their inability to foster integration without outside assistance. While
hardly a startling revelation, it demonstrated that Walker’s aggressive troop cuts were not
the solution, and in fact could cause further problems for all involved. As Brucker saw it,
the Army must do nothing “which might result in jeopardy of its mission or the
embarrassment of the Administration.”34 The problem was nobody knew exactly what
that might be.
Walker believed that removing troops would force the school and police
authorities to accept responsibility. Others farther up the command chain were not so
sure. By mid-February, after Brown’s expulsion, Gen. Wheeler communicated to Walker
that “Secretary wants to drift for a while . . . the thing they are concerned about is this: If

32. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Re: Report of the trip to Little Rock
Arkansas by Brigadier General Pachler,” February 18, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
33. Ibid.
34. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 248.
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things go along the same line, we might have to take more precautions, not less.”35
Wheeler pointed out that if more black children were expelled, or if they were severely
injured, as Vice Principal Powell suggested was likely, the mission would be just as
endangered as if the children were driven out by constant harassment.
Inside Central High, the segregationist students were elated by Brown’s
expulsion. They began distributing cards around the school which said “One down, eight
to go.”36 Sammie Dean Parker, a leading segregationist student, was caught by a
Guardsman distributing cards on February 17. She was turned over to the principals and
immediately suspended herself. Mrs. Huckaby described the student’s reaction: “She
cried. She sobbed. And then she shouted and bawled. She left the office. In a very few
minutes her father came in. He was fully as angry and almost as noisy as his daughter.”37
After her father threatened to sue the school, with the help of Capital Citizens Council
lawyer Amis Guthridge, the school board extended her three-day suspension to two
weeks, and then after an altercation with Mrs. Huckaby at the superintendent’s office,
expelled her for the year. The school board eventually relented on the expulsion and
allowed Parker back in Central to prevent the case from going to court, an act “which
devastated staff morale” at the school.38
At the same time as these events were unfolding, Daisy Bates and Clarence Laws
of the NAACP accused the Army of ordering its soldiers at Central High to “do nothing”
35. Telcon: Wheeler to Walker, February 19, 1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
36. Coakley, Operation Arkansas, 244.
37. Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, Little Rock, 1957-58 (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 170.
38. Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 240.
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at the school. In the fall Bates had tried to make contact with the Army through Arkansas
National Guard Captain Leon Stumbaugh, who served as the liaison between the
Arkansas Military District Headquarters and the school. (Stumbaugh replaced paratrooper
Capt. William Madden in the role when the airborne left in November.) According to
Stumbaugh, Bates had called him on a few occasions, clearly “attempting to establish a
point of contact, as well as liaison with the military personnel at the school.”39
Stumbaugh stated that while he was courteous, he said he had given her no information,
but instead had referred her to Blossom’s office and Walker’s headquarters.
Bates informed Stumbaugh by telephone on March 10 that she had met with
Congressman Brooks Hays and a high-ranking military officer in the office of the
Secretary of the Army in the Pentagon. She told Stumbaugh that the NAACP was not
pleased with the level of student security. She was especially concerned about two
incidents in which she alleged the Guard had done nothing to protect the students – one
was the attack on Minnijean Brown, and the other a incident in which several boys hurled
rock-filled snowballs at the students.40 According to Stumbaugh, Bates said she was
sympathetic to the Army position, but that more protection was needed and that “the
number of troops . . . was so small that the troops could not be effective.”41
Bates’ visits and accusations set off a full investigation at the Department of the
Army level, which Walker’s headquarters submitted to the Pentagon along with the rules
he had established for handling of disturbances at the very beginning of the Arkansas
39. Memorandum for Record: Telcon from Major Pfeifer to Col Crayton, March 11,
1958, Box One, Journal Four, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
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operation. In both cases Walker’s headquarters contended, and the Army accepted, that
the soldiers at the school had followed orders and that Bates’ accusations were
unsubstantiated. As the report stated, the Guardsmen were “carefully selected, schooled,
and are frequently checked for knowledge and understanding of their orders and are
carefully supervised by Captain Stumbaugh and Sergeant Blackwood.”42 The report
stated unequivocally that:
Consideration has been given to all the facts noted in the information offered by
Mrs. Bates and it is believed that the military personnel at the Central High
School conducted themselves in such a manner as not to interfere with the
exercise of control by the school authorities who were present at the scene of the
two incidents. They were, however, available to assist if and when called to do
so.43
The Army further stated that “it had studiously avoided direct contact with Mrs.
Bates” in Little Rock and recommended that no formal reply be made to her “informal”
statements, and that she be directed to submit information to Blossom through
“established channels.”44 The report did not mention that Bates’ concerns were similar to
those of Army planners, and that Walker shared her same concerns about the safety of the
black students at Central High. While Army intelligence agents had occasionally sought
out and spoken with Mr. L.C. Bates during the crisis, the Army apparently wanted to
avoid contact with Mrs. Daisy Bates, presumably in order to prevent accusations from
segregationists; it would have been very impolitic to be accused of collusion between the
NAACP and the Army.

42. Memorandum for Record, Re: The Seignious-Bates Conversation, March 12, 1958,
Box One, Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
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When Bates did not receive a formal reply, the NAACP made public its
accusations of the Army’s inactivity at Central. Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the
NAACP wrote the Secretary of the Army, saying, in substance “there is no record of
action by military personnel after the withdrawal of the Federal troops, either original or
in the form of assistance to school authorities.”45 The NAACP alleged that Guardsmen
inside the school had done nothing to stop forty-two incidents in eighty school days.46
Wilkins asserted that the troops were “operating under orders to do nothing in the case of
a disturbance except to observe,” and stated perceptively that “if this be the Army's
interpretation, then we are confronted with the incredible spectacle of the government of
the United States placing the burden of enforcing the orders of its courts upon the slender
shoulders and the young hearts of eight teenage Negro students.”47
One could hardly blame Wilkins for his concern, since no one from the NAACP
had been able to make contact with the Army at any time throughout the crisis. They did
not know the orders under which the soldiers at the school were operating. Their public
criticism was an act of desperation in the name of mercy on behalf of the exhausted and
harassed students. Ironically enough, the Army found itself in the same place as the black
students and the NAACP – frustrated and weary. The Army and the black children were
in a symbiotic relationship, they needed each other to survive. The Army would fail its

45. “Troops in Little Rock,” Harrison Times, Tuesday, April 1, 1958, Harrison,
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46. “‘Do Nothing’ Troops at CHS Hit,” Arkansas Democrat, March 22, 1958; Elizabeth
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Huckaby, Crisis in Little Rock, 194.
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mission if it gave up or mishandled the situation at the school; the black students needed
the Army to stay in the school, lest they be driven out.
Secretary Brucker clarified the Army’s position saying to the NAACP: “It must
be understood that the school authorities are directly responsible for the control and
discipline of the students within the school. Accordingly, the troops at the High School
have conducted themselves in such a matter as not to usurp or interfere with the
responsibilities of the school authorities.”48 In practice, the Guard was not protector or
bodyguard, as the black children and their supporters had expected, but as federal
observers on behalf of the Eisenhower administration – and as a last resort, rescuers.
From the Army’s standpoint, if anything, this rationale publicly settled the issue
of why the Guardsmen were doing nothing – or as near to it as possible. While the
Army’s carefully orchestrated reduction of troops and its limited willingness to intervene
eventually had the effect of encouraging the school authorities to do their duty, it also
made the soldiers easy targets for critics who wanted more active protection.
Nevertheless, the policy, at length, proved fruitful. Through the remainder of March and
April, after the school had expelled the worst students (such as David Sontag) and
severely curtailed the activities of Sammie Dean Parker (who was forced to sign a
statement saying she would not participate in any further segregationist activities at
school), the number of incidents declined to the point that Brucker consented to further
troop reductions. The Army’s dedication to keeping a close hand on the Guardsmen and
Walker finally scored success.

48. “Army Defends Role at Central, Set to Continue,” Arkansas Democrat, May 1, 1958.
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The guard force at the school dropped to a mere ten men in late March, though the
number of troops in the Alert Force at Camp Robinson remained near 400. Ever careful
to stay the course on the federal mission, Capt. Stumbaugh and Vice Principal Powell
interviewed Terrence Roberts and Earnest Green on March 28.49 The two boys reported
that they were no longer molested in the halls, even without guards present, and were no
longer physically abused in gym class. Green said he had “no trouble since Minnie
Brown had left school.”50 Asked about the situation of the other black students, the two
boys said they believed the situation was much the same for them and that perhaps three
to five white students were heckling them – the same ones who had been troubling them
since the beginning.51
Segregationist tactics had changed somewhat over the last few months, however.
Vandalism at the school – fires, graffiti, clogging of toilet bowls, and urinating on the
steam pipes to produce awful fumes – were becoming more commonplace. Powell
wondered if the students could not be prosecuted for such vandalism and told the Army
that perhaps some deputized employees could arrest the students.52
One new tactic which concerned the Army was Sammie Dean Parker’s hamhanded flirtations, an attempt to provoke an attack on Earnest Green, or as the Army
reported “an attempt by a white girl student to involve a colored student in certain acts

49. Memorandum for Record: Talk to Colored Students by Mr. Powell and Capt.
Stumbaugh, March 26, 1958. Box One, Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
50. Ibid.
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52. Memorandum for Record, March 20, 1958. Box One, Journal Five, Operation
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against her.”53 These “certain acts,” revealed in an Army telephone log, included details
from intelligence agents about press reports that Parker had wildly accused Green of
being flirtatious with her – rubbing against her in a store, winking at her, and so forth.
Walker and Blossom both felt they were untrue and that Parker was “trying her best to
entice Green.”54 As evidence, Walker noted one incident in which Parker “paraded” in
front of Green’s cafeteria table eight times. Walker was confident that the soldiers at
Central had seen “no evidence . . . or anything else that Green has been out of order in
any way.”55 From the Army stand point, these accusations were simply more strategies
developed to cause controversy at the school. Walker said that “the Parker man was in on
it too, but as soon as he found out the school knew” of the plan that the Parker girl had
“ceased and desisted.”56
This improved picture – given by the students who were perhaps most welladjusted to their environment – encouraged the Army and the school authorities. In early
April the Army approved Walker’s request to further reduce patrols. By the end of April,
some school days found no troops in the school at all. On these days a small number of
troops were stationed at Walker’s headquarters while jeep patrols observed the area
around the school. As one Army historian put it, “on 24 April, precisely seven months
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after the arrival of federal troops, [Walker] removed all troops from the school. The day
passed without any report of trouble.”57
Describing similar circumstances at Central High a month later, Capt. Stumbaugh
reported on May 2 that he had spoken with Earnest Green and Carlotta Walls. In those
conversations, Stumbaugh reported that Green felt that locker damage was the only
“possible, unobserved incidents” of the last few weeks.58 On a more positive note, some
“25 or 30” students had exchanged graduation cards with Green. Carlotta Walls had
experienced no further problems in gym class; her only report was prank calls to her
home after she had been reported on the honor roll at the school.59
This situation, and the approaching end of the school year, induced Ike to begin
the de-federalization of the Arkansas National Guard. He announced in early May that by
the end of the month the Guard would end its long mission at Central High. He offered
something of an olive branch along with a threat, stating that at the end of the month
“state and local officials and citizens will assume their full responsibility” and that “the
faithful execution of this responsibility will make it unnecessary for the Federal
Government to act further to preserve the integrity of our judicial processes.”60
The last phase of the Army operation was to prepare for the graduation of Earnest
Green. Secretary Brucker firmly commanded Walker to ensure that “no hair on the head

57. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 64.
58. “Carlotta Walls, Earnest Green.” Undated letter. Box One, Journal Five, Operation
Arkansas, NARA.
59. Ibid.
60. Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement by the President Concerning the Removal of the
Soldiers Stationed at Little Rock.," May 8, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11376.
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of one Ernest Green be harmed.”61 By this point Walker had approached Little Rock
Police Chief Gene Smith and worked out a situation for the Army to play a background
role, while Smith promised to have ninety men at the exercise.
The Army arrangements at the school were quite thorough. A complex radio net
kept the FBI, police, and Army troops in constant communication.62 Walker made
arrangements for three platoons of Guardsmen to be on standby inside the school
basement and for two platoons to be stationed under the bleachers.63 The Army tried to
maintain a low profile at the request of Chief Smith, so the Guardsmen staged at US
Army Reserve Center, arrived in trucks around 9 PM, and marched through the yards of
nearby houses to arrive under the East bleachers, unnoticed by the spectators in West
stands.64 An Army officer stood by at a telephone in the press box, able to call the forces
from the Central High basement if they were needed; all troops were directly under the
control of Gen. Walker, who was present during the exercise.65 At the same time FBI
agents patrolled the area, inspecting homes for potential snipers.66 Guards stood at the
stadium light switches to keep them from being tampered with, a nod to a concern

61. Memorandum for Record, Telcon Pachler to Walker, May 21, 1958. Box One,
Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
62. Memorandum for Record, Telcon Crayton to Williams, May 27, 1958. Box One,
Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
63. Memorandum for Record, Telcon Pachler to Walker, May 21, 1958. Box One,
Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
64. Memorandum for Record, Telcon Crayton to Williams, May 27, 1958. Box One,
Journal Five, Operation Arkansas, NARA.
65. Ibid.
66. Scheips, The Role of Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 64.
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Brucker specifically mentioned. In all, nearly 250 troops plus over 100 police, FBI, Army
CIC agents, and civilian guards ringed the crowd.
Blossom made the graduation a ticketed event, with each family receiving only
eight tickets. One of the ticker holders in attendance at the ceremony was Martin Luther
King, Jr., who had been the commencement speaker that morning at an all-black college
in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. At the appointed moment Green arrived by taxi with a protective
cordon of police – including Chief Gene Smith, who walked right behind him – and
proceeded unmolested to his place with the other graduates. The police made sure that the
city’s forces for “law and order” seized control of the ceremony at the school that night.67
Some 4,000 people watched as Earnest Green became the first black graduate of Little
Rock Central High school. When Green received his diploma no one made a sound.
Walker’s headquarters, careful to report the accomplishment of the last detail of
their mission, noted Green’s safe arrival at home at “2216 hours, Central Standard
Time.”68 Two days later, on May 29, Walker reported that at 1310 hours “the last man of
the Arkansas National Guard was paid and received his discharge” from federal service.69
The mission was at last completed. The Department of the Army communique to the
Arkansas Military District headquarters stated that “the conduct of the troops throughout
the mission, both of the Regulars and the National Guard in active service, was
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exemplary and conformed to the highest standards of the United States Army.”70 General
Pachler told Walker by phone that he wanted to have “one last talk with you and to tell
you how much I appreciate everything.”71
As Operation Arkansas came to a close, the segregationists in Little Rock
delivered a parting shot. The League of Central High Mothers, the most vocal of the
segregationist groups, threw a “Liberation Day” party on May 29, 1958, in celebration of
the demobilization of the federalized Guard. In their view, Little Rock was no longer
“occupied” by federal troops. The Arkansas Gazette carried the picture: a large cake
decorated for the occasion, with grinning party-goers waving Rebel flags.72
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8.
322

CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
Although segregationists criticized the paratroopers and Guardsmen, Little Rock
moderates commended them. Superintendent Virgil Blossom said, “I have nothing but
praise for the Guardsmen and the manner in which they performed a trying job under
difficult circumstances.”1 Another acknowledgement came from the Arkansas Gazette,
which in May 1958 won two Pulitzer Prizes for its coverage of the crisis. The next month
Harry Ashmore wrote a note of appreciation in an editorial:
Officers and men of the Arkansas National Guard have now completed one of the
most difficult and personally unpleasant tours of duty American military men can
be called upon to perform . . . by and large the Guardsmen carried out their duty
with efficiency and with dignity, even though they were often subjected to abuse
from the members of the White Citizens Councils and their sympathizers . . . The
Guardsmen deserve a salute from every Arkansan.2
Army historian Robert W. Coakley observed Operation Arkansas from the
Pentagon and wrote the official history of the operation as it happened. He reported
twelve years later that “one problem that some anticipated was conspicuous by its
absence. No Guardsman legally obligated to report failed to do so because he opposed the
purpose for which the Guard had been called.”3 Coakley reported that “Officers and men,
dutiful to federal authority, carried out their assigned tasks faithfully however distasteful
they may have been to many of them.”4 Most aptly, Coakley wrote that the mission

1. W.D. McGlasson, “The Forgotten Story of Little Rock,” The National Guardsman,
August 1958, 24.
2. “The Arkansas Guard,” Arkansas Gazette, June 1, 1958, 50
3. Robert W. Coakley, “Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil
Disturbances: The Whiskey Rebellion to Little Rock,” in Bayonets in the Streets, ed. Robin D. S.
Higham, 11-38 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1969), 30.
4. Coakley, “Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil Disturbances,” 30.
323

“forced Guard officers and men to accept the superiority of the federal to the state
obligation, whatever their individual opinion of the issues involved in the struggle.”5
What Coakley did not mention, and perhaps could not have known, was that the
southerners in the 101st Airborne’s 1/327th Airborne Battle Group had been placed in
much the same situation. In fact, there was something of rumor, of which Ike was well
aware, that federal forces might revolt if forced into the integration business. President
Eisenhower even broached “the specter of civil war” during his September 14 meeting
with Orval Faubus.6 At this meeting, the president produced a letter claiming that he
should remove every southern officer from command in the U.S. Army “because they
were going to stage a revolution over [integration].”7 This ugly prophecy proved to be
entirely untrue, but even Ike must have given pause. The president undoubtedly used the
letter to warn Faubus that he was dealing with forces far bigger and potentially more
devastating than his own re-election.
The ability of the Guard to function as ordered at Little Rock had long reaching
ramifications for the civil rights movement. As Coakley argued, Little Rock “set a
modern pattern for federal use of the militia” and established the Guard as not only the
“first line of reserve for war and national emergencies” but also as the “main reserve.”8
Little Rock showed that the Guard did not necessarily belong to the Governor; it had

5. Ibid.
6. David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil
Rights Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 182.
7. Ibid.
8. Coakley, “Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil Disturbances,” 31.
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moved beyond a parochial “rifle club” of undetermined loyalty to become a reliable
modern reserve force, precisely as the planners of NSC 68 intended. This
professionalization was no accident, but a requirement of the Cold War buildup of
reserve forces. It was a watershed moment, given that the Arkansas National Guard was
the only unit in recent military history to “have been on both sides of ‘war’ within a
week.”9
After Little Rock, during deployments in Alabama and Mississippi, the National
Guard again provided essential aid to the civil rights movement. The NAACP said in the
1930s that “it is the fear of lynching and physical violence, which more than anything
else cripples our progress.”10 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Guardsmen prevented attacks
upon the Freedom Riders, and protected James Meredith, the First Baptist Church in
Montgomery, and King’s final march to Selma. While the tireless efforts of black
activists, as well as a host of other legal, social, and economic changes obviously deserve
the primary credit for progress in civil rights, state and federal military forces quelled
riots and protected the activists, and thus were critical to the process.
The rapid deployment of the 101st Airborne was possible only because Cold War
prerogatives had created such a disciplined, integrated unit in the first place. The 101st
was on the way to Little Rock before anyone could react; a slower response might have
resulted in attempts by Faubus to further delay Eisenhower. Political conniving and
treachery might have followed the slow deployment of a land convoy from Texas or
Louisiana. The swift movement of the airborne troops nullified all of those possibilities.
9. Higham, Bayonets in the Streets, 101.
10. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 444.
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Some, however, saw in Eisenhower’s move a real danger. Former Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, who had no love for Eisenhower, wrote to Harry Truman regarding
his misgivings about Eisenhower’s handling of Little Rock, saying “a Little Rock with
Moscow and SAC in place of the paratroopers could blow us all apart.”11 Acheson
believed that Ike acted only out of personal peevishness at Faubus, given the governors’
impudence in refusing to leave the Guard at the school in support of integration. There
seems to be no evidence for this interpretation. The use of federal troops in the Little
Rock operation was sufficient to protect the Little Rock Nine and ensure the rights of
African American, even in the face of recalcitrant Southern governors and politicians.
Eisenhower has been criticized for never having made an impassioned plea on
behalf of the Brown decision. Of course, neither did Kennedy or Johnson.12 His tendency
was to lean on his military background to “make his presidency look bland and boring.”13
But by using first the disciplined troopers of the 101st, followed by a slow transfer over
to the Guardsmen, he served the needs of justice. Ike said of his decision to send the
troops to Little Rock that it was “the hardest decision I had had to make since D-Day.”14
In 1957, that was a good place to begin. As Jean Smith wrote, “it is thanks to Eisenhower
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that integration proceeded and the rule of law prevailed.”15 However, as a recent
biographer noted, he “sometimes overlooked a fundamental truth about his job: in matters
of national conscience as well as in moments of national crisis, the president’s words do
matter.”16
The president’s decision was carefully calculated. Army records from the
operation indicate that from the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army down to the
lowliest private standing a post inside Little Rock Central High school, everyone
understood the importance of the mission and did their best to make sure the mission was
accomplished – both in protecting the black students, but also in establishing federal
authority for other integration crises. The proper method was a matter of debate; General
Walker wanted an aggressive reduction of troops, but he was continually monitored by
Army brass in Washington. The carefully calculated reductions, while protested fiercely
by the black activists, actually did as Ike and Brownell anticipated – they pressured the
local authorities into taking responsibility for the safety of the black students and they
avoided using local courts, which were unfriendly to the whole process.
This was an important and essential victory in this first serious confrontation
between the federal government and the South over integration. When it became apparent
that integration could work, the segregationists in Arkansas changed tactics and sought to
close the schools instead. The next school year, the hardliners managed to pass laws that
closed the schools and attempted to sell them off as private ventures. This strategy was an
overreach, and in 1959 the schools were re-opened with integration slowly proceeding.
15. Ibid., 729.
16. Evan Thomas, Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 244.
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The black children paid the price for this slow-going process, for they were
subjected to constant abuse and harassment. Army policy was not the sole reason – as the
children themselves noted. From the first days in the school, even when flanked by
hardened paratroopers, the black students endured segregationist abuse. Harassment
intensified because school authorities evaded their responsibility until the subtle threat of
a complete Army reduction forced them to expel the racist ringleaders. In this regard, the
strategy of phased reductions worked surprisingly well.
There was certainly mutual suspicion and distrust between the Guardsmen and the
Little Rock Nine and the NAACP, resulting in a prickly relationship. In addition, there
was considerable friction between school and the Army officials over the integration
mission and its conduct. For their part, the Guardsmen seemed to generally follow orders
and perform the mission, despite having little personal sympathy for its goals or the
plight of the black children. Given the military structure of the mission, and the context
of the Cold War, as well as their role in the South as community protectors, the
Guardsmen would have gained little by acting against lawful orders. They voiced
complaints to superiors, and perhaps even sympathized with the white children in Central
more than their black charges, but it was professionally and personally in their best
interest to perform the duty, even if they found it distatestful.
In this regard, Ike and the Army’s focus on color blind language – on “the
mission” and the support of “presidential orders,” on “the orders of the court,” and on the
country as a “law-abiding nation,” contributed to an environment in which unit identity,
professionalism, military bearing, and obedience were enhanced. It could serve,
furthermore, to somewhat mute the soldiers’ regional identity and personal feelings about
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integration. Army orders, information packets, and administration speeches and
comments to the press never broached the subject of social justice. The mission was
strictly constructed as one necessary to observe legal requirements.
In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington maintained that soldiers should
be subservient to civil authorities, and that this was the key to a functioning democracy.17
The focus was purely on the soldiers’ duty as “autonomous” military men planning and
executing their mission in subordination to the goals determined by their community and
nation. Trusted with the means of massive retaliation and mutual annihilation, the Cold
War construction of soldierly manhood demanded obedience above all. Men who were
“hard” on communism were disciplined and tough; “soft” men did not follow orders, did
not accept “tough missions.”18
The Guardsmen saw themselves as protectors of their Southern community, and
as American soldiers serving in the Cold War, and they retained a personal sense of
accomplishment and professionalism. The very act of performing the unpopular mission
was a profound statement of manhood in an era when a heightened sense of patriotism
and respect for military service was commonplace. The strong anti-communist and promilitary rhetoric in the South actually served to delegitimize violent segregationists.
This sort of masculine discourse was perhaps most apparent during the Ole Miss
riots, when rabid segregationists from all over Mississippi clashed with their own
Mississippi National Guardsmen and U.S. Army troops. In a widely quoted conversation

17. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
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between a soldier and a segregationist student at the University of Mississippi shortly
after the Battle of Oxford in 1962, a soldier said, “I’m just doing my duty. It must take a
lot of courage on your part to insult a man wearing the uniform of your country.”19
Even the vaunted symbol of massive resistance itself was part of this contested
battlefield. During the rioting at Oxford, U.S. Army officer and native of Albany,
Georgia, ordered his men to take a Confederate flag from a couple of Ole Miss college
students. He explained that because of the rioting on the campus, “I didn’t think those
rioters were using the Confederate flag in a way Robert E. Lee would approve of. They
would not have made Robert E. Lee proud.”20 This Army officer contested the “misuse”
of the Confederate flag. A Guardsman from Oxford, Mississippi, who had been subjected
to sniper fire, rocks, bottles, and other attacks for hours on the Ole Miss campus took a
Confederate flag from rioters “and stomped it into the ground.”21 These incidents did not
reflect a rejection of southern identity by the soldiers so much as an argument with the
rioters over the acceptable public expression of it.
In Alabama, the Anniston Star honored the Guard with this acclaim in 1962 in the
wake of the Freedom Rides saying “The Alabama National Guard [is] deserving of . . .
confidence and support . . . for as the Alabama National Guard grows, so goes
Alabama.”22 Here the writer was drawing support for the Guard by associating its

19. “Mississippians Taunt Troops,” United Press International, October 30, 1962.
20. William Doyle, An American Insurrection: James Meredith and the Battle of Oxford,
Mississippi, 1962 (Harpswell, ME: Anchor Publishing, 2003), 254.
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success, both in completing assigned missions, and through community support, in
recruiting, with the state itself.
The paper also defended Alabama National Guard General Henry V. Graham, the
commander of troops during all of the major civil rights missions in Alabama, who had
faced down his own governor and even planned with his Special Forces-trained
Guardsmen to subdue Gov. Wallace if necessary. In 1965, The Anniston Star wrote:
Henry Graham is no less a devoted son of his state than any other Alabamian of
public or private status and undoubtedly he has his own strong opinions on
current topics. Personal feelings, however, whatsoever they are, are not reflected
in his conduct as an officer and a leader. Assigned his duties, Graham carries
them out in a manner that reflects credit not only on him but on Alabama.23
Graham was admired for his dispassionate and steady devotion to duty, in contrast
to W.J. Cash’s depiction of Southerners as irrational and emotional. Stoicism is a
hallowed attribute of military manhood, and all the more appealing to Southerners who as
a people had felt the cultural weight of defeat, and in the words of Bertram Wyatt-Brown,
possessed a sense of “honor-bound fatalism.”24
Mississippi Guardsmen were equally praised for their efforts at protecting James
Meredith. The Delta-Democrat Times’ moderate editor Hodding Carter wrote:
Two times in less than, a month National Guardsmen from Greenville and
surrounding towns have been called out. Both times they have met the call
honorably. Both times they have performed their duty to the utmost of their
ability. They deserve the thanks of fellow Mississippians. The first call up was
not a pleasant one for the Guardsmen. Their personal convictions in many
instances ran counter to the task they might have been, and some cases were,
called upon to perform. For their efforts they were subjected to abuse and
slander which was unfair and unwarranted.25
23. “Graham Does His Duty,” Anniston Star, April 3, 1965.
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York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 29.
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In the eyes of the most vocal, visible, and violent Southern demagogues, the white
Southern Guardsman who enforced integration was unmanly, submissive, and traitorous
to his Southern homeland. Judge Tom P. Brady claimed that “No true, loyal, Southern
man will ever agree to [integration] or permit it. It shall not be!”26 Governor Ross Barnett
directly challenged those participating in federal civil rights activities, saying “Physical
courage is a trait sadly lacking in altogether too many of the South’s so-called leaders ...
we must separate the men from the boys. We must identify the traitors in our midst. We
must eliminate the cowards from the front lines.”27 In the “hard” and “soft” discourse on
Cold War masculinity, Barnett and Brady associated integration with feminization, and
segregationists routinely associated integration and “race mixing” with communism.
While their actions elicited rage among extremists, this anger was not generally
transferred to individual soldiers. Paradoxically, “military duty” was an exception to the
segregationist plank, which further weakened it. One of the only recorded attacks on
Guardsmen during integration missions occurred when two soldiers were attacked while
on their way to training in their civilian vehicle.28 In 1956, two Tennessee Guardsmen
were “attacked en route to routine drill at Dayton, [Tennessee]” during the “guard's
occupation of mob-rocked Clinton, Tennessee.” Five men forced the car over and
inquired of the men, “Are you on your way to Clinton?” to which the Guardsmen
responded, “No, were on the way to drill.” When the men asked if they “would you go to
26. Steve Estes, “A Question of Honor: Masculinity and Massive Resistance to
Integration,” in White Masculinity in the Recent South, ed. Trent Watts, (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 115.
27. Ibid.
28. “Two Guards Slashed By 5 Men,” Kingsport News, September 4, 1956.
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Clinton if they ordered you to?,” the Guardsmen said “Yes.” They were then attacked by
the knife-wielding group; one Guardsman was cut on the face. Governor Frank Clement
immediately announced a “$5,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the attackers.”29
This attack demonstrated the fundamental obstacle which segregationists faced
when dealing with the Guardsmen, or for that matter, federal troops. If extremists
attacked the law-and-order types within southern society, they could never claim the
moral high ground. The soldiers’ military credentials and identity as “local boys”
mollified the more violent segregationists, who were unwilling to fire on their fellow
southerners. Ironically, this made the white privilege of the Guard a vehicle the goals of
black activists.
In Little Rock, the Guardsmen claimed a grander accomplishment than the
integration of nine black students into a single white school. For many of them, their
actions ushered in a sweeping change for the better for the South, and not solely for
African-Americans. William Cook, reflecting on the crisis, said “there was so many
people . . . that hadn’t really made up their mind [about integration]. They didn’t too
much like it, but they knew it was time to do something, that segregation was wrong, and
they knew it needed to be changed.”30 Cook said he and his men helped make that change
possible.
Roger Vaughan said that initially he had not put much thought into the integration
issue, that he had not decided whether he was “for [integration] or against it.” Later, as he
29. “Two Guards Slashed By 5 Men,” Kingsport News.
30. William Cook, interview by author, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas, October 5,
2007.
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witnessed the hostility and harassment directed at the Little Rock Nine, he said, “After I
saw what they were going through, I felt sorry for them.”31 He said, “I was proud of them
for what they were able to accomplish.”32
Eulan Simpson lived in Little Rock in 1957, and as a Guardsman walked patrols
around Central High School during the crisis. Reflecting on his feelings at the time, he
said that “when all this was going on, a black person, if they were traveling, had a hard
time getting something to eat, because the whites wouldn’t serve them. Regardless of
what you think about integration, this is not right.” Simpson said, “Central made people
realize the way things were, and it was not the way it should be . . . you know
[segregation] was the way we had grown up . . . I think [integration] needed to happen.”33
The soldiers that served at Little Rock Central High, both Airborne and Guard,
were men of their time and place. Many of them either had strong feelings against
integration or had given little thought to the idea of racial justice. Virtually all of them,
however, were committed to performing their duty. This duty, they seemed assured,
would support the correct end. These were run-of-the-mill Southern men in their racial
outlooks, but disciplined to follow military orders and performing them in blind faith that
by doing so they were supporting the right cause. If Jim Johnson and the Capital Citizens
Council opposed them and the segregationist white students at Central High abused them,
this could only have highlighted the rightness of that course, even if they did not
personally support that end.
31. Roger Vaughan, interview by author, taped interview, Searcy, Arkansas, September
28, 2007.
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That was the triumph of the U.S. Army in 1957 – not that its soldiers were all in
personal agreement with their mission, or that they were sympathetic to the black
children they were assigned to protect, but rather that they performed as ordered. No
unanimity on the mission existed among black and white soldiers assigned to any
integrated unit, nor did it exist broadly among the civilian population of America in 1957.
Therefore, it could not exist among the military men assigned to Little Rock. But that
they believed in lawful orders, the rule of law, and the idea of justice even when they
could not make personal sense of it. Military ethicists have noted that “without private
virtue . . . there is little prospect of public virtue.”34 Operation Arkansas required
uniformed white southerners to rise publicly to their private virtues in ways that white
civilians could not. Southern men in uniform, whether Guard or Army, protected by their
military identity, marshaled their private virtues in service of a public virtue.
The profession of arms has always been one in which participants agreed first and
foremost to sacrifice for others. The basic bargain is to sweat and bleed and suffer
personally in order to achieve a corporate success, to stand sentry in the cold and rain and
snow while others sleep in safety. To be disciplined is to accept ones duty, a discipline
which “makes a sentry, whose whole body is tortured for sleep, rest his chin on the point
of his bayonet because he knows, if he nods, he risks the lives of the men sleeping behind
him.”35 This discipline compels the soldier to conduct hopeless attacks while realizing
that ultimately the result might bring his cause victory and peace. The soldier agrees to
trade his life for others – firstly for that of his comrades, but also his family, his
34. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kansas, 1995), 145.
35. Ibid., 121.
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hometown, his nation, and even its ideals and abstractions. For many of the military men
which served at Little Rock there was a sense of personal sacrifice and loss, a smear on
his honor and suppressed deep below the surface most of their adult lives.
Capt. William A. Madden, mortar battery commander of the 1/327th, ensured his
paratroopers fiercely protected the Nine inside the school. As commander of “the interior
guard, [he] sought to make himself and his subordinates useful to parents and teachers
through numerous small acts of kindness.”36 When the 101st reentered the school on
October 3, after the failed Guard take over the previous day, Madden approached the high
school office staff with a smile and said, “I want my re-admittance slip.”37
As a fellow southerner, Madden was well-liked by the teachers and respected by
the high school students. When the 101st departed they gave Madden a door decoration
from Central High’s football “Color Week” celebration as a memento. The decoration
depicted tiny airplanes dropping paratroopers onto the Central High Tiger’s football foes.
The teachers sent him off with “coffee and doughnuts” in the teacher conference room,
and gave him two “toy stuffed tigers” for his sons; Huckaby estimated half the faculty
came by that morning to say goodbye to this kind, helpful, and professional young Army
officer.38
Madden was born in 1928, and hailed from Cheraw, in Chesterfield County,
South Carolina; the rural farm county had a population of 35,000, including some 13,000
blacks. Madden played football and basketball in a segregated high school for the Cheraw
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Braves, and later attended segregated Presbyterian College in Clinton, South Carolina,
earning a Bachelor of Science degree in 1948.39 In 1950, he joined the South Carolina
National Guard and then headed off to fight in Korea. In 1953 he joined the Army and
had a long career: after Little Rock he led an artillery battalion in Vietnam, earned a
Silver Star and two Distinguished Flying Crosses, and taught at the Army War College
and Army Command and Staff College. He eventually made the rank of colonel, before
retiring as Director of Army Material Test and Evaluation at White Sands Missile Range,
New Mexico in 1979.
Yet, Madden considered Little Rock an unremarkable event in his career. The
father of six never revealed his role at Little Rock to his children. One of his sons
considered him “something of a racist,” based on his use of racial epithets, and was
shocked to learn his father had such a prominent hand in the Little Rock mission.40
Madden’s obituary mentioned many of his career accomplishments – but it did not
mention Little Rock.41
Earnest Green, reflecting on his Little Rock experience, said that “The colonel
[sic] in charge of the detail escorting us to school was from South Carolina. And that
seemed, from what I knew about southerners, so incongruous – that this guy with this
deep southern accent was going to provide us with our protection.”42 Capt. Madden and

39. Obituary: William R. Madden Jr., Cheraw Chronicle, Cheraw, South Carolina, March
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40. Scott Madden, interview by author, telephone interview, Searcy, Arkansas, July,
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his troopers, many of them southerners, did their best to provide that protection, and by
all accounts did an impeccable job. Nevertheless, Madden never spoke of it.
Another southerner who served Little Rock was also shamed by his duty there –
General Edwin A. Walker, the commander of the operation. After leaving Arkansas in
late 1958, Walker assumed command of an infantry division in Germany, but when his
hard right anti-communist “Pro-Blue” indoctrination sessions went public he was soon
forced to resign.43 He later said he “was on the wrong side” at Little Rock.44
Walker aligned himself with various extreme right wing groups and eventually
found himself in 1962 rallying the student protesters at the Battle of Ole Miss, saying to
the students, “We are at war. Man your weapons and attack.”45 Army forces there
identified him and arrested him for encouraging the riot. He was held by federal
authorities for weeks while his mental state was evaluated, but eventually the charges
against him were dropped.46 Years later, Walker claimed he had given his resignation to
Eisenhower rather than command Operation Arkansas, but it had been refused.47
While Walker’s reversal was the most colorful and dramatic of the Little Rock
participants, many Guardsmen and paratroopers never discussed their role at Little Rock.
For most Guardsmen, there was no need. Their communities were well aware of their

43. Clive Webb, Rabble Rousers: The American Far Right in the Civil Rights Era
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, May 15, 2010), 141.
44. Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative
Counterrevolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 79.
45. Webb, Rabble Rousers, 141.
46. Ibid., 141.
47. Steven E Atkins, Encyclopedia of Right-Wing Extremism in Modern American
History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2011), 186.
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mission, and while they generally supported them individually, they also criticized their
deployment at the school. As one Arkansas newspaper editor wrote when discussing the
need for Guardsmen to be released from duty at the school, “why on earth didn’t [the
Army] just leave the federal troops . . . and send the badly needed guardsmen [sic] back
to their families and jobs.”48 The same editor also wrote, “the guard [sic] members were
deprived of their liberties which they enjoyed as citizen-soldiers by being forced to
remain on duty to protect a situation which was shown no need whatever for them since
their arrival.”49 The mission was humiliating to both the soldiers and the community and
largely went unmentioned thereafter.
As Karen Anderson has argued, middle-class southern values considered overt
racism to be taboo; by the 1950s, polite southern society did not tolerate “visible
manifestations of racial hatred.”50 Thus the soldiers could not display their loathing. To
do so would have brought not only possible military retribution, and accusations of
unprofessionalism or disloyalty, but it also would have been considered unseemly to the
same middle-class Arkansans who despised the actions of the White Citizens Council but
then voted for Faubus. This was the paradox of the southern whites in uniform. They had
to perform a shameful task in order to acquire honor.
And yet, looking back, many of those soldiers saw their military service in the
civil rights missions as essential to the progress of the South. Edwin Waddell was a
Guardsman in Magnolia, Arkansas. He said integration at Central High and elsewhere
48. “Good . . . but Bad . . .” Searcy Daily Citizen, November 20, 1957, 6.
49. “Historic Guarantees of America,” Searcy Daily Citizen, November 15, 1957, 4.
50. Karen Anderson, Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 3.
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was “something that needed to be done many years [before] . . . as you look around,
anybody with one eye and half sense can see the great progress that has been made in the
integration of races.” He said, “The Guard’s role was to make sure that [progress]
happened. And it happened, and it was good.”51

51. Edwin Waddell, interview by Arkansas National Guard Historical Branch, taped
interview, October 10, 2006.
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